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Abstract 
While agriculture remains a key economic activity in Africa, employing about 55% of the 
population, only approximately 1% of bank lending goes to the agricultural sector. This 
phenomenological case study explored the financing of small- and medium-scale farmers in 
Namibia. Farmers on the demand side and financial institutions on the supply side 
constituted the population from which the researcher drew the study sample. Multiple 
methods of data collection were used, including conducting interviews, secondary data and 
document analysis. The results of the study were compiled into four different but 
thematically connected research essays.  
The first essay investigates the constraints to financing agriculture in Namibia from the 
perspectives of small- and medium-scale farmers and the Agricultural Bank of Namibia 
(Agribank). The findings on the supply side (Agribank) reveal constraints such as a lack of 
collateral and poor loan recovery from farmers while on the demand side, insufficient 
capital, bureaucracy and a lack of collateral are among some of the constraints preventing 
farmers from successfully financing their agricultural activities. Finance is found to be a 
binding constraint.  
The second essay identifies financing options for agricultural SMEs (apart from Agribank). 
The essay indicates that only about 33% of formal financial institutions are providing 
finance to agricultural SMEs, with lack of expertise and perception of risk in financing 
agriculture cited as top reasons why formal financial institutions find it hard to provide 
finance to agricultural SMEs. On the demand side, the majority of non- Green Scheme 
farmers indicated that they were unaware of financing options in the country while those in 
Green Scheme projects pointed to Agribank as the only bank that they knew.  
The third essay assesses the agricultural SME finance gap. The estimated agricultural finance 
gap stands at N$63 520 512, with demand more than supply. On the demand side, problems 
causing the finance gap within Green Scheme farming projects include loan default and thus 
denial of further loans and lack of financial institutions in the country. On the supply side, 
loan default and dishonesty by farmers limit Agribank’s supply of loans, especially to small-
scale communal farmers. 
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The fourth essay asks what we can learn from successful nations in agricultural finance, such 
as Brazil and Indonesia, as compared to Namibia, given the above findings. The findings 
show that Agribank-supported Green Scheme projects in Namibia mark government’s effort 
in promoting agricultural productivity and access to finance by small- and medium-scale 
farmers. However, Namibia lacks agricultural financing expertise and farmers have poor 
access to markets, making it difficult to improve their farming practices. Brazil has adopted 
structured demand to promote access to markets and flexible repayment terms matched to 
production cycles. Indonesia addresses market failure in the agricultural industry through 
investing heavily in irrigation and improved provision of formal sector credit.  
As compared to previous studies, this study contributes to the body of knowledge relating to 
SMEs in the agricultural sector by focusing on the financial aspect both from the supply and 
the demand side using primary data. 
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Opsomming 
Hoewel landbou een van die vernaamste ekonomiese aktiwiteite in Afrika is en sowat 55% 
van die bevolking van werk voorsien, word slegs ongeveer 1% van banklenings aan die 
landbousektor toegestaan. Dié fenomenologiese gevallestudie ondersoek die finansiering van 
klein- en middelskaalboere in Namibië. Boere van verskeie persele aan die vraagkant en 
finansiële instellings op die aanbodkant saamgestel die populasie waaruit die navorser het 
die studie monster. Veelvuldige metodes van data-insameling gebruik, insluitend 
onderhoude , sekondêre data en dokument analise. Die studieresultate word in vier 
verskillende dog tematies verbandhoudende navorsingsopstelle aangebied.  
Die eerste opstel ondersoek die beperkings op die finansiering van landbou in Namibië uit 
die onderskeie oogpunte van klein- en middelskaalboere en die Landboubank van Namibië 
(Agribank). Die bevindinge aan die aanbodkant (Agribank) dui op beperkings soos ’n gebrek 
aan aanvullende sekuriteit en swak terugbetaling deur boere; aan die vraagkant verhinder 
onvoldoende kapitaal, burokrasie en ’n gebrek aan aanvullende sekuriteit dat boere hulle 
landboubedrywighede suksesvol finansier. Finansiering blyk ’n bindende beperking te wees,  
Die tweede opstel bepaal die ander beskikbare finansieringsmoontlikhede (benewens 
Agribank). Die studie toon dat slegs ongeveer 33% van formele finansiële instellings 
finansiering aan KMO’s op landbougebied voorsien. Die hoofredes waarom formele 
finansiële instellings dit moeilik vind om hierdie KMO’s te finansier, is oënskynlik ’n gebrek 
aan kundigheid en die algemene oortuiging dat landboufinansiering riskant is. Aan die 
vraagkant is nie-kontrakboere merendeels onbewus van finansieringsmoontlikhede in die 
land, terwyl dié wat kontrakboerdery in groenskemas beoefen slegs van Agribank weet.  
Die derde opstel assesseer die landbou se klein en medium ondernemings se finansiele 
gaping. Die beraamde landbou finansiele gaping staan op N$63 520 512, met vraag meer as 
aanbod. Op die vraag kant, word probleme veroorsaak deur the finansiele gaping  binne die 
groenskemaprojek wat insluit wanbetaling van lenings en daarom die afkeer van addisionele 
lenings en gebrek aan finansiele instansies in die land. Op die aanbod kant, lenings 
wanbetaling en oneerlikheid by die boere beperk die Agribank se toekenning van lenings, 
veral vir die klein-skaal gemeenskaps boere. 
Laastens ondersoek die vierde opstel wat ons op grond van bogenoemde bevindinge kan leer 
uit ’n vergelyking tussen Namibië en suksesvolle landbounasies soos Brasilië en Indonesië. 
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Daar word bevind dat die groenskemaprojek wat deur die Agribank van Namibië ondersteun 
word, ’n teken is van die regering se pogings om landbouproduktiwiteit en toegang tot 
finansiering vir klein- en middelskaalboere te bevorder. Tog kom Namibië 
landboufinansieringskundigheid kort, sowel as beter toegang tot markte sodat boere hulle 
landboupraktyke kan verbeter. Brasilië volg byvoorbeeld ’n strategie van gestruktureerde 
finansiering om marktoegang te bevorder, sowel as buigsame terugbetalingsvoorwaardes in 
pas met produksiesiklusse. Op sy beurt gebruik Indonesië grootskaalse belegging in 
besproeiing sowel as verbeterde kredietvoorsiening deur die formele sektor om markgebrek 
in die landboubedryf teë te werk.  
In vergelyking met voerige studies, dra die studie by tot the liggaam van kennis in verband 
met die klein en medium ondernemings in die lanbou sektor deur te fokus op die finansiele 
aspek van beide die aandbod en die vraag kant deur primere data te gebruik.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play a very important role in most economies, 
particularly in developing countries, including Namibia. Some of the advantages for SMEs 
are the encouragement of entrepreneurship and the likelihood that SMEs will utilise labour-
intensive technologies and thus create employment, amongst others (Cook, 2000). Despite the 
noted advantages of SMEs to the economy of a country, there are restrictions to SME’s 
progress. These include access to markets, finance, technology and training. However, access 
to finance is considered the greatest constraint, in both the formal and informal sectors 
(Mbonyane & Ladzani, 2011; Tonin, Dieci, Ricoveri, Foresi & Hansohm, 1998). SMEs exist 
in many different sectors of the economy, one of them being the agricultural sector. 
Agriculture, either commercial or subsistence, forms the backbone of most economies. 
Agricultural SME finance is defined as “financial services available for small and medium 
enterprises who are involved in agricultural production (i.e., farming) and production-related 
activities” (International Finance Corporation [IFC], 2011:13).  
The issue of lack access to finance for SMEs has been observed in Namibia. The government 
of the Republic of Namibia therefore created a number of institutions in an attempt to 
increase access to finance for SMEs in general and those that are sector specific to respond to 
the plight of the poor. According to Nakusera, Kadhikwa and Mushendami (2008), 
operational inefficiencies characterise most of the development finance institutions (DFIs) in 
Namibia. Financial Institutions that are still operational to date include the Development 
Bank of Namibia (DBN), the Agricultural Bank of Namibia (Agribank), the National 
Housing Enterprise and the Small Business Credit Guarantee Trust, now called the SME 
Bank. Apart from the other financial institutions mentioned above, Agribank is the only bank 
that was established in Namibia to focus on providing finance to agricultural SMEs. This 
research focused mainly on Agribank, but other relevant stakeholders such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development and commercial banks were also used to provide 
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needed information for the objectives of the study. Agribank, established in 1907, was 
formerly known as the Deutsch-Sudwestafrikanischer Farmerbund. In April 1922, the Land 
and Agricultural Bank of South West Africa was established. The Agricultural Bank of 
Namibia Act No. 5 of 2003 as amended was made widely known in order to expand the scope 
of business, to capitalise on opportunities in the market and to transform the institution into a 
more versatile and responsive one for all stakeholders. This was done in order to meet the 
demands of the ever-changing business environment (Agribank, 2014). 
SME financing comprises of the demand and the supply-side. On the demand side, there is 
argument that  (Tonin et al., 1998; Yaron, 2004) a number of SMEs are not well refined 
financially to participate in the formal financial sector or cannot afford market interest rates 
and therefore require credit subsidies. On the supply side, there is argument  (Adongo & 
Stork, 2006; Mu, 2002; Vos, Yeh, Carter & Tagg, 2007)  that the provision of funding that 
will result in a profit is not possible due to a number of reasons such as high transaction costs 
and institutional risks as a result of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, 
the inability of the SME owner to generate sufficient volume of business to attract formal 
financial institutions and sparsely distributed populations or inadequate enabling 
infrastructure in rural areas. The above arguments are some of the reasons why this study was 
carried out to explore financing decisions between borrowers and lenders.  
In 2013, Namibia did not receive much rainfall in most parts of the country and therefore the 
country was hit by drought. Most people in the country who depended on agricultural food 
products experienced starvation because agricultural SMEs could not produce food for 
consumption, and as a result the health of the economy suffered.  
The health of the economy as a whole has a strong relationship with the health and 
nature of small enterprise sector. When the state of the macro economy is less 
favourable, by contrast, ... employment expansion in SMEs are limited (Mead, 1998, 
as cited by Bowen, Makarius & Mureithi, 2009:17).  
Given this scenario, an understanding of access to finance for agricultural SMEs is relevant 
for the development of SMEs and for the growth of the economy as a whole. Agriculture is 
the main economic activity and provides food for the majority of people in most low- and 
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middle-income countries (IFC, 2011; 2014). However, the daunting environmental 
limitations such as the lack of rainfall and long-term drought coupled with the perennial lack 
of access to finance in countries such as Namibia have hindered agricultural productivity and 
affected employment, especially in the rural areas (Frøystad, Hoffman & Schade, 2008; IFC, 
2011; Schmokel, 1985). The lack of access to finance has been aggravated by numerous 
factors, including a lack of political will for rural development, weak institutional capacities 
in ministries of agriculture and perceived risk of agricultural projects. Because of this, 
funding for agricultural projects has fallen by half from a peak in 1970 to as low as 8% of 
total bank lending in 2000–2001 (Csaki, 2001). 
As with many developing countries, very limited research and scholarly studies about the 
agricultural SME sector in Namibia are available. Given the importance of agricultural SMEs 
to the Namibian economy, a need was identified to conduct an empirical enquiry to 
understand the issue of access to finance for agricultural SMEs in Namibia and to determine 
how financial providers assisted these SMEs.  
The term ‘agricultural SMEs’ was used broadly in this research to include those engaged in 
primary crop production. Those engaged in primary production could include individual 
farmers or farmer-based organisations and cooperatives. The study did not cover other rural 
SMEs although their significance to the economy is well recognised.   
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In order to shift from subsistence to commercial agricultural production, access to finance is 
critical. Access to finance will enable the growth of the agricultural sector (The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015). Agriculture is a very important sector which 
not only plays a major role in poverty reduction and food security but also the creation of 
employment (International Finance Corporation 2011:32). However, the challenge in 
Namibia lies in working as a small-holder farmer (Ministry of Agriculture, Water and 
Forestry [MAWF], 2008). Agriculture in Namibia is practised on farms where a system of 
freehold land tenure prevails. Land tenure is the condition on which land is held, utilised and 
transacted (Adams, Sibanda & Turner, 1999). In the case of arable farming, farmers operating 
on a certain parcel of land may use it as they see fit, but it is usually precluded from being 
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used as collateral. Moreover, lending policies are not designed to fit specific target groups; 
for example, terms of payment, duration and security.  This has resulted in the difficulty of 
providing finance more especially for those engaged in small-scale agriculture (Ofei, 2001, 
cited by Samuel, Ernest & Awuah, 2012).  
 
It is acknowledged that it is a challenge to develop SMEs in developing countries (Hussain, 
Zeeshan & Akhtar, 2012). Both in industrialised and non-industrialised countries, SMEs have 
been found to have less access to external finance and therefore struggle in their operation 
and growth. Research shows that finance from family and friends plays a more important role 
in developing countries as compared to developed countries (Beck & Demirguç-Kunt, 2006). 
For different reasons, ranging from a lack of collateral to bias against SMEs, SMEs tend to 
face greater financial constraints than do larger firms (Hussain et al., 2012). 
 
Previous studies have demonstrated that neither commercial banks nor the emerging 
microfinance industry are keen to sufficiently meet the financial needs along agricultural 
value chains, leaving agricultural SMEs unserved in the so-called ‘missing middle’. A basic 
problem behind certain government interventions is that politicians come up with quick fixes 
for social problems such as rural poverty and reduction of unemployment by, for example, 
offering short-term job creation. However, these quick fixes are temporary and therefore the 
provision of sustainable financial services for agriculture has proven to be difficult (IFC, 
2011). 
 
The provision of finance for people engaged in small-scale agriculture in Namibia has proven 
to be a challenge because small-scale farmers have no secure tenure rights to land and 
without such collateral, they have difficulty in obtaining credit and other resources from 
financial institutions for the purpose of production (Werner, 2004). Previous studies in the 
area of agricultural finance have leaned towards the use of secondary data or review of 
literature (Adongo & Deen-Swarray, 2006; Adongo & Stork, 2006), adopted purely 
quantitative methodology approaches (Abor & Biekpe, 2006; Adongo & Deen-Swarray, 
2006; Diagne & Zeller 2001) or  focused on the entire SME sector but excluded agricultural 
SMEs (Tonin, 1998).  
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However, documents used in secondary data may be biased, since they represent the 
view of their authors. Furthermore, some documents are not complete or up to date. 
The problem with the quantitative methodology is that it restricts the options of the 
research process, inhibits the initiative and motivation of the researcher, limits the 
effectiveness of research, and produces artificial data that do not reflect the reality as 
a whole (Sarantakos, 2005:35). 
This study employed a qualitative methodology approach using primary data to understand 
issues from the view of the subjects and provide some insights on how to unlock agricultural 
finance in Namibia specifically for small and medium-scale farmers. This was done by 
identifying the financial constraints for small and medium-scale farmers; examine financial 
support offered to farmers and reasons against financing agriculture, determine the magnitude 
of the SME finance gap and finally compared results with other successful nations in order to 
draw some lessons.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The specific questions to be addressed in this study included the following:  
1. What are the significant financing constraints for agricultural SMEs in Namibia from 
the demand and supply sides? 
2. What are the financing options available for agricultural SMEs, and why are some 
financial institutions not interested in financing agricultural SMEs?  
3. What is the magnitude of the agricultural SME finance gap, and what are the causes 
of such a gap?  
4. What are some of the agricultural finance lessons to be learned by the government of 
Namibia from successful practices in nations such as Brazil and Indonesia? 
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Given the above research questions, the specific objectives addressed were as follows:   
 
1. Identify financial constraints for agricultural SMEs in Namibia with particular 
reference to their access to finance from Agribank. 
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2. Examine the different support mechanisms for agricultural SMEs in Namibia through 
identification of the types of financing options and reasons against financing agricultural 
SMEs to explain the unfulfilled loan demand.  
3. Determine the magnitude of the agricultural SME finance gap among communal 
farmers and identify the main determinants of the identified gap. 
4. Investigate government support mechanisms for agricultural SME finance in Namibia 
and compare these with practices from Brazil (Latin America) and Indonesia (South-East 
Asia). 
5. Make suitable recommendations based on the findings. 
The study was organised around four stand-alone essays, each of which explored one of the 
research questions.  
1.5 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY AND RATIONALE FOR EACH ESSAY 
SMEs were among the most disadvantaged groups during the colonial era and need to be 
supported to empower the previously disadvantaged sections of the population (Republic of 
Namibia, 1997). As part of the legacy of land dispossession in Namibia, many black people 
were left with almost no alternative than subsistence farming and were forced into wage 
labour on the commercial farms of white settlers (Vermeulen, 2009), thus leaving many 
people unable to work for themselves. The National Resettlement Programme (NRP) aims to 
transform large-scale commercial farming into a new small-scale commercial agricultural 
sector in order to create employment through farming and make beneficiaries self-sufficient 
in terms of food production (Werner & Odendaal, 2010). 
 
The review of performance of Namibia’s Third National Development Plan (NDP3) in 
Namibia’s Fourth National Development Plan (NDP4) showed that the agricultural sector had 
diminished. The sector registered over 7% below expected contribution to economic growth. 
At the start of the NDP3 period, performance in agriculture was very poor, with a contraction 
of 7.8% in 2007/08 and 14.1% in 2008/09 (Table 1.1). 
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Table 1.1: Out-turn against targets to economic growth during the  NDP3 period.  
Item NDP3 target Out-turn 
Agriculture 3.7 -3.6 
Fishing and on-board fish 
processing 
2.5 -3.7 
Mining and quarrying 0.8 -8.4 
Primary industries 2.0 -6.5 
Source: National Planning Commission (NPC) (2013) 
 
This research looked at the financial problems that small-scale farmers experienced and what 
options were available for them. If an awareness of the factors that inhibit access to finance 
exists, better decisions, such as the allocation of land, will be made, taking into account the 
issue of collateral. This is important because according to the SME policy document, it is 
recognised that the development of SMEs will contribute strongly to Namibia’s 
socioeconomic development (Republic of Namibia, 1997).   
 
Extant research in developing countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, India and Malawi has tended 
to focus on SMEs in general (Akorsu & Agyapong, 2012; Mead & Liedholm, 1998; Olaitan, 
2006; (Akorsu & Agyapong, 2012;Zaidi, 2013). Namibia has had very few studies done on 
this topic that focused not only on SMEs in general but also only on the borrowers’ side 
(Nakusera et al., 2008). This study thus contributes to the body of knowledge relating to 
SMEs in the agricultural sector by focusing on the financial aspect both from the supply and 
the demand side.  
 
This study can be regarded as an original contribution in at least three different ways. Firstly, 
previous studies that have focused on small-scale farmers have subjected farmers’ access to 
finance to rural credit markets, in other words informal moneylenders, using secondary 
information with a quantitative approach to collect and analyse the data (Aleem, 1990; Hoff 
& Stiglitz, 1990; Obeng, 2008). This study focused on formal financial institutions such as 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 
 
 
 
 
development financial institutions and banks using primary data with a qualitative approach 
in order to get to the grassroots and gain an in-depth understanding.  
 
Secondly, small- and medium-scale Green Scheme farmers have been in business in Namibia 
for more than a decade. However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there has never 
been any empirical investigation into their access to finance. This research thus addresses this 
urgent need by providing valuable empirical knowledge needed not only for the growth and 
development of the sector but most importantly for improving agricultural finance. This will 
encourage entrepreneurship, boost agricultural production, contribute to food security and 
thus reduce poverty.  
 
Thirdly, the study initiates a new dimension to the debate and controversies regarding access 
to information on agricultural financial services for independent farmers as compared to 
Green Scheme farmers. The information is very timely and an important input to the NPC’s 
strategy towards the realisation of continued financial and technical support expected to those 
involved in agricultural production activities between the years 2012 and 2017 (NPC, 2013).   
 
The significance of the study lies in its potential to assist policy makers in decision making 
because one of the desired outcomes of the NDP4 is for agriculture to experience average real 
growth of 4% per annum over the NDP4 period from 2012 to 2017 and one of the strategies 
to accomplish this is to offer continued financial and technical support to those involved in 
agricultural production activities. For this reason, the first essay identifies the constraints to 
financing agriculture from both the demand and the supply side. This is done with a specific 
focus on small- and medium-scale farmers on the demand side and Agribank on the supply 
side.  
 
The second essay identifies whether farmers (demand side) are aware of financing options 
targeting farmers in the country and whether formal financial institutions (i.e. commercial 
banks, venture capital funds and development bank institutions on the supply side) finance 
agricultural SMEs. If the interviewed institutions indicated that they did not provide finance 
to the agricultural sector, reasons for this were sought.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the second essay on reasons why financial institutions do not finance agriculture 
and arguments in the literature that a finance gap between demand and supply exists (Arshad, 
2011; Doran, McFadyen & Vogel, 2009; IFC, 2013; Morvant-Roux, 2007; Vitoria, Mudimu 
& Moyo, 2012), the third essay investigates the magnitude of the agricultural SME finance 
gap and specific causes of such a gap. The purpose is to offer insights into how Agribank can 
bridge the gap between the demand for and supply of finance. 
 
The fourth essay takes advantage of results from the three essays and recent research work in 
Latin America and South-East Asia because these regions achieved respectable rates of 
agricultural productivity growth in the recent past (Duff & Padila, 2015) to draw a 
comparison between selected features of both regions’ government intervention in the 
funding of agriculture by financial institutions and that of Namibia and government 
intervention in lending to agriculture.  
 
The overall study will therefore assist in creating awareness of specific financial constraints 
among agricultural SME owners in Namibia and how these can be minimised in order to 
encourage entrepreneurship and reduce poverty. The theoretical background that informed 
this study is presented in the following section. 
1.6 CHAPTER ORGANISATION  
The dissertation is organised around four main themes under agricultural finance. These are 
constraints to financing agriculture, financing options for agricultural SMEs, the magnitude 
of the agricultural SME finance gap and the government of Namibia’s efforts to finance 
agriculture as compared to successful nations. Each theme has been developed into a stand-
alone essay.  
 
The first chapter of this thesis introduces the research and highlights some of the debates 
surrounding agricultural finance. The second chapter gives an overview of the agricultural 
sector in Namibia. The third chapter focuses on the theoretical framework and broader 
literature guiding the study. The fourth chapter explains the methodology used. The fifth 
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chapter presents the beginning of the empirical investigation by identifying the financial 
constraints to financing agriculture with specific emphasis on small- and medium-scale 
farmers in Namibia and their access to finance from Agribank. The sixth chapter presents the 
exploration of the unfulfilled loan demand by identifying the financing options for 
agricultural SMEs in Namibia and the reasons why financial institutions do not finance 
agriculture. The seventh chapter presents the assessment of the SME finance gap. The eighth 
chapter provides a comparison of agricultural finance in Namibia to that of Latin America 
and South-East Asian countries and draws some lessons. The ninth and final chapter presents 
the conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 2  
OVERVIEW OF NAMIBIAN AGRICULTURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents brief background information on Namibia and overview of the 
agricultural sector. It sets out with a description of the country and follows with an overview 
of the agricultural sector. As the motivation behind this study was to make an enquiry into the 
financing of agriculture in Namibia, it is deemed important to first give a general overview of 
the agricultural sector in Namibia in order to situate the institutional arrangements within 
which agricultural SMEs operate. Finally, the chapter gives a brief outline of the main DFI in 
the agricultural sector, Agribank.  
2.2 BACKGROUND OF NAMIBIA 
The Republic of Namibia was a German colonised country on the south-western coast of 
Africa. Interestingly, prior to independence, Namibia was referred to as South West Africa. 
Geographically, Namibia has a total land area of about 825 615 km
2
. It is surrounded by the 
Atlantic Ocean on the west coast, and it is bordered by Botswana on the east, South Africa on 
the south and Angola on the north. The country is currently divided into 14 regions with the 
vast majority of the population residing in the urban areas in the northern part of the country 
and in the capital city, Windhoek. The population of Namibia is 2 113 077 inhabitants, as 
recorded by the 2011 Population and Housing Census. It should be noted that 90% of the 
population is made up of black Namibians and that white Namibians only comprise 6.4% of 
the population (Namibia Statistics Agency [NSA], 2013). 
 
Namibia is classified as an upper-middle-income country, according to the World Bank 
classification. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at US$12.3 billion 
in 2011 and its population at 2.1 million (NSA, 2013). These figures translate into a GDP per 
capita of US$5 693.13 (N$43 158). This per capita income falls below the threshold of the 
World Bank’s definition of a high income, which is a per capita income that exceeded US$12 
476 in 2011. Nonetheless, irrespective of Namibia’s poor classification as per the World 
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Bank’s definition, Namibia’s income level is relatively higher than that of most African 
countries. However, on the United Nations’ Human Development Index, the country’s 
ranking is worrisome. In 2014, Namibia’s Human Development Index was ranked 11th in 
Africa and 127
th
 at a global level. Namibia’s counterparts, Botswana and South Africa, were 
ranked 6
th
 and 7
th
, respectively, while at a global level, Botswana and South Africa were 
ranked 84
th
 and 104
th
, respectively (NPC, 2015). 
With regard to economic growth, between 2009 and 2014, the Namibian economy has 
registered an average growth rate of 4.3% (NPC, 2015). Despite a relatively high GDP per 
capita and a steady economic growth, the country’s poverty and unemployment rates are 
among the highest on the African continent. According to the NSA (2013), Namibia’s 
poverty rate was 19.5% and the unemployment rate (broad) was 27.4% in 2012, lower than 
36.7% and 51.2% reported in 2004 and 2008 respectively.  
The NSA (2012) further revealed that the tertiary industries of Namibia made the highest 
contribution to its economic growth as they contributed 56% to the GDP, followed by the 
primary and the secondary industries, which contributed 20% and 17%, respectively (Figure 
2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Industries contribution to GDP, Namibia 2012 
Source: NSA (2013) 
Taking a closer look at the Namibian sectors’ contribution to GDP over the past decade, one 
sees that the mining and the manufacturing sector have been the main contributors to GDP 
(Figure 2.2). Over the years, the contribution of the service sector to GDP has been increasing 
at a steady rate (Bank of Namibia [BoN], 2013).  
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Figure 2.2: Share of sectors' contribution to GDP, 2000 - 2013 
Source: NSA (2014) 
The mining sector has been fairly unstable due to its high sensitivity and exposure to external 
shocks. In 2009 and 2011, the sector experienced a huge reduction in its contribution to GDP. 
The poor performance of the mining sector in 2009 could be explained by the 2008/09 world 
economic crisis. 
The agricultural sector, which is the source of livelihood for the majority of the Namibian 
population, has been shrinking over the years. In 2013, the sector reached a nadir and its 
contribution to GDP was a mere 3.5% while the mining, the manufacturing and the service 
sectors contributed 10.7%, 10.8% and 8.5%, respectively.  
Despite Namibia’s satisfactory macroeconomic performance, the country is facing a number 
of socioeconomic challenges. Namibia still ranks amongst the most unequal societies in the 
world faced with high levels of unemployment and poverty rates (Jauch 2012). The section 
that follows gives an overview of Namibia’s socioeconomic challenges.  
Namibia suffers from an inherited dual economy at independence in 1990. The highly 
productive capital-intensive mining sector employs 2% of the labour force while agriculture 
with its low productivity employs 31.4% (Phiri & Ojijo, 2015). Despite rapid urbanisation, 
58% of the Namibian population makes up the rural society while 42% makes up the urban 
society, which means that the country remains a mainly rural society in which a large number 
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of people depend on agriculture. Between 2001 and 2011, the main source of income for 
households in Namibia was farming, second to wages and salaries (NSA, 2013). While the 
urban regions have lower unemployment rates, the agricultural regions by contrast (which are 
mainly rural) not only have high unemployment; they also experience high informality and 
low pay with 75% classified as unpaid family workers and 20% reporting underemployment 
(Phiri & Ojijo, 2015).  
 
Namibia’s unemployment rates rank among the highest in the Southern African region (see 
Figure 2.3 below).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Unemployment rates comparison in sub-Saharan Africa in 2008 
Source: Mwinga (2012) 
In addition to the challenge of unemployment, another socioeconomic challenge facing 
Namibia is the high poverty rate. According to the NPC (2015), poverty has been prevalent in 
Namibia since independence. Poverty levels in Namibia were estimated at 69.3% in 1993/94, 
37.7% in 2003/04 and 28.7% in 2009/10 (NSA, 2012) (see Figure 2.4 below). Further, the 
NSA (2012) revealed that the poverty gap ratios (which measure the minimum amount of 
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income or resources required to move the poor out of poverty) were 37.7% in 1993/94, 12.9% 
in 2003/04 and 8.8% in 2009/10.  
 
Figure 2.4: Poverty levels over time in Namibia, 1993/92, 2003/04 and 2009/10 
Source: NSA (2012) 
The measure of poverty severity is more enlightening than the poverty incidence and poverty 
gap. Poverty severity pays attention to both the poverty gap and inequality among the poor, 
thus suggesting that in trying to reduce poverty, a higher weight must be placed on those that 
are further away from the poverty line (NSA, 2012). Notably, the severity of poverty in 
Namibia has declined significantly (from 24.2% to 3.9%) over the past two decades.  
With regard to rural versus urban poverty, poverty in Namibia is largely rural. According to 
the NSA (2012), in 1993/94 70% of people living in poverty were found in Namibia’s rural 
areas whereas only 30% of the poor people lived in the urban areas. The largest share of the 
poor generates their income from subsistence farming and rural non-farming business, which 
makes rural-based economic activities in Namibia the main source of income for the poor. 
Closely linked with high poverty rates is the lopsided distribution of income. With a Gini 
coefficient of 0.59 (this has fallen rapidly from 0.7 in the early 1990s), Namibia still ranks 
among the most unequal economies in Africa (Jauch, 2012). Excessive unequal distribution 
of income adversely affects people’s quality of life and results in economic inefficiency, 
political instability and social unrest. This view agrees with that of the NPC (2013), which 
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states that Namibia’s high degree of unequal distribution of income is detrimental to 
sustainable and equitable economic growth, poverty reduction and social cohesion.  
The 2011 population census enumerated 2 104 900 persons, and this figure represents an 
absolute increase of 274 570 persons compared to the 1 830 330 persons enumerated in the 
last census in 2001. Overall, the population of Namibia has grown steadily since 1921, rising 
from about 1.4 million persons in early 1921 through 1.8 million persons in early 2001 to 2.1 
million in 2011 (NSA, 2013).  
 
Despite an increase in the population and dependency on agriculture, the country’s economy 
in general and the agricultural sector in particular are constrained by socioeconomic 
challenges that limit the country’s ability to produce enough food for security of the entire 
population. These challenges include stagnant income levels, escalating unemployment, 
extreme poverty, unequal distribution of income and untenured land, to mention just a few. In 
addition, only 8% of the country receives an average rainfall higher than 500 mm per annum. 
High evaporation rates, spatial differentiations in water availability, major variations in 
annual precipitation and erratic rainfall influence and further impede production and farming 
conditions. Over the past decade, periodic droughts have led to a dramatic decrease in 
livestock numbers, the cancellation of agricultural subsidies and rising interest rates while 
bush encroachment has undermined production conditions. Although classified as a dry 
country with relatively low agricultural potential, agriculture plays a central role in the lives 
of many Namibians (Werner, 2004).  
 
The combination of high unemployment, high poverty rates and high inequality of income 
dictates that policy interventions must be directed to the economic sector(s) in which the 
incidence of poverty is highest and also to the sector(s) that is/are responsible for the 
livelihood of many. In the case of Namibia, poverty rates are highest in the rural economy 
(both subsistence farming and nonfarming). The rural economy is also the source of 
livelihood for many. According to the Institute for Public Policy Research (2011), the 
majority of the population are employed in the agricultural sector and derive their livelihood 
from it. Therefore, policies that are aimed at creating employment and reducing poverty in 
Namibia should be directed towards the rural areas, focusing on the agricultural sector. In 
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addition to this view, Tregenna and Tsela (2008) found that unemployment explained much 
of the inequality in South Africa and inferred that reducing unemployment was central to 
reducing inequality. Bearing in mind the fact that the agricultural sector in Namibia has the 
potential to create more employment in Namibia, Tregenna and Tsela’s (2008) argument 
therefore highlights the potential role that this sector could play in economic transformation.  
2.3 THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN NAMIBIA 
Scarce productive land and fragile soils coupled with limited water resources and an erratic 
rainfall regime are the principal features of Namibia’s agriculture. The country can be divided 
into four ecological zones: 
1. The desert region, comprising 22% of the land area, where mean annual rainfall is less 
than 100 mm. 
2. The arid region, comprising 33% of the land area, where mean annual rainfall varies 
between 100 and 300 mm. 
3. The semiarid region, comprising 37% of the land area, where mean annual rainfall 
varies between 301 and 500 mm. 
4. The semi-humid and subtropical region, comprising 8% of the land area, where mean 
annual rainfall varies between 501 and 700 mm (MAWF, 1995). 
As the largest contributor to employment in the county, the agricultural sector has always 
received attention in Namibia’s national development plans. However, the Namibian 
agricultural sector has been shrinking over the years (as seen in Figure 2.2). During the 
period 2000 to 2013, according to the NSA statistical data, the contribution of the agricultural 
sector to GDP has been falling. 
The BoN (2008) advanced a number of reasons for the negative growth of the sector such as 
droughts, decline in product prices, higher interest rates, lack of agricultural financing, 
growing population, insufficient usage of technology, low investments in the sector and bush 
encroachment.  
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The agricultural sector in Namibia displays a dualistic nature whereby a developed, 
technologically based and relatively productive commercial sector coexists with a subsistence 
sector characterised by low productivity in which manual labour and the use of traditional 
methods of production are still predominant. This is traceable to the legacy of apartheid. 
The different farming systems found in Namibia are grouped and organised as follows: 
  
1. Small-scale mixed farming (small fields of cereals and some vegetables, and small 
numbers of cattle and goats used largely for domestic consumption). 
2. Cattle ranching (large-scale commercial cattle farming for beef production on big 
farms on freehold and communal land and on open-access communal land). 
3.  Small stock farming (small stock farming primarily means sheep and goat farming 
in semiarid areas on large, exclusive freehold farms and on open-access communal 
land). 
4. Commercial crop production and other intensive agriculture (commercial 
production of grains, vegetables and fruit and other largely high-value commodities 
on farms by a few farmers using comparatively intense management and production 
techniques and specialist knowledge) (Namibia Training Authority, 2013). 
 
Like other countries where inequality in land distribution has been high and governments 
have supported land reforms to reduce this inequality (Independent Evaluation Group World 
Bank, 2011), during 1990 when Namibia gained independence, there were about 6 000 
commercial farms owned by about 4 000 white farmers. These farms covered most of the 
land suitable for farming. From Table 2.1 below, it is clear that land ownership in Namibia is 
favourably skewed towards the white individuals who own a lion’s share of 20.6% of 
Namibia’s total land surface; in contrast, black individuals own only 2.4% of the total land 
surface. The inequitable distribution of land along the racial groups and also the differences 
in farm sizes between commercial farmland and communal land partly underscore the highly 
unequal distribution between the two races and the two farming sectors. This is in keeping 
with the view of Werner and Odendaal (2010) who argue that unequal access to land in 
Namibia has contributed to poverty and unequal income-generating opportunities between the 
two sectors. 
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The Agricultural Land Reform Act, passed early in 1995 (Ministry of Land Resettlement 
[MLR], 2014), enables citizens who have been economically, socially and educationally 
disadvantaged by the discriminatory laws of the past colonial rulers to gain access to 
commercial farmland. Moreover, the Agricultural Land Reform Act recommended how 
commercial land was to be accessed through the two government initiatives, namely the 
AALS and the NRP.  
The AALS is a redistributive land reform programme through which previously 
disadvantaged as well as emerging black farmers can acquire ownership of commercial land 
at affordable prices (MLR, 2014). Further, according to Werner and Odendaal (2010), the 
AALS provides subsidised loans to previously disadvantaged Namibians purchasing large-
scale commercial farms. According to the MLR (2014), the AALS serves two broad 
objectives: to facilitate the resettlement (on commercial farms) of well-established but 
previously disadvantaged Namibians who are from the communal areas and to assist small-
scale communal farmers to gain ownership of freehold farms and to develop these farmers 
into fully fledged commercial farmers (MLR, 2014). The primary objectives of the NRP are 
redressing the past inequitable land distribution, providing an opportunity to the previously 
disadvantaged to produce their own food for subsistence purposes and to sell any surplus 
food products, and creating employment opportunities through engaging beneficiaries in 
farming and related income activities (MLR, 2014). 
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Table 2.1: Land ownership among different groups in Namibia 
Land ownership  Land 
surface 
(km
2
) 
Share of title 
deed land 
(%) 
Share of 
agricultural land 
(%) 
Share of 
Namibia’s land 
surface (%) 
White individuals  170 000 40 24.7 20.6 
Companies  63 200 14.9 9.2 7.7 
Black individuals 
who bought their 
own farms 
19 800 4.7 2.9 2.4 
Black individuals 
who live on the 
‘Odendaal Farms1’  
84 000 19.8 12.2 10.2 
Government  13 600 3.2 2 1.7 
Non-Namibian 
citizens  
4 700 1.1  0.7 0.6 
Municipalities  5 900 1.4 0.9 0.7 
Unclear ownership 
(at the time) 
63 000 14.9 9.2 7.7 
Source: Odendaal (2005) 
As a response to the uneven land distribution, the country implemented various land reform 
policies between 1990 and 2008. The government bought farms and redistributed them to 
landless people. Some of the big farms bought entailed dividing the land into smaller farms 
(Frøystad et al., 2008). The commercial sector largely exists on title deed lands (freehold 
sector) while the small-scale sector mostly exists on communally administered state lands.  
                                                 
1
 Odendaal farms are referred to as farms on the southern part of Namibia that were demarcated for a particular 
purpose during the colonial regime. The farms are named after the person (Odendaal) who initiated this idea.   
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The commercial farming subsector is made up of 6 337 freehold title deed farms belonging to 
about 4 200 large-scale farmers, each having an average landholding of approximately 8 620 
hectares (MAWF, 2008). Commercial agriculture is practised in the northern and southern 
parts of Namibia; 70% of the black Namibian population live in the north and the majority 
derive their livelihood from small-scale farming (Elkan, Amutenya, Andima, Sherboune & 
Van der Linden, 1992). As a result, there is a skewed distribution of arable land whereby 
52% of agricultural land is mainly owned by large commercial farming households while the 
remaining 48% of largely communal land supports 70% of rural households (Phiri & Ojijo, 
2015). The north receives reasonable rainfall and adopts arable farming while the south is 
arid and most of the time only adopts ranching (Elkan et al., 1992). Furthermore, in order to 
deal with the land issue and to allow access to finance, the Constitution identified different 
areas in which previously disadvantaged persons should be advanced (Werner, 2004). Access 
to finance for agricultural purpose is promoted by Agribank. 
2.4 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF NAMIBIA  
Agribank is a financial institution that exists in Namibia to promote agriculture or activities 
related to agriculture by lending money to persons that is to be used in connection with 
agriculture or activities related to agriculture. Agribank was established in 1907 and was 
formerly known as the Deutsch-Sudwestafrikanischer Farmerbund. In April 1922, the 
Deutsch-Sudwestafrikanischer Farmerbund was renamed the Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South West Africa. The Agricultural Bank of Namibia Act No. 5 of 2003 as amended was 
made widely known in order to expand the scope of business, to capitalise on opportunities in 
the market and to transform the institution into one flexible and responsive to all 
stakeholders. This was done in order to meet the demands of the ever-changing business 
environment (Agribank, 2014). The functions of Agribank are to advance money for the 
purposes of agricultural activities and to lend money as an agent of the government to 
persons under Green Scheme projects created by contract with the ministry responsible for 
agriculture (Office of the Prime Minister, 2014). The Green Scheme is a government 
programme aimed at increasing food production through irrigation production. The principal 
component of the Green Scheme is to create a public-private partnership aimed at developing 
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and managing basic infrastructure for irrigation and promoting private sector investments in 
agriculture (Agribank, 2014). While the purpose of the Green Scheme is to increase food 
production in Namibia, the main beneficiaries are rural farming communities that are willing 
to venture into new agricultural activities. As far as employment and job creation are 
concerned, preference is given to rural communities residing near the Green scheme projects 
in order to stimulate the rural economy. The private investor obtains land through the Land 
Board and develops the land according to an approved business plan. Incentive schemes 
available for all projects under the Green Scheme are interest rate subsidisation and loan 
guarantee collateral. The interest rate subsidy is applicable regardless of any equity 
contribution to the project by the commercial irrigation farming enterprise or small-scale 
irrigation farmers (MAWF, 2008). The government transfers money from the national budget 
to Agribank to provide for the interest rate subsidies under the scheme. The government 
policy has three fundamental rationales for this transfer of funds: to promote the ownership of 
Namibian farmland by formerly disadvantaged Namibians, to encourage farmers with large 
numbers of livestock in the communal areas to move to commercial farmland, thereby freeing 
up land for smaller communal farmers, and to encourage formerly disadvantaged Namibians 
to become fully fledged commercial farmers. The degree of subsidy depends on whether a 
farmer operates full time or part time and on nonfarming income if the farmer operates part 
time.  
A typical AA loan will include a large element of subsidy. For example an AA loan of 
N$500,000 to full-time farmer will contain a subsidy of almost N$400,000 over the 
life of the loan at a 11.75% rate of interest (in 2002), compared with the equivalent to 
a non-AA farmer (Sherbourne, 2004:16).  
 
While the interest rate at Agribank stood at 11.75%, the interest rate of commercials banks 
stood at 16.35% in 2002. No business plan is required since Agribank values the land 
(although owned by government who acts as guarantor) extremely conservatively and uses 
the land as collateral for the loan (Sherboune, 2004). The bank offers a wide range of 
products that are meant to meet the needs of a wide range of farmers and their farming 
activities. Some of the loan products in its loan booklet are shown in Table 2.2 below. 
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Table 2.2: Agribank loan products and services 
Period Interest rate
Commercial 
clients
Communal 
clients
Resettled 
clients
Short-term loans
Production inputs 1–2 years 7.50% 4% 4%
Medium-term loans 
Loans for the purchase of female breeding stock 5 years 7.50% 4% 4%
Loans for the purchase of light delivery vans and small trucks 5 years 8.25% 7%              n/a
Loans for the purchase of used tractors and agricultural implements 5 years 7.50% 7% 4%
Loans for the purchase of draft animals and implements 5 years                   n/a 4%              n/a
Loans for the purchase of irrigation implements 5 years 7.50% 4%               n/a
Loans for infrastructure and improvement 10 years 8.25% 7% 8%
Loans for the purchase of large stock 10 years 8.25% 4% 4%
Loans for the purchase of small stock 8 years 8.25% 4% 4%
Loans for the purchase of new tractors and agricultural implements 10 years 8.25% 7%              n/a
Long-term loans 
Loans for the purchase of land for beginners 25 years 8%                n/a              n/a
Loans for the purchase of additional land for expansion 20 years 8%                n/a              n/a
Loans for the construction of dwellings and other permanent farm buildings 15 years 8%                n/a              n/a
Loans for the construction of labourer housing 15 years 4%                                n/a   n/a
Loans for water provision, fencing and other improvements 15 years 8% 7%              n/a  
Source: Agribank (s.a.) 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shed some light on the profile of Namibia and the challenges facing the 
country in general and the agricultural sector in particular. Although Namibia is classified as 
a middle-income country, a large part of the population still lives in deprivation. The country 
is faced with high unequal income distribution and a great deal of socioeconomic challenges 
such as unemployment and poverty. The government has established the Agricultural Bank of 
Namibia to promote agriculture or activities related to agriculture. The loans provided by 
Agirbank are subsidised by the government to ensure that formerly disadvantaged Namibians 
have access to finance and land to farm under schemes run by the government. Although 
agriculture is the largest contributor to employment, there is still much to be done in the 
agricultural sector as the sector has been showing a downward trend in recent years regarding 
GDP contribution as compared to other sectors. Issues that need to be tackled are drought, 
land ownership and financial investments in the agricultural sector. This will not only assist 
in reducing poverty but will also reduce the unemployment rate.  
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Chapter 3  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief explanation of the theoretical framework that underpinned this 
study and also attempts a rather brief literature review. Given the structure of the dissertation, 
each analytical chapter attempts a more detailed discussion of conceptual issues and a 
broader literature review that zeroes in on the specific objectives addressed in the chapter.  
3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.2.1 Information asymmetry and market failures 
The central theme or theory guiding this study was the role of government intervention in 
lending to agricultural SMEs because of market failure that exists in the loan market. Market 
failure occurs when “a competitive market fails to bring about an efficient allocation of 
credit” (Besley, 1994:29). This is observable when a competitive market fails to allocate the 
scare societal resources optimally to achieve the maximum possible social welfare or Pareto 
efficiency (Rao, 2012). Credit markets in developing countries tend to fail mainly due to the 
contracting problem and the problem of information asymmetry. Contracting challenges 
occur when the borrowers are unable to repay the loan due to a legitimate inability to repay 
the loan (for instance, if the borrowers’ output has been negatively affected by, for example, 
one form of natural disaster or the other) or due to unwillingness to repay the borrowed funds 
(if the lender applies insufficient sanctions against delinquent borrowers) (Besley, 1994). 
Contract enforcement is usually uncommon in developing countries’ credit markets because 
in such markets, enforcement cost is prohibitively high. As a result, lenders would end up 
undersupplying credit and in extreme cases, they might even cease to lend, a situation that is 
very common in developing countries’ credit markets. The undersupply of credit in the credit 
market is therefore referred to as market failure.  
Information asymmetry leads to adverse selection and moral hazard that ultimately result in 
market failure. According to Besley (1994), adverse selection occurs when lenders do not 
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have perfect information (particular characteristics) about borrowers, for instance borrowers’ 
preference of understanding risky projects. In such a situation, lenders will not be able to 
estimate the borrowers’ likelihood to repay the borrowed funds with certainty; hence, there 
exists a possibility of borrowers not repaying the borrowed funds. Therefore, in order for 
lenders to at least break even and remain in business, they must charge borrowers a risk 
premium above their opportunity cost. However, raising interest rates to counteract possible 
losses comes with potential ‘adverse selection’, asserts Besley (1994).  
According to Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000), adverse selection occurs when 
lenders are unable to distinguish between higher risk and lower risk borrowers. Thus, in order 
to compensate for the possible risk, due to information asymmetry, the banks opt to raise the 
average interest rate for all borrowers. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2010) claim that 
this often drives less risky borrowers out of the credit market. Once the safer customers are 
driven out of the market, only the riskier ones remain, hence adverse selection.  
In contrast, the problem of moral hazard arises when the lender is unable to detect accurate 
intentions (hidden actions) of the borrower (Rao, 2012). According to Armendáriz de Aghion 
and Morduch (2010), moral hazard occurs due to one or two possible reasons. Firstly, moral 
hazard occurs when lenders are unable to ensure that borrowers are making the full effort 
required for their investment to be borrowed. Secondly, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
(2010) maintain that moral hazard occurs when borrowers have indeed realised profit from 
the investment for which the funds were borrowed for but simply try to escape with lenders’ 
money (the problem of enforcement). These are what Giné, Goldberg and Yang (2012) 
termed ex ante moral hazard and post ante moral hazard.  
According to Gine et al. (2012), ex ante moral hazard is the possibility of borrowers not 
putting adequate effort into an enterprise as intended whereas post ante moral hazard is the 
possibility of borrowers not settling their loans irrespective of an enterprise profit being 
sufficient for repayment. 
3.2.2 Government intervention to market failure 
Until well into the 1980s, governments and development cooperation agencies attempted to 
promote growth in smallholder agriculture and in the small and microenterprise sector by 
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providing the sector with subsidised loans. The hope was that this would cause the informal 
credit sector, which was regarded as being usurious, to dry up. However, this did not have the 
intended effect of improving smallholder farmers’ access to finance. Instead, it caused the 
credit market to become even more segmented or gave rise to segmentation where none had 
existed previously (Tschach, 2002). Due to this failure, the preponderance of views in the 
1980s and 1990s was that government policies in the financial sector should focus on 
reforming institutions, developing infrastructures to take advantage of technological 
advances, encouraging competition and providing the right incentives through prudential 
regulations (see Demirguç-Kunt & Beck, 2008).  
The resurgence of literature in recent times ponders government intervention with emphasis 
on the creation of appropriate lending channels and institutions that could provide credit, 
especially in the agricultural sector. This strand of literature has been boosted by the 
performance of government-sponsored credit guarantee schemes and equity injections into 
state-sponsored institutions in Latin America and India (Christiano & Ikeda, 2012; Craig, 
Jackson & Thomson, 2007). Lerner (2002) argues for the need of government intervention in 
areas that are not attractive to the private sector in order to address the finance gap although 
he emphasises that this should be done according to a very well-defined set of funding 
criteria (see also Cressy, 2002). Jessop, Boubacar, Marjan, Abdallah, Job and Bert (2012) 
emphasise that these government interventions in rural financial markets should generally 
focus on piloting innovations (through seed money) and providing support for institutional 
development rather than introducing large-scale credit programmes through public 
institutions.  
The consequences of management weaknesses by development banks that were created in 
many African countries after their independence (with a view to achieving modern 
agricultural credit) provided little credit to agriculture. These consequences were poorly 
adapted procedures, exaggerated operation costs, inadequate strategies in the event of low 
yielding crops, certain farmers attempting to dodge repaying loans and loans granted 
according to political rather than technical criteria. As a result, the majority of farmers were 
left outside any institutional financial circuit (Doligez, Lemelle, Lapenu & Wampfler, 2010; 
Perret & Mercoiret, 2003).  
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The theme of this study was supported by the fact that governments of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries are convinced that there are 
enough reasons to justify the need for government intervention in SME finance. This is 
because SMEs in many emerging markets do not have access to bank financing while they 
employ a large share of the labour force and account for a large part of the national income 
(OECD, 2006). As a result, policy efforts targeted at the SME sector have often been 
accepted on the argument that the SMEs are constrained by institutional and market failures 
(Beck, 2013). Carter (1988) identified market imperfections to include interest rate ceilings, 
usually imposed by government, lack of information, monopoly power in credit markets, 
large transaction costs incurred by borrowers and moral hazard problems.  
Most small-scale enterprises and to a slightly lesser degree medium-scale enterprises find it 
difficult to obtain working capital or long-term credit needed for capital investment on an 
adequate or timely basis and on reasonable terms. This is caused by various issues including 
substantial collateral to guarantee the loan and enforcement problems. Enforcement problems 
arise when a borrower is willing but unable to repay. This constitute features of rural credit 
and make it more difficult for financial institutions to lend, thus resulting in market failure 
(Besley, 1994; IFC, 2011; Kinsey, 1987; Perret & Mercoiret, 2003; Zaidi, 2013). Carter 
(1988) believes that banks discriminate against small farmers when farm size is used as an 
indicator of individual characteristics.  
While access to formal payment and savings services can approach universality as economies 
develop, the argument is not that everyone should qualify for credit. For example, Diagne and 
Zeller (2001) argue that besides credit, actual opportunities and other constraints such as 
access to markets, roads and infrastructure faced by farmers should also be considered in 
order for credit to work effectively; otherwise, giving credit is not of much use (see also 
Ulimwengu & Sanyal, 2011). However, the neglect of questions by economists related to the 
need for government interventions specifically in financing agricultural SMEs is lamentable.  
This research undertook a case study mainly of Agribank and other relevant stakeholders 
involved in the financing of agricultural SMEs with a view to providing evidence of how 
market failure in the credit market could possibly be addressed.  
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3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section outlines some of the conceptual issues regarding SME financing. In general, the 
definition of SMEs and the notion of access to finance for SMEs are discussed. An empirical 
literature review is zoomed into with regard to financial constraints for SMEs, the type of 
financing options available for SMEs as well as the ‘SME financing gap’. As explained 
earlier, the broader literature is covered in forthcoming chapters as per each specific research 
objective.  
3.3.1 Definition of small and medium enterprises 
The term ‘SME’ covers a wide range of definitions and measures, varying from country to 
country (Kroukamp, 2009; Migiro & Wallis, 2006). Some of the commonly used criteria for 
defining SMEs are the number of employees, total net assets, amount of sales and investment 
level (Ayyagari, Beck & Demirguç-Kunt, 2007).  
 
In the Philippines, SMEs are defined on the basis of either asset size or the number of 
employees (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Agricultural Technical Cooperation 
Working Group, 2007). In Kenya, SMEs are grouped into micro, small, medium and large 
enterprises. SMEs with fewer than 5 employees are referred to as microenterprises, those 
with fewer than 49 workers are referred to as small enterprises, those with 50–99 employees 
are known as medium-scale enterprises while those employing 100 or more workers are 
classified as large-scale enterprises (Migiro & Wallis, 2006).  
 
In India, SMEs are not defined by the number of employees but by the amount of investment. 
It is worth noting that a significant number of SMEs in India are involved in agricultural, 
horticultural, forest and nonforest production and that they generate much-required 
employment, thus preventing mass migration from rural to urban areas (Zaidi, 2013).  
 
Given the basis on which SMEs are defined in different countries, Senderovitz (2009, cited in 
Amiss, 2012) is of the opinion that there is no ‘one best definition’ of SMEs and therefore 
SME definition should be the result of a deliberate and well-grounded choice taking the 
methodology, purpose and/or content of the study into account. In this context, the IFC 
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(2011) suggests that agribusiness SMEs can be thought of as those agricultural businesses 
that fit the general definition of an SME for a given country or region. In Namibia, the 
criteria used to arrive at a definition of small and microenterprises
2
 include the number of 
employees, the turnover and the capital employed. The following definition in Table 3.1 has 
been given to fit the Namibian context.  
 
Table 3.1: Definition of small and micro enterprises in Namibia 
 Criteria 
Employment Maximum turnover Maximum capital 
investment 
Manufacturing Less than 10 N$1 000 000 N$500 000 
Other businesses* Less than 5 N$250 000 N$100 000 
Source: Tonin et al. (1998) 
* = Agricultural SMEs fall in the category of other businesses. 
3.3.2 Definition of agricultural SME finance 
The IFC (2011:13) has defined agricultural finance as a “sectoral concept that comprises 
financial services for agricultural production, processing, and marketing. This includes short-, 
medium-, and long-term loans, leasing, savings, payment services, and crop and livestock 
insurance”. According to the IFC, agricultural finance heavily overlaps with SME finance in 
the agricultural sector; therefore, agricultural SME finance is defined as financial services for 
small and medium enterprises engaged in agricultural production (i.e., farming) and 
production-related activities, such as input supply, processing, trade, wholesaling and 
marketing (IFC, 2011). 
 
There are four types of farmers engaged in primary agricultural production that would be 
considered SMEs: 
                                                 
2
 The acronym ‘SME’ in Namibia stands for small and microenterprises; in this study, the acronym refers to 
small and medium enterprises. 
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1. Semi-commercial smallholders, also referred to as subsistence farmers: They do not 
farm to make any profit but farm to survive. 
2. Commercial smallholders: They produce surplus crops that may be sold  for cash. 
3. Medium-sized farmers: They produce meaningful income from farming, and part of 
the land owned may be used for commercial farming. They are also known as 
‘emerging’ farmers. 
4. Large farmers: They produce and market their output in a professional manner and 
have access to a full range of financial services (IFC, 2011). 
 
Because subsistence farmers do not produce to make a profit and often do not have access to 
financial institutions, although financial inclusion is important, this study concentrated 
specifically on commercial smallholders and medium-sized farmers because these produce to 
make a profit. 
3.3.3 Access to finance for SMEs 
Many people in Namibia who want to start up their SMEs are confronted with the problem of 
accessing finance for starting up their businesses. This is usually evident in newspaper 
articles in which people write about their frustrations and opinions. The quote below is 
evident of this: 
It was on 25 February 2013 that I went to the bank and asked them the requirement to 
get a loan of N$100 000. I was given a list to comply with; I made sure all the 
necessary documents were in order for me to meet the bank’s standard requirement. I 
was then informed by the bank that they can only give me a loan if I am able to pay 
back within 12 months, and looking at the nature of my business proposal it would 
take me two to three years to pay back their loan. I was further informed that the bank 
is only assisting short term business activities such as tenders. I was advised to 
venture into tendering (Kandume, 2013:1). 
 
The challenges faced by Kandume are not unique. In recent years, difficulty in obtaining 
finance for start-up SMEs and the associated preferences by financial institutions have 
increasingly been cited as binding constraints to growth among entrepreneurs. According to 
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the World Bank report on access finance 2007, there are two major factors that inhibit access 
to finance: Firstly, financial institutions have difficulty offering loans to poor and remote 
borrowers at an affordable cost. This is more common in Africa because of small national and 
local markets that are made worse by low geographic population density and economic 
isolation in rural areas. Secondly, there is the difficulty of assessing which borrower is 
worthy of credit and enforcing contracts in Africa (World Bank, 2007). The difficulty of 
assessing which borrower is worthy of credit is caused by a lack of information between the 
lender and the borrower, and this has financial implications for the two parties that can create 
a wide gap between available and accessible funds. In addition to the difficulty in securing a 
loan, it is also likely that some financial institutions are holding back cash for companies (or 
individuals) that are already in their portfolios (Watts, 2009). 
 
Factors such as inherent risks associated with agricultural production, the high cost of 
administration of agricultural loans, the inability of farmers to provide the necessary 
collateral and the fact that most banks operate in an urban area far from people in rural areas 
who practise agricultural farming result in a further decline in agricultural production loans 
(Olaitan, 2006). The Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A) task force found that in 
Africa, only about 10% of the total funds of financial institutions went to agriculture (World 
Bank, 2007). It is of the utmost importance that financial institution branches be set up in 
rural areas closer to rural agricultural SMEs because in this way, more people will be able to 
travel to banks and obtain the necessary information. It will also provide an opportunity for 
banks to make better informed decisions about their borrowers and cause a reduction in 
unemployment in rural areas as a result of newly established financial institutions. 
 
Both financial providers and SMEs face a challenge when it comes to having accessible 
finance because every party wants to gain something from the borrowing and lending 
process. Banks want to lend money to earn interest and ultimately make a profit while SMEs 
want to borrow affordable funds to set up their businesses at a cheaper rate. The OECD 
argues that the agribusiness is a sector that is full of potential and if this is tapped into, it 
could support economic diversification in the country (Pretet, 2013). 
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3.4 EMPIRCAL LITERATURE ON SME FINANCE  
3.4.1 The financial constraints for SMEs 
In a special issue containing papers presented at the Financing SMEs conference held in 
Brussels in September 1995, Cressy and Olofsson (1997) posit that three main sources of 
demand- and supply-side constraints have been identified, namely management, labour skills 
and access to finance. The methods of evaluation used by the banks to assess small business 
loans may be a source of financing constraints on business. In a perfect market, all projects 
with a positive net present value should be funded. However, banks tend to argue that either 
the assessment of future cash flow is impossible or that they, as lenders, are not equipped to 
assess it. 
 
Using the World Business Environment Survey of 1999 and 2000, a unique firm-level survey 
was conducted in more than 80 countries and it was found that firms in countries with high 
levels of financial institutions experience fewer financing obstacles than firms in countries 
with less developed financial institutions (Beck & Demirguç-Kunt, 2006). The database 
provides information on the obstacles faced by firms and allows researchers to relate these 
obstacles to the growth of the business. The World Business Environment Survey shows that 
factors such as size, age and ownership are the predominant causes of financing obstacles.  
 
In investigating whether lack of funds was the main obstacle to growth, Pissarides (1999) 
used data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which used data 
from a set of enterprise surveys by the World Bank between 1991 and 1993 in Hungary, the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Poland and Russia. Pissarides cites liquidity constraints, 
managerial constraints and transaction costs as some of the reasons why small firms find it 
hard to grow and survive although not much empirical work has been done to test these 
factors. The data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development indicate that 
most enterprise creation take place with capital from relatives and friends. Capital from 
financial institutions in transition economies is unavailable except from specially designed 
programmes (Pissarides, 1999).  
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An econometric analysis and a sample survey of small firms were conducted in Slovenia by 
Bartlett and Bukvič (2001) to identify the critical barriers to small business growth and 
development. The authors found that financial barriers included high cost of credit, relatively 
high bank charges and fees, high collateral requirements and a lack of outside equity and 
venture capital. Information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers make it hard for 
banks to determine the real value of a project and lead to credit rationing.  
 
In South Africa, the findings of an exploratory, descriptive and qualitative research study by 
Mbonyane and Ladzani (2011), who used semi-structured interviews to explore the factors 
that hindered the growth of small businesses in South African townships, showed that small 
businesses sometimes failed not because of a lack of support from financial institutions but 
because of their own internal weaknesses that made it difficult for them to obtain access to 
finance. The weaknesses identified by Mbonyane and Ladzani included unlicensed 
businesses, poor record keeping and poor financial management, for example absence of a 
reliable track record. Mbonyane and Ladzani went on to conclude that there was a lack of 
information distribution between SMEs and the government and that was why lending was 
limited.  
3.4.2 Financing options for SMEs 
Financing options in this study meant different forms of financing, either monetary or 
nonmonetary, that financial institutions offer offered to SMEs. These could also include 
different lending criteria. A number of papers have been written on different financing 
options available for SMEs. Some authors have reported positive effects while others have 
reported certain drawbacks with regard to different lending options.  
 
In Serbia, a study on bank lending to SMEs was conducted using standard questionnaires and 
detailed on-site interviews with eight banks. The study found that the financing options 
provided by banks in Serbia included working capital and investment finance as well as other 
credit-related products, for example credit cards, overdrafts and guarantees. The most 
important lending products were found to be short-term loans and overdrafts. According to 
the World Bank, the types of products offered to SMEs are not much different from what is 
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offered to larger companies. The larger foreign banks offer a larger range of products and 
more sensitive pricing than the domestically owned banks (World Bank, 2012). 
 
In an article on the discussions that took place on 26 April 2012 at the OECD financial 
roundtable with participants from the private financial sector, Wehinger (2012) stated that 
mezzanine financing
3
 was proposed as a financing option of providing finance to SMEs. He 
went on to say that new policy efforts to promote new lending by banks to SMEs such as 
reducing the cost of borrowing, at least during the transition stage of a business, could also be 
used. Equity financing was also identified as another option that could be considered by 
banks instead of debt financing.  
 
However, an internal report of the supply-side regulatory review of 2002 in Pretoria, South 
Africa, by the Task Force Group of the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation 
argued that although equity finance had advantages for SMEs, some of which were that 
dividends were paid only once a business had made a profit and the holders of equity were 
business partners themselves, it had disadvantages as well. Some of the disadvantages that 
the task force reported were that unlike interest, dividends were not deductible from tax and 
that for competitive reasons, shareholders might demand greater disclosure than the owner 
would be willing to make. The task force reported that with equity finance, financiers were 
advantaged in a way that businesses that turned out to be successful would always assess the 
cost of the funds that they received and eventually settle their debts and request more funding 
(The Task Group of the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation s.a).  
 
In developing an alternative model of financing SMEs in Ghana, Akorsu and Agyapong 
(2012) observed that existing funding institutions were tormented by several problems and 
therefore they proposed a model called the SMEs network fund model (see Figure 3.1) The 
model derives its foundation from three theories: the social network theory, the social 
exchange theory and the theory of large numbers. The social network theory is of the view 
                                                 
3
 Mezzanine finance is used by “companies that are cash flow positive to fund further growth through expansion 
projects, acquisitions and recapitalization” (Silbernagel & Davis, 2003:2).  
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that SMEs may gain great advantage from collaboration and forming relationships and 
subsequently knowledge exchange. The social exchange theory explains that business 
partners need to share their knowledge with others rather than to withhold information for 
their own strategic advantage. The theory of large numbers is mostly used by insurance 
companies and individuals who have little funds to invest (Akorsu & Agyapong, 2012). This 
could be applied to agricultural SMEs in the sense that resources are pooled together into a 
fund from time to time by different stakeholders including SMEs themselves and SMEs could 
have access to the fund at a cheaper rate than other lenders. A manager can be employed to 
manage such a fund. In this way, information is shared by stakeholders in the fund and 
networks are formed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1: The SMEs network fund model 
Source: Akorsu & Agyapong (2012) 
 
As stated above, a fund manager will scrutinise received applications to offer advice and 
counselling to the applicants on how to utilise the funds.  Moreover, funds accessed from the 
SME fund will require no collateral. Unlike existing schemes, the SME fund will be headed 
by volunteers from the SMEs, representatives from government, representatives from 
international bodies and other institutional investors (Akorsu & Agyapong, 2012).   
STATE CONTRIBUTION 
Venture capital funds 
International donors 
SMEs 
fund 
Private investors 
Small and medium enterprises 
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3.4.3 SME financing gap  
A study in Western Australia that used three focus group discussions, a mail survey and a 
review of literature to investigate both the supply- and demand-side issues for SME owners 
found a strong link in the literature between the availability of finance and SME growth, 
leading to the belief of the existence of a finance gap, which implies that there may be major 
‘barriers’ preventing an owner’s access to equity (Watson, Newby & Mahuka, 2009).  
 
The G-20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion SME Finance Sub-Group reports that 
many SMEs in different sectors may not have the security required for conventional 
collateral-based bank lending or high enough returns to attract risk investors while their 
financial requirements are too large for the type of finance that they require. This has led to 
speculations of an SME finance gap, particularly in emerging and developing countries (IFC 
2011). 
 
Doran et al. (2009) in the Oxfam research report refer to the agricultural finance gap as a 
‘missing middle’, which means that loans are rarely provided in the range between where 
small amounts of finance requested end and where large amounts of finance commence. In 
general, agricultural SMEs borrow funds that are too small and they are considered risky, 
hence the existence of a gap. 
 
Because of the persistent financing gap, existing SMEs’ financing interventions can be 
classified into two options, namely official schemes and financing provided by financial 
institutions. Official schemes are schemes introduced by government, either alone or with the 
support of donor agencies, to increase the flow of financing to SMEs (Mensah, 2004). 
Financial institutions can include commercial banks, insurance companies, discount houses, 
finance houses, leasing companies’ savings and loans associations, credit unions and stock 
exchanges. Added to these are several rural banks. Because of the lack of collateral and/or 
credit history, most farmers are bypassed not only by commercial and national development 
banks but also by formal microcredit institutions (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990). In addition to their 
own savings, farmers therefore rely on incomes of friends and relatives, remittances and 
informal moneylenders (Salami, Kamara & Brixiova, 2010).  
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has provided the theoretical framework that guided the study and a brief review 
of the literature with regard to SME finance. The aim was to provide a picture of the financial 
constraints faced by SMEs in general. There are key financial barriers affecting SMEs as a 
result of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. This is a sign of market 
failure, and government intervention could play a role in piloting innovations in lending to 
support SMEs in their growth.  
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Chapter 4  
OVERVIEW OF THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief outline of the methodology applied in this study. Due to the 
structure of the dissertation, each paper undertakes a deeper analysis of the methodology 
relevant to the specific objective of the paper, as outlined earlier.  
4.2 METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology for this study derived from the objectives. In using a qualitative 
methodology, a case study research design by way of in-depth semi-structured interviews and 
document analysis was followed. According to Creswell (2013), qualitative research is an 
approach for exploring and understanding the meaning that individuals or groups assign to a 
social or human problem. The qualitative methodology was considered to be appropriate for 
this study because the researcher’s aim was to interact with people in their natural settings, 
using a language that they understood and then finding out what meanings they attached to 
financial access for agriculture. Talking to participants in their natural settings was helpful in 
exploring and gaining insight into the topic under investigation.  
A case study provides a deeper understanding of a phenomenon. It assists in exploring a case 
using a number of data sources (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Baxter and Jack suggest that in 
choosing a case study research design, one must consider the type of case study to be 
conducted and the decision should be guided by the overall study purpose. Yin (2009) and 
Stake (1995) describe a variety of case studies. Yin categorises case studies as explanatory, 
exploratory or descriptive. Stake (1995) uses the terms ‘collective’ and ‘intrinsic’ in 
differentiating case studies and suggests that when several cases are conducted to form a 
collective understanding of the issues or questions, it is referred to as a collective case study 
and when a case is studied for the intrinsic interest of the case itself, it is referred to as an 
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intrinsic case study. This research was an exploratory study with both a collective and an 
intrinsic nature. 
4.2.1 Why the case study approach was the best methodology for this study 
A case study compared to other approaches such as survey research allows the researcher to 
use a combination of different sources of evidence (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). The case 
study strategy has a considerable ability to generate answers to the ‘why?’, ‘what?’ and 
‘how?’ questions, and for this reason, these types of questions are often applicable in 
explanatory and exploratory research (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007).  
The researcher believed that a case study was the best methodology to use because the study 
intended to explore, build on existing theory from multiple perspectives and then contribute 
to the understanding of access to finance among agricultural SMEs in Namibia, financial 
providers such as Agribank, policy makers and other stakeholders by answering the ‘what’, 
‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. This study sought to investigate a contemporary phenomenon 
within the financial institutions/participants’ real-life settings by using multiple data 
collection methods. In other words, the aim was to understand the depth rather than the 
breadth of the issues concerning access to finance on the ground. Hence, the researcher 
believed that the data needed for this aim could be gathered more effectively by using this 
approach as opposed to others. 
4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis approach  
A semi-structured interview is a verbal interchange between two people whereby one person, 
the interviewer, attempts to elicit information. Although the interviewer prepares a number of 
questions well in advance, semi-structured interviews unfold in a conversational manner, 
offering participants the chance to explore issues that they feel are important (Longhurst, 
2009). Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to follow his or her own thoughts, and 
probing techniques are allowed (Cooper & Schindler, 2011).  
Secondary data and documents such as research reports, policies, newspaper articles, relevant 
financial institutions’ annual reports, and published and unpublished journal articles related to 
the topic were used to supplement the semi-structured interviews.  
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4.3 SAMPLE METHOD AND SITE SELECTION 
The idea behind qualitative research is to judiciously select participants or sites (or 
documents or other materials) that will best help the researcher to understand the problem and 
the research question (Creswell, 2003, cited in Grobler, 2010). One way of sampling 
suggested is purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is used when the researcher uses his or 
her own judgement to select cases that will best enable him or her to answer the research 
questions and meet the objectives. This is mostly used when working with very small 
samples such as in case study research. Purposive sampling is a nonprobability method of 
sampling
4
 whereby respondents are chosen according to the researcher’s judgement as to 
their suitability for the projects. It is also referred to as judgement sampling (Sarantakos, 
2005). This study utilised a purposive sampling method.  
Unlike probability sampling, in nonprobability sampling methods, there are no rules when it 
comes to selecting the sample size. The sample size depends on the research objectives for 
the research question(s) (Saunders et al., 2012). The following criteria were included in 
choosing participants and research sites in Namibia: 
1.  Participants had to be involved in primary production with a farm size between 3 and 
12 hectares.  
2.  Participants had to produce to sell and not for family consumption. 
Table 4.1 below provides the population list of the Green Scheme projects that fitted the 
criteria above that the researcher was presented with by the Agricultural Business 
Development Agency (AGRIBUSDEV) office in Windhoek, Namibia.  
 
                                                 
4
 Because the dissertation is made up of four different but thematically connected research papers, each paper 
had a different sample size and this is indicated in each of the forthcoming research papers. This chapter only 
provides the population list. 
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Table 4.1: Population list of Green Scheme projects 
Green Scheme projects Number of farmers 
(with valid 
contracts
5
) in a 
Green Scheme 
project  
Region 
1. Etunda Green Scheme Irrigation Project 9 Omusati Region 
2. Uvhungu-Vhungu Green Scheme 
Irrigation Project 
10 Kavango  East 
Region 
3. Hardap Green Scheme Irrigation Project 13 Hardap Region 
4. Ndonga Linena Green Scheme Irrigation 
Project 
28 Kavango East 
Region 
5. Shadikongoro Green Scheme Irrigation 
Project 
13 Kavango East 
Region 
Source: Nambili (2014)  
To have a clear idea of the location of the Green Scheme projects in the country, see the map 
below: 
 
                                                 
5
 The researcher only received the population list of farmers whose farming lease contracts had been renewed at 
the time of the interviews from AGIRBUSDEV. The real number of farmers may be more than reported in this 
dissertation.  
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Figure 4.1: Map of Namibia with regions 
Source: Stat planet
6
 
4.4 RESEARCH PROCEDURES  
Participants were given informed consent forms to read. They were given the opportunity to 
ask any questions related to the study and had to sign the forms before the researcher could 
commence with the interview. All questions were translated into Oshiwambo (the language 
of the Omusati Region). For participants who could not understand the official language, 
English (For example in Kavango region, many of the participants could only speak in 
                                                 
6
 Stat Planet is a software for interactive data visualisation and mapping. 
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rukwangari.), a person was used to help with translation in the Kavango Region as the 
researcher could not understand the language. The collected data were reported in such a way 
that persons could not be identified. The interviews lasted no more than 45 minutes each. The 
interviews were conducted between September and December 2014 and again during 
December/January 2015 at the interviewees’ places of work, which were located mostly at 
the Green Scheme projects on the demand side and bank offices on the supply side. The 
interviews were taped and transcribed for analysis, and anonymity of the participants was 
ensured.  
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS 
If qualitative research is to yield meaningful and useful results, it is imperative that the 
material under scrutiny be analysed in a methodical manner (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Pope, 
Ziebland & Mays, 2014). Content and thematic analyses were the main techniques for data 
analysis. To support the analysis, the software ATLAS.ti was used. For a computer-assisted 
analysis, Friese (2014) suggests the use of the NCT approach – Noticing things, Collecting 
things and Thinking about things (see Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: The NCT model 
Source: Friese (2014:15) 
Noticing things according to Friese (2014) refers to the process of finding interesting things 
in the data when reading through transcripts, field notes, documents, reports and so forth. 
After data collection, interviews were transcribed, read through, cleaned up and uploaded into 
the ATLAS.ti software. It was during this process that noticing things in the data started. 
After the researcher had noticed the right information in the data pertinent to the research 
questions, collecting things began.  
Collecting things refers to the process of naming things that one has noticed and grouping 
those things that belong together or have the same name. This is referred to as coding. Codes 
relevant to the research questions were created, and themes were established. Data were then 
systematically examined to see ways in which themes were portrayed. This study employed 
an open coding with both an inductive and a deductive framework approach. Coding is 
defined by Cooper and Schindler (2011) as categorising and combing the data for themes, 
ideas and categories and then marking similar passages of text with a code label.  
Thinking about things refers to the ability to think about things that one has noticed and 
collected in order to find patterns and relations in the data. The categories were refined 
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through a repetitive glance at the data. During this process, subcategories or new categories 
of themes were identified and analysis continued until no new categories emerged. The 
research question memoranda were then set up and linked to the various types of constraints 
identified in the data.  
Using the NCT method of analysis enables an analyst to work in a systematic manner (Friese, 
2014). The main aim is to put all the findings together and gain a coherent understanding of 
the phenomenon. 
In the findings section, illustrative comments are presented in the form of quotes for the 
various themes in order to provide a sense of what participants actually experienced.  
4.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There are certain limitations that are associated with qualitative research. These limitations as 
outlined by Sarantakos (2005:46) include:  
1. Efficacy.-.qualitative research is unable to study relationships between variables with 
the degree of accuracy that is required to establish social trends or to inform social 
policies. 
2. Representativeness – qualitative research is based on small samples and hence does 
not produce representative results 
3. Generalisability – Findings in qualitative research cannot be generalised 
4. Objectivity – the methodological approach does not ensure objectivity, and hence the 
quality of the findings is questionable. 
5. Validity and reliability – the research structure and procedure do not ensure the 
validity and reliability of methods 
6. Replicability – Given the individualist and subjectivist nature of qualitative research, 
replicability of studies is not possible 
7. Ethics – The nature of research that allows close contact with respondents can lead to 
ethical problems 
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8. Time  - Qualitative inquiry is very time consuming 
9. Costs – Qualitative research is very expensive. 
The above limitations are characteristics to the nature of the research and should be seen in 
their contexts as strengths and not weaknesses. Furthermore, many of the aspects are different 
and not inferior. For instance validity and reliability are observed in qualitative research but 
in a way that is different from (not inferior to) those employed in quantitative research.  
Some of the limitations pointed out above applied to this study. Namibia is a country with a 
highly dispersed population, the research only covered a small number of farmers, especially 
those without Agribank loans, and this may have created some bias. The reason for this is that 
independent farmers are difficult to locate because they are not farming in one place as 
compared to Agribank loan holders who are mainly found in Green Scheme projects. 
Nevertheless, many of the participants were representative because one farmer with an 
Agribank loan in a particular Green Scheme project could also have represented the entire 
Green Scheme in a region because of repetitions in farmers’ interviews and therefore data 
saturation. The study mitigated the limitations by ensuring that both private and Green 
Scheme farmers were included in the study and ensuring regional representation. 
Furthermore, the research design employed allowed for the sample size used in this study.  
4.7 CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Yin (2009), there are criteria to consider in judging the quality of the research. 
These are construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. For this study, 
quality was ensured by doing the following: 
Qualitative credibility is achieved through practices including thick description, triangulation 
or crystallization, multivocality and partiality (Tracy, 2010). This study has provided a thick 
description of the data and used triangulation methods that ensured its validity. For construct 
validity, multiple sources of evidence, namely interviews, secondary data and document 
analysis, were used. The secondary data documents provided the necessary information to 
make cross-references for the inferences from primary data. 
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For external validity, the results from this study may only be generalised to relevant theory 
used in carrying out the study and not to the population.  
The reliability of the data for this study is solely attributable to the answers given by the 
interviewees. The procedures used in carrying out the study were documented to allow data 
collection and analysis by another researcher. 
Internal validity is about establishing causal relationships. Because this study did not measure 
any relationships, internal validity is not applicable to the study.  
4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has provided an overview of the methodology used in the study. A qualitative 
approach (using multiple sources of evidence) was adopted in order to understand issues at 
the grassroots level. The researcher employed a purposive sampling method to ensure that the 
research questions were answered by the right participants. The chapter has also highlighted 
the limitations of the study and criteria for judging the quality of the research. 
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Chapter 5  
CONSTRAINTS TO FINANCING AGRICULTURE IN NAMIBIA
7
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sir Paul Collier, the British mainstream economist, has consistently denounced small-scale 
agriculture in Africa. Recently, he and his colleague (Stefan Dercon) claimed that “trying to 
fix market imperfection problems in the credit market is the best solution not promoting 
smallholder agriculture” (Collier & Dercon, 2014:93). The experience of Namibia, however, 
shows that Collier’s analysis is oversimplified. The country is pursuing a smallholder-driven 
approach (MAWF, 2008) with constraints and opportunities that defy Collier’s dualism. One 
of the desired outcomes of the NDP4 is for agriculture to experience average real growth of 
4% per annum over the NDP4 period 2012–2017. As a major strategy towards the realisation 
of this goal, continued financial and technical support is expected to be offered to those 
involved in agricultural production activities (NPC, 2013). This strategy warrants careful 
study, particularly because while smallholder activities abound in Africa (Elhadary, Samat & 
Obeng-Odoom, 2013), the state in Africa – much like described by Collier – has tended to be 
quite antagonistic to farming on a small scale, preferring instead to promote commercial and 
large-scale agriculture (Obeng-Odoom, 2015).  
Our knowledge of small-scale agriculture, particularly its financial aspects, remains 
inadequate even though financial services in Africa continue to expand (Abor, Alagidede, 
Ocran & Adjasi, 2014; Both, 2015). Research on financial development in Africa has also 
grown in recent times (see e.g. Domeher, Frimpong & Appiah, 2014; Gwama, 2014; Mazanai 
& Fatoki, 2012; Ndikumana, 2001), but it does not centre on agriculture, a focus that can help 
to advance the global debate on financing development (see Both, 2015) and development 
finance more generally.  
 
                                                 
7
 This paper has been accepted for publication by the African Review of Economics and Finance and will appear 
in the December 2016 issue. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
65 
 
 
 
 
The paper addresses this gap by relating the research on finance to the financial constraints 
faced by SMEs in agriculture. Theoretically, the paper focuses on the so-called logic of 
market failure and, as a result, the need for government intervention. Eyiah and Cook (2003) 
cite imperfections in financial markets as one of the specific constraints to financial access 
for SMEs. Beck, Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) identified these imperfections as 
collateral requirements, bank paperwork and bureaucracy, high interest rates in comparison 
with the profitability of agricultural activities, the need to have special connections with 
banks, lack of money in the banking system and lack of access to financing for leasing 
equipment. However, Beck and Demirguç-Kunt (2006) found evidence that it was not only 
market imperfections that impeded SMEs’ access to financial services but also their 
institutional weaknesses. Put simply, real-life markets contain varying and systemic degrees 
of imperfections from both the demand and the supply side (see Minot, 1986).  
 
The formal contribution of this paper lies in the new data collected and the methodology 
adopted. Most of the literature on this topic in Namibia and elsewhere has used secondary 
information that was either from census data (e.g. Adongo & Deen-Swarray, 2006; High 
Level Panel of Experts, 2013; World Bank, 2013) or panel data and/or regression analysis 
(e.g. Guirkinger & Boucher, 2008; Obeng, 2008; Reyes, Lensink, Kuyvenhoven & Moll, 
2012). Although these studies have provided a ‘big picture’ of financial access for small 
businesses, they have not paid sufficient attention to the complexities that both farmers and 
financial organisations face every day that might have an impact on poverty in local 
communities. This paper, in contrast, goes further to describe and explain the phenomenon 
surrounding constraints to financing agriculture from the ‘ground’ using a naturalistic 
approach with narratives that highlight and illustrate key issues. This alternative approach 
reveals that a lack of collateral and poor loan recovery on the supply side and insufficient 
capital, bureaucracy and lack of collateral on the demand side are the biggest constraints to 
financing agricultural SMEs from formal financial institutions. 
 
Following this introduction, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 
provides a conceptualisation of financial constraints and agricultural SME finance followed 
by a review of the literature on financing constraints in Section 5.3. The methodology for 
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sample size is explained in Section 5.4. The results are presented in Section 5.5, and Section 
5.6 makes up the discussion and summary.  
5.2 CONCEPTUALISING FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND AGRICULTURAL 
SME FINANCE  
The definition of a ‘financing constraint’ or ‘credit constraint’ comes from the work of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, as cited in Reyes et al., 2012). According to the definition used, 
certain individuals obtain loans while other individuals, who are willing to borrow at 
precisely the same terms, do not. Because lenders may take on risky project applications only 
at high interest rates, they refuse to raise the interest rate to eliminate excess demand and, 
consequently, may ration their supply of credit. This type of credit is referred to as quantity 
rationing and is therefore a supply-side credit constraint. On the demand side, risk rationing 
and transaction cost rationing are other forms of credit constraints identified. Risk rationing 
constraint refers to a situation where farmers may not seek a formal loan because the risk 
implied by the available credit contract is too high whereas transaction cost rationing 
constraint refers to a situation where farmers may not seek a loan simply because of high 
transaction costs. Growing empirical literature suggests that in rural areas of developing 
countries, credit constraints have significant adverse effects on farm output (Huppi & Feder, 
1990), farm profit (Carter, 1988; Foltz, 2004) and farm investment (Carter & Olinto, 2003) 
whether for large-, medium- or small-scale enterprises.  
 
Agribank refers to enterprises that are small, medium and involved in agricultural production 
as small- and medium-scale
8
 farmers as opposed to small- and medium-scale enterprises. 
Small-scale farmers are those who are farming on 3–6 hectares, and medium-scale farmers 
are those who are farming on 12 hectares. However, Kirsten and Van Zyl (1998) are of the 
opinion that the size of the land alone is not a good criterion to define small-scale farms. 
They argue that “Defining the ‘viable farm’ in terms of size alone had a profoundly negative 
effect on the relative profitability of farms smaller than the viable size” (Kirsten & Van Zyl, 
1998:562). 
                                                 
8
 For a detailed definition of SMEs, see Chapter 3. 
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This paper therefore combines the definitions of Agribank and Kirsten and Van Zyl (1998) to 
define a small-scale farmer as one who is farming on 3–6 hectares and has maximum annual 
turnover of less than US$20 292. A medium-scale farmer is one who is farming on 12 
hectares and has maximum annual turnover not exceeding US$39 919. This paper argues that 
SMEs in the Namibian context shall be defined to include medium-scale enterprises as well. 
It would be ideal to review the existing definition to allow for comparisons. 
Although the definition of agricultural SME finance
9
 found includes the whole value chain, 
this essay refers to agricultural SME finance as financial services for SMEs engaged in 
primary agricultural crop production (i.e. farming) and not the whole value chain.  
5.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW: IDENTIFIED FINANCING 
CONSTRAINTS 
The literature on financing constraints in agricultural SMEs has developed around six themes, 
namely collateral and land issues, bank paperwork and bureaucracy, risk posed by seasonality 
with long gestation periods, poor access to markets and low profits, lack of skills in 
agriculture and information asymmetry. Each of these is reviewed in turn.  
5.3.1 Collateral and land issues 
Land is no doubt an important asset to have in agriculture as it not only helps to increase 
farmers’ confidence in what they are doing but may also improve access to financial services. 
Trzeciak-Duval (2003) avers that well-established property rights, particularly regarding the 
use of land, are of particular importance in the agricultural sector because they lead to the 
possibility of using land as collateral and credit constraints can be eased. Similarly, Foltz 
(2004) used survey data of randomly selected households engaged in irrigated farming in the 
Cap Bon region of north-eastern Tunisia to measure the credit rationing of households. He 
emphasises that having title to land is expected to have a greater influence on supply than 
demand because it increases collateral and creates a direct relationship to supply while land 
                                                 
9
 The conceptualisation of agricultural SME finance has been explained in the paper accepted for publication, In 
order to avoid too much repetition in the dissertation, the same definition of agricultural SME finance has 
already been provided in Chapter 3. 
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titles bring about an increase in demand through an investment demand equation, which in 
the end benefits lenders. This result is in line with the findings of Reyes et al. (2012:12) who 
used a panel data set from a survey conducted in 2006 and 2008 with 177 farmers and found 
that “possession of land reduces the probability of being credit constrained. Titled land may 
be used as collateral which helps formal financial institutions overcome adverse selection and 
moral hazard problem”.  
While studies by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) and Cabannes (2012) in addition to those 
reviewed above have stressed the importance of land tenure in order to have better access to 
financial services on both the demand and the supply side, Gilbert (2002) has a different 
opinion based on his data gathered in the self-help settlement of Bogota, Colombia. His 
results show that having title to land does not necessarily lead to formal access to credit. In 
other words, land ownership makes little or no difference to the availability of formal sources 
of credit. Because of transfer uncertainty, the bank may not accept land as collateral because 
it may not be able to repossess it in case of default. Even when borrowers have title to land, 
they may not be willing to borrow because of fear that they may not be able to repay the loan. 
Similarly, a critical review of the relevant literature on land registration, access to credit and 
agricultural investment by Domeher and Abdulai (2012) agrees with Gilbert (2002) in 
explaining that owning land has failed to enhance agricultural investment because the 
demand side does not provide an incentive for investment for reasons such as widespread 
poverty in Africa, a lack of appropriate agriculture-based infrastructure and the highly risky 
nature of agriculture in Africa. The supply side, namely lenders, in contrast, does not look at 
land registration in isolation but also looks at where that particular land is located and 
whether it can be used as collateral. In addition, lenders’ views are that land registration does 
not change the profitability of agricultural activities or improve the repayment capacity of 
farmers. Domeher and Abdulai (2012) therefore conclude that the pursuit of land registration 
alone as an agricultural investment tool may fail unless critical factors are given priority. 
These include interventions by government to tackle the problems that have made African 
agriculture highly risky, unprofitable and unattractive.  
Plainly, land is just part of the equation in gaining financial access, at least when it comes to 
agriculture, and not the solution. Beck (2013) surveyed the recent literature on the 
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relationship between SMEs, financial deepening and economic development and concluded 
that loan classifications that relied completely on collateral were biased against SMEs that 
had less hard collateral available. Perhaps other types of lending requirements, such as 
relationship lending, should be considered.  
5.3.2 Bank paperwork and bureaucracy 
Beck, Demirguç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2006), whose data were taken from the 
World Business Environment Survey conducted in 1999 and 2000 in 80 developing 
countries, argue that agricultural and construction firms face greater obstacles compared to 
service firms, especially when it comes to bank paperwork, bureaucracy and high interest 
rates. For SMEs, processing loan applications usually takes longer due to the number of 
forms that they must complete, which makes it more difficult for them to even think about 
gaining access to finance from a formal financial institution. Bureaucracy, or red tape as it is 
often referred to, generally involves completing seemingly unnecessary paperwork, obtaining 
unnecessary licences, having multiple people or committees approve a decision and having to 
abide by various low-level rules that make conducting one’s affairs slower, more difficult or 
both (Martini, 2013). Rehber (1998) note that farmers who are involved in contract farming 
run the risk of nonrenewal or termination of contracts for noneconomic reasons and losing 
timely receipt of desired quality and quantity of their products. 
In order to reduce the bureaucratic process, some countries have adopted measures developed 
by the OECD in 2006 to reduce the regulatory burden on SMEs. Process reengineering is 
one. Within these measures, timeframe is established and ‘silence is consent’. This means 
that institutions have a timeframe in which to respond to financial requests, and failure to do 
so implies that all the necessary conditions have been met (Martini, 2013).  
5.3.3 Risk posed by seasonality with long gestation periods 
By isolating promising cases of emergent and innovative financing, risk mitigation and 
distribution models, the IFC identified key elements observed across various case studies in 
developing countries and found that challenges in lending to agriculture existed because of 
the risk associated with seasonality, with long gestation periods from planting to harvest. The 
result is that cash flows are highly seasonal and sometimes irregular, with earnings 
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concentrated in certain times of the year. Because of this, there is slow income from 
agricultural SMEs as compared to SMEs in other sectors. For a financial institution, this 
means that short-term agricultural credit may need to be repaid in ‘lumpy instalments’, 
sometimes over multiple seasons. It also means that farmers require flexible and targeted 
savings and term finance products to meet their specific needs. From the banker’s point of 
view, irregular repayment schedules make liquidity management more challenging and 
require costly investments in developing customised loan products in an unfamiliar sector 
(IFC, 2012).  
Seasonality, especially with crops, has to do with the nature of agriculture, which is mainly 
rainfed. In Namibia, as a very dry country, seasonality poses a very big problem for farmers 
in terms of access to finance because it means that banks may not be willing to finance 
agriculture at all. 
5.3.4 Poor access to markets and low profits 
The main constraint faced by farmers is poor access to markets. In order to meet the demands 
of the consumers, food retailers usually need products that are packaged by their suppliers 
and are of high quality. Consumers usually look for these types of products from food 
retailers rather than straight from smallholders because the products from smallholders are 
perceived to be unclean and not of high quality. Based on a comparative analysis of 
international development activities in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Near East, Minot 
(1986) claims that smallholders usually lack the capital to maintain the set standard and to 
meet this type of demand and that the lack of credible assurance of quality reduces the 
demand for a product to the point that the market disappears. Fibiger, Weber and Schnabel 
(2011) note that as a result of this, smallholders struggle to settle their debts because their 
profits are quite small due to marketing difficulties and harvest losses, and when the state 
steps in for those who are unable to pay back their loans, there are cases of abuse where loans 
are used for things other than the declared purposes. In Namibia, even if farmers produce, 
harvest and deliver their produce to relevant marketing agencies in the country, they still 
stand a chance of nonpayment for their produce, thus experiencing low profits. “After you 
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harvest, they take your produce and go. Officials threaten farmers with eviction from the 
State-owned vineyards if they complain about the non-payment” (Haidula, 2015:1). 
5.3.5 Lack of skills in agriculture 
On the one hand, using mainly secondary sources of information in examining the status of 
agricultural and rural finance in South Africa, De Klerk, Fraser and Fullerton (2013) argue 
that many financial institutions do not understand adequately how specialised the agricultural 
sector is and how difficult it is to succeed and/or transform from an emerging into a 
commercial farmer. On the other hand, the Agricultural Sector Skills Plan reports that 
farmers do not have the requisite skills to perform their work to an expected standard 
(Namibia Training Authority, 2013). However, Norton, Alwang and Masters (2015) posit that 
often the training provided in agriculture, especially in developing countries, does not 
correspond to the real conditions faced by farmers and that usually time spent in such training 
reduces time available for other relevant activities. The Ghana banking survey that used 
interviews with a number of stakeholders to sample their views on SMEs concluded that 
banks should invest in acquiring a good understanding of working with SMEs, irrespective of 
the industries or economic sectors that they operate in or the scale of their operations. This is 
crucial for banks-SMEs relationships and therefore important for the financial inclusion 
question (Pricewaterhouse Coopers Ghana, 2013). 
5.3.6 Information asymmetry 
Imperfect information is usually the main reason for higher transaction costs, especially in 
rural areas where farmers are located. The opinion of Bartlett and Bukvič (2001) whose 
research was based on a sample survey of small firms in Slovenia and on an econometric 
analysis of the sources of firms’ growth is that 
Information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers make it hard for banks to 
determine the real value of a project, and lead to credit rationing Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981 as cited by Bartlett & Bukvič 2001). The high risk of credit to SMEs with 
information asymmetry may explain the relatively high interest rates charged to those 
borrowers, and the demands made on SMEs by banks for high collateral and loan 
guarantees (Bartlett & Bukvič, 2001:182) 
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Aleem (1990) used 14 informal money market lenders and their clients in Chambar, Pakistan, 
to examine whether high implicit interest rates charged reflected the actual costs of operating 
in that particular market. He found that due to imperfections, the lender was not motivated to 
reduce interest rates in order to increase the number of borrowers, even when rates were well 
above the lender’s marginal cost of lending. Imperfect information available to farmers about 
the terms on which loan contracts are being sold in the market implies that a lowering of 
interest rates is a signal that filters through to only a limited section of the market. This is a 
situation that occurs mostly with informal moneylenders; however, these types of lenders 
were beyond the scope of this study.  
Trzeciak-Duval (2003) is of the opinion that sources of information are important to creditors 
to establish credit histories and to borrowers to obtain market information and to produce 
data. Because of a lack of information, a moral hazard problem usually arises. The latter 
normally occurs because individuals’ actions cannot be observed and hence contracted on 
(see Holmstrom, 1979). 
5.4 METHODOLOGY 
Adopting the methodology explained in Chapter 4, the way in which questions were 
structured depended on whether farmers had received finance from Agribank or not and 
whether they were small- or medium-scale farmers (see appendixes A and B). The 
participants’ history and experience decided which topics were important in the various 
interviews. 
5.4.1 Sample size  
To ensure that there was equal representation of the Green Scheme projects from the list 
provided
10
 in terms of the location of regions in the country, the following Green Scheme 
projects (with corresponding sample sizes) were judiciously selected per region on the 
demand side:  
1. Etunda Green Scheme Irrigation Project – 5 
                                                 
10
 The population list is provided in Chapter 4. 
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2. Hardap Green Scheme Irrigation Project – 6 
3. Ndonga Linena Green Scheme Irrigation Project – 5  
Table 5.1 in the results section shows the characteristics of all the participants.  
On the supply side, two interviews were conducted at the Agribank Head Office in the 
Khomas Region and Oshakati Branch in the Oshana Region to determine the constraints that 
Agribank experienced in financing agricultural SMEs. 
5.4.2 Research measures and justification of sample size 
After ethics approval by the University of Stellenbosch Business School ethics committee 
and permission by Agribank had been granted, a total of 16 interviews were conducted for 
this paper (11 small-scale farmers and 5 medium-scale farmers were interviewed). Included 
in the 16 interviews were 3 independent
11
 farmers in the same regions who were operating 
outside
12
 the Green Scheme projects. These were Second Chance Garden in the Omusati 
Region and Pozere and Gamade gardens in the Kavango East Region.  
The adequacy of only two interviews on the supply side is certain in the sense that besides 
Agribank having branches (six in total) in other regions, many of the decisions of these other 
branches go through Head Office (Khomas Region) before they are implemented. In addition, 
Oshakati Branch in the Oshana Region deals with farmers of various scales in four northern 
regions, which is the highest number of regions dealt with compared to the other four 
Agribank branches (in the Hardap, Kavango East, Caprivi and Otjozondjupa regions) that 
deal only with a maximum of one or two regions. Because of this, the researcher was sure to 
obtain more detailed information from the Khomas and Oshana regions than the other 
regions. On the demand side, the accessibility of the farmers, more especially farmers without 
Agribank loans, the willingness of participants to speak freely with the interviewer and data 
saturation determined the number of interviews conducted (see Mason, 2010). Furthermore, 
                                                 
11
 Independent in this dissertation means not receiving financial assistance from Agribank and/or operating 
outside the Green Scheme projects. 
12
 Identified by way of snowball sampling. 
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the high level of homogeneity among the population resulted in 30 codes
13
 being developed 
just after the first 8 interviews and 40 codes after all 16 interviews (before the structured code 
list) on the demand side was sufficient to enable development of meaningful themes and 
useful interpretations (see Friese, 2014; Guest et al., 2006, cited in Mason, 2010). 
5.5 RESULTS 
5.5.1 Characteristics of the participants on the demand side 
Table 5.1 below shows that the majority of independent farmers own medium-scale farms 
compared to out-grower farmers who own small-scale farms.  
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the participants 
Characteristics of farmers without Agribank loans  Characteristics of farmers with Agribank 
loans in Green Scheme projects  
 Hardap Kavango 
East 
Omusati Hardap Kavango 
East 
Omusati 
Sex n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Male 3 (100) 2 (100) 0 (0) 1 (50) 3 75 2 (50) 
Female 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (50) 1 (25) 2 (50) 
Size of farm 
Small 0 (0) 2 (100) 1 (100) 1 (50) 4 (100) 3 (75) 
Medium 3 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (50) 0 (0) 1 (25) 
Average number of 
years in business 
2 8 3 2 4.25 9.5 
Average start-up 
cost 
48 300 2 700 
14
 170 000 93 600 63 500 
 
 
Source: Authors’ data, fieldwork, 2014 
                                                 
13
 See Appendix D for the code book. 
14
 The interviewee did not want to divulge the information. 
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Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Amounts are displayed in US$.  
5.5.2 Financial constraints – demand side 
Demand-side constraints refer to difficulties experienced by borrowers, namely small- and 
medium-scale farmers, in accessing finance from financial institutions. Financing constraints 
were identified from two groups of farmers. One group included farmers who were receiving 
financial assistance from Agribank, and the other group was comprised of farmers without 
Agribank loans. Figure 5.1 below shows the constraints for farmers with Agribank loans, and 
Figure 5.2 shows the constraints for farmers without Agribank loans.  
 
Figure 5.1: Financing constraints for farmers with Agribank loans 
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Figure 5.2: Financing constraints for farmers without Agribank loans 
Source: Authors’ data, fieldwork, 2014 
In combining the two groups of farmers, the top five issues identified were a lack of collateral 
and land issues, bank rules and regulations, insufficient capital, poor understanding among 
loan officers, and bank paperwork and bureaucracy. Only illustrative quotes by participants 
pertaining to the top five constraints are presented. However, quotes for the rest of the 
constraints are available on request.  
5.5.2.1 Lack of collateral and land issues 
Possessing collateral is regarded as one of the main requirements by banks that must be met. 
It is in this context that the independent farmers complained of the following: 
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In Namibia most of the instances, a bankable business plan will not always help you. 
You can say this is the projections of the space, it is a workable thing it will be 
successful but still they would expect collateral. (P1, 93:93
15
) 
 
I don’t know who brought this requirements of even when people want to buy farms, 
you can buy a farm with Agribank you must at least have hundred and fifty cattle that 
was the requirement then I don’t know if they have changed it now and I mean in 
communal areas most of us with historical reasons come from communal areas, 
where are you going to keep running fifty heads of cattle in a communal area? It’s an 
impossibility you know so the requirement, the loan requirements are too stiff, they 
are impractical and they are not workable. (P4, 129:129) 
 
For farmers with Agribank loans, the untitled land provided by the government to small-scale 
farmers leaves farmers with uncertainties not only about how long they will continue with 
their businesses but also about whether they can continue to grow and become medium-scale 
farmers.  
 
The land belongs to the government and not to us and because of this you can find me 
here today but tomorrow I might not be here. A government official can always come 
and say I am not producing and that I should go then they can replace me with 
someone else while they are just seating in government offices. (P12, 92:92)  
 
I was very much impressed to get a loan because it was not easy for me to get it but 
now after five years I am going to graduate to be a medium farmer and I have to have 
my own collateral and the money which they are even talking for me to get a loan they 
are asking lots of money. They are saying at least I must have four hundred thousand 
on the account and it is not easy to have four hundred thousand because now I am 
farming I am having family, I am resettling and the people which are working for me 
                                                 
15
 The numbers at the end of the quotes represent the primary document numbers and paragraph numbers in 
ATLAS.ti. For example P1, 93:93 means that the quote is from primary document 1, starting and ending in 
paragraph 93.  
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they are depending on me because they are also having families and whatever, now it 
is difficult for us farmers like us who are going to graduate to go for the medium 
farmer because their requirements which they are asking is too much which we 
cannot afford. (P9, 110:110) 
5.5.2.2 Bank rules and regulations 
The rules of the bank are found to be discouraging some of the farmers from asking for a loan 
for agricultural purposes because of the bank’s terms and conditions and the repayment 
terms. 
 
Agribank put up a rule that no second bond is to be granted until the loan is paid back 
and information is not very clear why I could not get a second bond. That would 
discourage people to take risks. Also more money is paid back at the end of the day 
than what was given to me in the first place and the system could not trace why I paid 
more money. (P2, 92:94) 
 
Production loans repayment term must be prolonged to 4-5 years because 2 years is 
difficult especially for first time farmers. During the first two years one is still 
thinking of alternative options for business. (P2, 104:104).  
 
Regulations regarding the need for Agribank to have information about the borrower before 
any loan is granted cause frustration among borrowers because they feel that the process 
takes too long and that they do not have any financing options apart from Agribank.  
 
The problem that I experienced was, the long time it took for the bank and the 
training institution to approve my qualification because nothing happens before the 
two institutions come to an agreement. The government should inform the bank that 
we have trained this person and he has passed his training by showing the 
qualifications, on the other hand the bank says no we don’t know the person and we 
are afraid of losing our money. Agribank usually needs assurance from the training 
institution whether we will be able to repay their money as they do not know our 
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capability of repaying the money. The training institution usually tells the bank we 
have been with the person for certain number of years, his performance is good, he 
has good knowledge in farming and we believe that he will be able to repay the bank. 
That’s where the problem is most of time. It takes long for the training institution and 
the bank to come to an agreement on our ability to pay back the money but money can 
only come from Agribank. (P16, 101:101) 
5.5.2.3 Poor understanding among loan officers  
In addition to the above, the absence of loan officers in the field has led farmers to believe 
that the former do not understand the issues that farmers face.  
 
They don’t understand our situation as us farmers who are down here because for 
them they are just in the office. They don’t understand the situation which is on the 
ground in the farm. When you tell them this you know if you are in the office you 
don’t, you are not used even maybe even from their childhood you are not farming 
that’s the problem which we are facing even in our ministry. Most of the workers they 
don’t know what is farming, what are the challenges of farming so they are just there 
in the office when you complain, they say you complain too much but it is us suffering. 
(P7, 168:168) 
 
Another participant noted the following: 
 
There should be someone from Agribank who knows what agriculture is because 
being in agriculture is a tough business there is a lot of challenges and unexpected 
losses. If Agribank has extension officers closer to the farmers who can come and 
assess that this farmer made this huge loss, what special treatment or discount should 
we give him. An unexpected loss is our biggest problem when it comes to our ability 
to pay back the loan. For instance if you look there, I only have two rows of corns left 
the rest are destroyed because there is a lack of water but having water here is not up 
to me but up to the government but I am expected to pay back every cent everything 
though I have not produced enough. These type of things need to be looked at and 
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agricultural officers should be brought closer to the people. After each and every 
month he or she can come and look at how we have worked and assess the situation 
rather than just sitting in the office waiting for us to pay back the money. (P16, 
109:109) 
5.5.2.4 Insufficient capital 
Apart from poor understanding among loan officers, farmers are of the opinion that the 
amount of capital provided from Agribank in the form of a loan is too small and unable to 
cover the cost of inputs and ensure timely production. 
 
 Financial constraints will not end because as we speak we are supposed to plant but 
like I said the amount of money that we receive as a loan is small. We were given the 
loan four years ago when we started but if a bag of maize cost twenty dollars then it 
doesn’t cost the same amount now. Like this year we exceeded before we could not 
even reach the due date of the loan. We cannot even buy input because the loan is 
finished in just one season when it was meant for two seasons. When we tell the 
government to extend our collateral to Agribank so that Agribank can increase our 
loan, they don’t want. (P11:160:160)  
 
5.5.2.5 Bank paperwork and bureaucracy 
The time that it takes for lenders to respond to borrowers is another issue that discourages 
farmers from asking for financial assistance. It leads to farmers giving up or delaying 
production. Participants noted the following:  
 
I did not get any response and whenever I went to ask there was no response so I just 
gave up. (P8, 68:68)  
 
Agribank takes time. If ever you do not have savings of your own you will find 
yourself just waiting for Agribank because Agribank takes forever for what reason I 
don’t know. Maybe it’s because all the farmers in Namibia depend on Agribank or 
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they are waiting for people to pay back their money. I don’t know but Agribank really 
takes long to respond or give assistance way later than they had promised you at first. 
Sometimes the good season to plant just pass you by doing nothing because you do 
not have money just waiting for Agribank although you had repaid your money on 
time. (P13, 99:99) 
 
It is too tedious. I mean you gotta know how tall your mother was, what size of shoes 
she is wearing, I hate those things. I think filling in forms is one thing I hate with a 
passion you know in the end it is as if you have undressed yourself and in the end you 
are told that no your shape is not good enough to get the loan. I mean that’s how I 
feel about applying for loans though we can’t do without but that’s my personal 
feeling. It’s an impossibility you know so the requirements, the loan requirements are 
too stiff, they are impractical and they are not workable. (P4, 98:129)  
 
These issues demonstrate the bureaucratic process that farmers have to go through before 
gaining access to finance.  
5.5.3 Financing constraints – supply side  
Supply-side constraints in this paper refer to difficulties experienced by lenders, namely 
Agribank, in providing finance to borrowers, namely small- and medium-scale farmers. 
The issue of lack of collateral makes up the major constraint among the interviews conducted 
at Agribank (see Figure 5.3). The following section provides illustrative quotes.  
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Figure 5.3: Supply-side financing constraints 
Source: Authors’ data, fieldwork, 2014 
5.5.3.1 Lack of collateral 
The types of properties that are needed by the bank to serve as collateral or security are not 
the ones owned by many farmers who need loans. The following quotes illustrate this fact: 
 
As people don’t have collateral which is part of the requirements that we need that 
becomes a bit difficult for us to grant loans. We have got a branch in Katima its very, 
it’s not performing very well in a sense that you only have a handful of teachers, 
handful of nurses and a handful of policemen that can own a property in town 
because most of them might be staying in villages which of they can’t use that 
property as collateral so to grant loans becomes a bit difficult in that area but it’s 
very, it’s one of the very fertile areas in the country but it needs a boost in terms of 
agricultural sector. (P17, 82:82) 
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5.5.3.2 Moral hazard 
Lenders are reluctant to provide finance because loans are used for purposes other than 
agriculture.  
 
We have got the livestock loan product which I feel is being misused, is being misused 
by the public because the funds are never used for the intended purpose we will try to 
introduce so many measures in order to ensure that someone actually buys the, there 
is a moral hazard problem because someone will then, will then for example come for 
a livestock loan hundred thousand, he will give you all the numbers, these are the 
animals I am going to but ‘…’ most cases that we have is that once the money goes 
into that seller’s account, you’ll see it back again being transferred into the 
applicant’s account and that guy will go buy a cow or whatever it is and when you go 
back onto the ground and say which animals did you buy, it is also a bit of a problem 
because we can’t be there to monitor all these problems it is quite expensive to travel 
throughout the country to see whether the people bought the animals or not. It is a bit 
of a problem. (P17, 100:100)  
5.5.3.3 Poor recovery of loans 
In addition to moral hazard, when Agribank decides to grant loans, it runs the risk of loan 
default among borrowers. This is because the government provides collateral on their behalf 
and farmers feel that if they default on their loans, they have nothing to lose.  
 
For those who are having security they really try their effort to repay because they 
know that there is something at stake. If they don’t pay, the bank might realise that 
security and they will lose out but for those who are not providing the own security 
they are bit reluctant to pay, they know that they don’t have anything to lose. (P18, 
53:53) 
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5.5.3.4 Lack of understanding among SMEs  
The moral hazard problem discussed earlier, also bring about an issue of lack of 
understanding among farmers. Most of the farmers who borrow do not have an understanding 
of what it means to get a loan and therefore end up using it for other purposes.   
 
We assist them in terms of completing the application but I don’t think the people 
understand the implications because he’ll come here and say I have a house, I want a 
loan so his strength of acquiring the loan is based on collateral that he has got or he 
has been able to provide and not necessary based on what he wants to achieve with 
the money or the purpose of that, I feel that is a bit of a problem. Everything is good 
on paper but on the ground it is something else different. (P17, 109:109). 
5.5.3.5 Poor access to markets 
Finally, access to markets is a requirement for gaining access to finance from Agribank, and 
because farmers do not have access to markets, it is difficult for Agribank to grant loans.  
 
They don’t have access to markets, formalised markets where they can sell their 
products. (P17, 67:67) 
5.6 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
The aim of the study was to identify and explain the financing constraints for agricultural 
SMEs. The results in this paper have confirmed that (as illustrated in figures 5.4 and 5.5) 
many of the constraints presented in the results section occur as a result of other constraints. 
Finance is indeed a binding constraint.  
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Figure 5.4: Network view of the demand-side constraints 
Source: Authors’ construct 
 
Figure 5.5: Network view of the supply-side constraints 
Source: Authors’ construct 
Finance is a binding constraint because many of the bank’s rules and regulations have an 
adverse effect on farmers’ ability to gain access to credit because of lack of collateral, 
bureaucratic issues, lending criteria used and short timeframe for land lease, thus affecting 
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production. This essay largely confirms the research discussed in the literature showing 
market imperfections to include lack of information (Bartlett & Bukvič, 2001), bank 
paperwork and bureaucracy (Beck, 2013), lack of collateral (Foltz, 2004) and moral hazard 
problems (Holmstrom, 1979). The deliberately extended quotations from interviews in the 
results section provide an indication of the realities/constraints of farming. Lack of collateral 
is identified as the biggest constraint among independent farmers, but this is not surprising 
because government only provides collateral for small-scale farmers in Green Scheme 
projects. However, this still creates some uncertainty among the farmers who receive 
collateral from Agribank because of a lack of security of tenure: “The land belongs to the 
government and not to us and because of this you can find me here today but tomorrow I 
might not be here.” What is surprising is that farmers in Green Scheme projects but without 
Agribank loans own medium-scale farms (mainly from the Hardap Region) compared to 
small-scale farms owned by Agribank loan holders, which could be an indication of market 
inefficiencies.  
There are several issues that may need special attention on the supply side. These are the fact 
that there are some independent farmers who have already commenced with their businesses 
and may not really need to form part of the Green Scheme projects in order to obtain finance 
from a bank. Such farmers have already shown the capability to produce, and thus other 
factors could be considered to serve as collateral apart from land. Not all farmers outside 
Green Scheme projects are the same; therefore, the merit of each case should be considered. 
Taking into account the fact that medium-scale farmers own bigger plots than small-scale 
farmers, Carter (1988) has noted that banks discriminate against small-scale farmers when 
farm size is used as an indicator of individual characteristics. Although credit is a 
determining factor in profits and investment, market failures such as labour, land and 
transportation issues overwhelm the effect of credit (Foltz, 2004).  
Poor timely response to farmers has been shown to have an undesirable effect on enhancing 
production, therefore causing low profits. It is in this context that the World Bank argues that 
“Small and Medium farmers not only need access to finance for investment, they also need it 
in a timely fashion to take advantage of market and investment opportunities” (World Bank, 
2008a:18). Lack of water also prevents farmers from gaining access to markets because, for 
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example, with no access to water, efficient production becomes a difficult task. This affects 
one’s ability to pay back a loan or discourages one from looking for a loan, thus resulting in 
accumulation of loan defaults. The argument by Agbozo and Yeboah (2012) that market 
imperfections result in misallocation of capital, lower productivity and poverty traps has 
proven to be true in this case, especially when it comes to poverty traps. Safeguarding basic 
needs such as water is absolutely essential for poverty reduction.  
If the aim of the Green Scheme of increasing food production through irrigation production is 
to remain, there are important aspects such as imports that should be taken into account in 
order to create markets. Furthermore, the absence of loan officers in the field as demand-side 
constraints came across as an issue of ignorance, for example, “They don’t understand our 
situation as us farmers who are down here because for them they are just in the office”, while 
that of loan default as a supply-side constraint among Agribank loan holders came across as 
an issue of attitude, for example, “For those who are not providing their own security they are 
bit reluctant to pay, they know that they don’t have anything to lose”. The results of the study 
are extremely important for the long-term survival of not only the Green Scheme projects but 
also the prosperity of independent farmers in their businesses, assuming that the constraints 
identified in this paper are addressed. 
Farming is naturally an activity extremely dependent on the climate and vulnerable to the pest 
challenges peculiar to a particular year, and as a result, farmers face the difficulty of actually 
developing their farms from small- to medium-scale businesses, as evidenced in this paper. 
“It is difficult for farmers like us who are going to graduate to go to the medium farmer.” In 
addition, rural credit is complicated by the seasonal nature of agricultural production, 
weather- and price-related risks, and the dispersed nature of farming, and this makes farming 
a unique activity. With this view, it is critical for formal financial institutions to increase their 
understanding of small-scale agriculture (De Klerk et al., 2013). A respondent said, for 
example, “They don’t understand the situation which is on the ground in the farm.” 
Namibia’s NDP4 documents (as part of Vision 2030) talk about continued financial and 
technical support between 2012 and 2017 to those involved in agricultural production 
activities (NPC, 2013). This can only be achieved if the problems that farmers face are dealt 
with and if farmers abide by the rules. Of course, financial constraints cannot all be 
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eliminated at once, but coordination, realistic rules and regulations, collaboration, innovative 
approaches and acting in an organised manner are a way to start and are advisable to both the 
demand and the supply side. The findings of this study were based on a small sample and 
therefore may not be generalisable. Nevertheless, within the context of qualitative studies, the 
findings point to the need to take the problems experienced by small- and medium-scale 
businesses, including farmers, in rural Namibia more seriously.  
Thus, without going against the idea of promoting smallholder farming, Collier and Dercon 
(2014) are indeed correct to argue that fixing market imperfections such as timely response, 
agricultural infrastructure, access to markets and access to land that can be used as collateral, 
among other constraints identified in this paper, may be the best solution. The paper shows 
that market imperfections are more systemic than acknowledged in mainstream economic 
theorising. From a policy perspective, this finding suggests that SMEs require financial state 
support. Precisely how to do so, especially how to link this support with social perfection, 
requires more research.  
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Chapter 6  
UNFULFILLED LOAN DEMAND AMONG AGRICULTURAL SMEs
16
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although the latest assessment of Namibia’s financial system stability by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that the banking sector was mature, very profitable and well 
capitalised (Bank of Namibia & Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority, 2015; 
IMF, 2007), recent evidence shows that farmers are unaware of many financing options open 
to them (Schutte, 2015). This lack of information and low productivity in agriculture suggest 
an opportunity for agricultural development (MAWF, 2008). Among the many factors that 
could lead to agricultural development, access to finance for agricultural SME farmers is 
considered important (Norton et al., 2015).  
The motivation for this paper follows the argument by Seibel, Giehler and Karduck (2005) 
who believe that there are two issues affecting the demand and the supply side of financial 
resources. These are the lack, on the one hand, and the abundance, on the other hand, of 
financial resources, both resulting paradoxically in a lack of resources for agricultural 
investments. On the side of the lack of financial resources, there is evidence that the number 
of donor-supported agricultural investments is in decline and that there is not much to show 
that government or commercial finance is compensating for the reduction in supply of 
loanable funds to agricultural production. When it comes to financial resources, there is an 
abundance of loanable funds in rural institutions because there are more savers than 
borrowers, which results in excess liquidity. Although the excess liquidity is generated in 
rural areas, it is siphoned off to urban areas. In this paper, the researcher aims to examine the 
financing options for agricultural SMEs in Namibian agriculture. The importance of studying 
the access to finance for agricultural SMEs in Namibia cannot be overemphasised as 
agriculture contributes to food security, food sovereignty and the national culture in Namibia, 
so access to finance for agricultural SMEs is crucial to fighting poverty. The findings of this 
research provide important information and advice that could be immensely valuable to 
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 This paper has been published in the South African Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, 19(2).  
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farmers, bank personnel, investors and planners in agricultural development and decision 
makers at any level in terms of access to finance 
There is evidence that the analysis and documentation of literature in agricultural credit, 
particularly in Namibia, are lacking, and this paper aims to fill the gap. Tonin et al. (1998) 
conducted a study focusing on financial services for small enterprises in Namibia, but the 
services excluded agricultural enterprises because of their ‘unique nature’. Other studies 
elsewhere that focused on small-scale farmers have subjected farmers’ access to finance to 
rural credit markets, in other words informal moneylenders, using either econometric models 
or secondary information to analyse the data (see Aleem, 1990; Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Obeng, 
2008). There has been no such study in Namibia, and there is a need for greater specificity. 
This paper focuses on both the formal financial institutions (supply side) and agricultural 
SMEs (demand side), using a naturalistic approach with primary data. Although previous 
literature already provides us with information on credit access for agricultural SMEs, this 
information is very slight (Cabannes, 2012) and does not allow us to grasp the real issues to 
enhance our understanding. This is the reason why this paper used narratives that highlight 
and illustrate key issues. The types of farmers that are the subject of discussion here are 
small- and medium-scale farmers rather than subsistence farmers (who barely interact with 
the market) or large farmers (who are generally well financed). This paper intends to explore 
the following two objectives:  
1. To identify the financing options for agricultural SMEs from both the demand and the 
supply side.  
2. To identify reasons why formal financial institutions may not be involved in agricultural 
finance in Namibia. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section looks at the theoretical 
framework and literature review, Section 6.3 provides stylised facts about Namibia’s banking 
institutions, the methodology for selecting the sample size is explained in Section 6.4, Section 
6.5 presents the results of the study, Section 6.6 discusses the results and implications of the 
study, and Section 6.7 provides the conclusions.  
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6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
6.2.1 Theory 
Until the early 1980s, agricultural planners in developing countries were concerned with the 
need to increase food production. As a result, vast amounts of financial resources were 
poured into agricultural development banks until the donors withdrew them in the early 
1990s because the banks’ performance was measured in terms of loan disbursements rather 
than the actual number of small-scale farmer borrowers. As a result, the development banks 
were tempted to grant loans to well-established larger farmers rather than small farmers and 
therefore missed their target group (Klein, Meyer, Hannig, Burnett & Fiebig, 1999). The 
absence of or withdrawal by development banks from lending to small farmers has also not 
allowed the private supply of funds to rural areas, as the private sector’s service tends to 
target the wealthier sectors. In other words, neither the countries whose donors withdrew 
their support from development banks nor those that changed the banks’ approach to private-
sector financing managed to achieve a widespread service to agricultural clients. Apart from 
the private-sector microfinance institutions that were set up after the unsuccessful operation 
for agricultural development, banks have not managed to close the agricultural finance gap 
because they have focused more on financing small-scale trading activities in urban areas, 
paying little attention to the rural population involved in agricultural production (Seibel et al., 
2005). The Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority has revealed that 
microlenders serve only the formally employed sector; in other words, lending by these 
institutions is salary backed.
17
 Trivelli and Venero (2007) posit that the reason for the limited 
response from the private sector lies in the failure of the rural financial markets. 
Given this, the theoretical framework guiding this study was the failure of the market to 
allocate resources efficiently or fairly. Jensen (2000) argues that market failures in agriculture 
exist, which could have been caused by monopoly power on the part of agricultural lenders, 
possible information asymmetries (generally referred to as insufficient information held by 
the lender regarding the borrower) and incorrect perceptions of agricultural risk from the 
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standpoint of agricultural lenders. The existence of market failures in agricultural markets 
results in inefficient markets and less credit given to agricultural borrowers.  
Trivelli and Venero (2007), however, maintain that despite the failure of the rural financial 
markets, agricultural SMEs could (and should) be served by development banks, as this could 
result in significant gains for the economy by, for example, reducing poverty. Given this 
theory, this study explored whether formal financial institutions in Namibia were involved in 
financing agriculture and, if not, for what reasons. A review of the financing options that 
could be used or are being used to finance agriculture is presented in the next section, 
followed by a review of the reasons why financial institutions do not provide finance for 
agriculture.  
6.2.2 Literature review 
The literature review section is divided into three subsections, namely financing options, 
lending techniques and reasons for not financing agriculture. This is followed by stylised 
facts about Namibia’s financial sector.  
6.2.2.1 Financing options  
The major sources of finance can be classified as debt and equity. Debt is referred to as 
outside finance (formal and informal) while equity is the owner’s investment in the business 
in the form of capital (Akingunola, 2011). Trzeciak-Duval (2003) suggests that one of the 
options for developing financial infrastructure and bank restructuring is for commercial banks 
to establish specialised rural financing units in order to provide debt, although this may create 
tension between the pure profit maximisation objective and the need to service agriculture 
and the rural areas. However, complementary instruments such as guarantee schemes could 
be introduced. This means that an increase in rural financing institutions is one way of 
promoting awareness of the formal sources of help available for farmers. Trivelli and Venero 
(2007) maintain that in Latin America, for example, financial entities have developed 
innovative technologies for gathering local information and established credit bureaux to 
store customers’ credit histories and share them among financial entities, benefiting both the 
financial market and the customers.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
 
 
 
In Bangladesh, as another example, out of five development finance institutions, only two 
were active lenders to agriculture. The government in Bangladesh provides refinance 
facilities to financial institutions interested in financing agriculture. These refinance facilities 
are provided for three types of loan products: short-term loans to cultivate crops, medium-
term loans for livestock and poultry production and long-term loans for agricultural 
equipment. Although these banks in Bangladesh eventually became insolvent because of 
growing capital deficits, reformation took place later (World Bank, 2008a).  
Coates and Hofmeister (2012:85) suggest that  
innovative approaches to increasing financial services to more isolated rural areas 
involve branchless banking but such approaches should not substitute a branch 
network because nothing seems to capture the full financial services of a community 
like a “bricks and mortar” branch.  
6.2.2.2 Lending techniques 
Closely linked with the discussion on financing options/mechanisms for agriculture is the 
discussion on lending techniques. Huppi and Feder (1990) note two lending techniques, the 
main forms being group and individual lending. Huppi and Feder (1990) further note that 
there are notable successes for group lending for financial institutions, for example reliance 
on members’ deposits rather than on outside sources for funding. Kodongo and Kendi (2013) 
support Huppi and Feder (1990) by arguing that group lending helps individuals to be more 
financially stable and reduces the risk of default because of pressure from other members of 
the group to pay on time (see also Besley & Coate, 1995).  
In contrast, Lehner (2009) suggests that group lending may be regarded as ineffective when 
the costs of monitoring for the group members are high because of loose social ties. This 
might have a negative effect on repayment, as the incentive of future credit is no longer 
present if one member fails to pay. Lehner (2009) therefore concludes that individual lending 
may be preferred when the requested amount is small, refinancing costs are low and 
competition is intense. Presenting a basic model and comparing between the optimal 
individual lending contract and the optimal simple group lending, Bhole and Ogden (2010) 
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disagree with Lehner (2009). They argue that group lending performs better than individual 
lending, even in the absence of social sanctions. 
Kodongo and Kendi (2013) conclude that the choice between individual and group lending 
should be informed by each financial institution’s philosophical orientation because high 
default from either individuals or groups is attributed to the failure by loan officers to 
properly screen, encourage and train clients on financial discipline. The researcher’s view is 
that lending institutions’ expertise on agricultural financing is important for the 
implementation of either individual or group lending.  
Although financing options are suggested in successful countries, such as Bangladesh and 
Latin America, in countries such as Nigeria, banks are ready to give a sizeable proportion of 
credit to SMEs only if they are forced to do so. This was observed when the mandatory 
commercial banks’ credit allocations of 20% of the total credit to small-scale enterprises 
declined progressively after these had been abolished by the government through the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (Olutunla & Obamuyi, 2008).  
6.2.2.3 Why financial institutions do not provide finance to agriculture 
Coates and Hofmeister (2012) argue that in most parts of the world, agriculture is exposed to 
high systemic and market risks, which, as a result, has created the problem of a lack of access 
to finance for agricultural SMEs and has hampered their performance and productivity. Apart 
from being regarded as risky, other reasons cited as to why financial institutions are reluctant 
to provide finance to agricultural SMEs are the following:  
• Agricultural SMEs lack skills (Namibia Training Authority, 2013).  
• The existence of information asymmetry arising from inadequate financial statements, 
making it difficult to assess their effectiveness (Coates & Hofmeister, 2012).  
• The high administrative or transactional costs of lending and investing small amounts 
 (Abereijo & Fayomi, 2005, cited in Akingunola, 2011).  
Jayasinghe (2009) conducted a survey in Gampaha (Sri Lanka) on 22 financial institutions, 
and only 10 of these were involved in agricultural ventures. Among the many perceived or 
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practical bottlenecks in financing agriculture are concerns about farmers’ behaviour when it 
comes to repayments and the perception that urban agriculture is small and unprofitable or 
does not match the current strategic objectives of the institution, to name but two. The World 
Bank (2008a) points out that the challenges faced by banks in serving small- and medium-
scale farmers are training loan officers and appraising agricultural activities, developing 
products with flexible repayment schedules that fit agricultural cycles, coping with weather 
risks, and developing delivery and monitoring mechanisms that keep costs low while serving 
sparsely populated areas. Further, Seibel et al. (2005) note that almost no use is made of 
commercial banks by small farmers in tropical Africa and elsewhere because there are few 
branches of private banks in rural areas and banks are reluctant to lend to small farmers 
without title to land (see also Mollett, 1984). Jessop et al. (2012) reason that the heavily 
subsidised interest rates usually place a low ceiling on savings deposits so that the system 
discourages commercial banks from lending to farmers. For this reason, most banks have 
neither the rural branch networks nor the agricultural lending expertise that would enable 
them to serve small-scale farmer clients. 
Coates and Hofmeister (2012) extend their discussion to venture capital funds, arguing that 
when it comes to venture capitals and private equities, the attention received by SMEs, 
particularly in the agricultural sector as opposed to other sectors in Africa, is not because of 
the paucity of information in the agricultural sector but because the potential investors’ 
understanding is limited. One should also not forget the restrictions that the investors place 
on venture capital funds (see also Samsel, Hambley & Marquardt, 1991).  
The agricultural sector is undeniably unique and faces greater risks than other sectors do 
when it comes to financing, but every business, irrespective of the sector in which it falls, 
faces risks to a certain extent. The question to ask is, How are those risks mitigated in other 
sectors? How could they be adjusted not only to serve an agricultural entrepreneur but also to 
satisfy the financier? Hartig, Jainzik and Pfeiffer (2014) suggest that structured finance may 
be the way to go in agriculture. Structured finance refers to the advancement of funds to 
enterprises to finance inputs, production and the accompanying support operations by using 
certain types of security that are not normally accepted by banks or investors and that are 
more dependent on the structure and performance of the transaction rather than on the 
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characteristics of the borrower. Therefore, in agricultural finance, there is a tendency to focus 
on securities (i.e. collateral) in order to reduce credit risk rather than focusing on other 
aspects such as risk transfer or liquidity. Structured finance can, for example, take the form 
of, inter alia, contract farming, agricultural portfolio guarantees, warehouse receipt finance 
and forward contracts.  
6.3 STYLISED FACTS ABOUT NAMIBIA’S FINANCIAL SECTOR 
6.3.1 Development banks 
Development banks are defined as mainly government-owned institutions (Seibel et al., 
2005). In Namibia, there are two development banks: the DBN, which started in 2004, and 
Agribank, which started as far back as 1907. The DBN was set up with the aim of 
contributing to national economic development by financing various types of economic 
enterprises, projects and activities. It provides finance for both the public and the private 
sectors (including emerging entrepreneurs and SMEs) for start-ups and expansions, equity 
deals, bridging finance, enterprise development finance, trade finance, SME finance, public-
private partnerships, public sector infrastructure, local authorities and bulk finance to 
microfinance providers (mainly term-lending credit only to micro-lenders) (DBN, 2014). 
Agribank, in contrast, provides loans for agriculture- and fisheries-related economic 
activities, including small-scale farmers. In order to boost food security, the government of 
the Republic of Namibia diverts certain funds to agricultural activities according to the 
principle of contract farming set out in its Green Scheme Policy of 2003. The MAWF has 
appointed Agribank to make production and capital loan facilities available to farmers in the 
Green Scheme projects.  
 
The IMF (2007) has revealed that only 9.5% of lending is allocated to agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, relative to the total credit from commercial and development banks in Namibia 
(IMF, 2007). Nevertheless, Agribank continues to be the major credit provider for 
agriculture. Agribank was established in order to expand the scope of business to capitalise 
on opportunities in the market and transform the institution into a more versatile one, 
responsive to all the stakeholders in order to meet the demands of the ever-changing business 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
 
 
 
environment (Agribank, 2014). Agribank continues to receive the greatest portion of financial 
support from government, with N$321 million expected for the financial year 2015/16 
(Menges, 2015). The number of loans to agriculture from Agribank has increased over the 
years from N$1 063 282 million in 2003 to N$1 930 667 million in 2015 (Abiatar, 2015). 
Despite this increase, lending to farmers remains a challenge because of the mortgage 
collateral requirements that are quite restrictive, especially to small-scale farmers in 
communal rural areas. This is exacerbated by the lack of secured land rights to enable access 
to credit by the majority of small-scale farmers in rural areas to expand and develop 
agricultural land to its full potential (see Ndjoze, 2012).  
6.3.2 Commercial banks 
Commercial banks are defined as banks falling under the banking law and not under a special 
act, such as the Development Banks Act or the Agricultural Reform Act (Seibel et al., 2005). 
In Namibia, the banking industry comprises six commercial banks, four of which are 
traditional commercial banking institutions (First National Bank of Namibia [FNB], Standard 
Bank of Namibia, Nedbank of Namibia and Bank Windhoek) while two are specialised 
banking institutions (FIDES Bank, which is a microfinance deposit-taking bank, and the SME 
Bank). Bank Windhoek is the only locally owned bank while the other commercial banks are 
subsidiaries of foreign institutions. According to Kaakunga, Zaaruka, Motinga and Steytler 
(2004), the distribution of commercial banks in Namibia is heavily skewed in favour of urban 
centres, with only a few branches located in rural areas. Although lending to agriculture from 
commercial banks has been increasing over the last 15 years in Namibia, it has moved at a 
very slow pace from 2001 to 2011 and dramatically increased from 2011 to 2014. From 2001 
to 2015(Q1) a total sum of N$ 979 666.82, 552 747.39 and 78 754.33 was lent to resident, 
commercial service and agricultural sector, respectively. These were the top 3 sectors that 
received the highest amounts (Abiatar, 2015) (see Table 6.1 below). It is unclear whether 
these loans went to large, medium-scale or small-scale farmers. Other research has shown 
that although commercial banks do finance agriculture, this type of finance usually goes to 
agricultural processing units, agricultural trading and related businesses while primary 
farming is shunned (Jessop et al., 2012).  
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Table 6.1: Commercial banks' lending to various sectors from 2001 to the first quarter (Q1) of 2015
18
 
                                                 
18
 Figures are expressed as percentage (%) of total lending 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2015 
(Q1) 
Sectors 
               
Agriculture 4.7 4.2 4.1 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.8 4.3 4.6 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.2 
Fishing 4.4 4.8 5.2 4.0 4.8 3.2 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Mining & 
quarrying 0.8 0.9 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.0 
Manufacturing 5.7 5.2 4.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.0 
Building and 
Construction 4.3 5.2 5.7 7.5 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.7 2.1 
Commercial & 
services 30.0 30.0 26.7 26.4 25.9 
36.1 
30.8 29.9 30.2 31.7 31.9 33.3 32.4 32.5 33.7 
Resident sectors 
and others 50.1 49.7 52.8 54.5 59.2 52.4 59.0 58.4 57.3 56.3 56.7 54.8 55.1 55.3 53.6 
Total Lending 37912 40848.1 56465.02 69549 78937.2 85326.5 108537 120751 132809 142706 162332 187802.18 216368 252033 68353 
Source: Abiatar (2015) 
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Despite the existence of and lending by commercial banks, the BoN (2013) reports that 
commercial banks in Namibia have been operating inefficiently because, according to the 
bank cost efficiency ratio, they are above 50%, which is not desirable. This inefficiency could 
be the result of the domination of the industry by the four main banks and thus a lack of 
competition. Ikhide (2000) maintains that attracting new entries to the industry is necessary to 
provide a competitive stimulus and spur innovation in products and practices, including those 
suitable for the financially excluded.  
According to the 12
th
 Annual Symposium on SME Development in Namibia of the BoN held 
in 2010, in order to improve access to financial services for the informal sector and bring the 
poor into the formal banking system, a paradigm shift has to occur. The BoN argues that 
mobile wallets have the potential to provide an urgently needed breakthrough. Banks need to 
return to basics and focus on making money through financial intermediation rather than 
through transaction fees (BoN, 2010). 
6.3.3 Venture capitalists and private equities 
Venture capital is explained as an investment made on the basis of the development of a 
business, which is mostly targeted at start-up, Green Scheme and early-stage investments, 
while private equity focuses on businesses that are already established or going through a 
stage of changing shareholders. Although there are countries in Africa such as Kenya, 
Nigeria and South Africa that are large recipients of venture capital funds and private equity 
funds, Namibia is still in its infancy, and investment in businesses comes mainly from local 
capital. There are 14 venture capitalists/private equities, according to the Business Financial 
Solutions report of 2013: 1) Stimulus Investments Limited; 2) Spitz Health Care Investment; 
3) First Capital Estate Finance Fund; 4) Preferred Investment Property Fund Trust; 5) Desert 
Stone Fund; 6) OMIGNAM Tunga Real Estate Fund; 7) OMIGNAM Expanded 
Infrastructure Fund; 8) Tukuneni Capital; 9) Frontier Property Trust;10) SIM Namibia Real 
Estate; 11) SME Compete Fund; 12) Namibia Procurement Fund; 13) VPB Namibia Growth 
Fund; and 14) Koigstein Capital Property Investment Fund. 
Established in 2004, Stimulus Investments was the first private equity fund to be established 
in the country, investing mainly in well-established companies. After 2004, 11 more venture 
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capital funds, private equity funds and angel funds were created between 2010 and 2013, 
which provide different forms of financing, such as trade credit. Although many venture 
capital funds invest in start-ups, they focus on sectors other than agriculture (see Business 
Financial Solutions, 2013).  
For the purpose of this research, the concept of financing options included both monetary and 
nonmonetary options. 
6.4 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology was designed to elicit the financial institutions that were financing 
agriculture in Namibia, the financing options that farmers were aware of and the reasons for 
not financing agriculture. Just like the paper presented in Chapter 5, the degree to which 
questions were structured depended on whether an institution financed agriculture or not and 
whether farmers were aware of other financing options apart from Agribank. It was the 
participants’ knowledge and experience that decided which topics were important in the 
various interviews (see the interview guides presented in appendixes A and B). Additional 
data collection methods were reviews of documents from different financial organisations, 
including international financial reports on the Namibian financial system, as well as Green 
Scheme project documents that were analysed for this study.  
6.4.1 Sample and site selection 
Depending on the availability of farmers and a convenient time for the researcher and the 
participants in the various regions, six interviews were conducted with farmers from the 
Ndonga Linena Irrigation Scheme, six with farmers from the Hardap Irrigation Scheme and 
six with farmers from the Etunda Irrigation Scheme. In addition, three agricultural SME farm 
owners in the Omusati and Kavango East regions who were operating independently outside 
the Green Scheme projects were interviewed. These were Second Chance Garden in the 
Omusati Region and Pozere and Gamade gardens in the Kavango East Region. Twenty-one 
farmers were thus interviewed on the demand side. 
 
On the supply side, more than 50% of the banks (all situated in the Khomas Region) 
participated in the study. The criterion used to select the financial institutions was that it had 
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to be a formal institution, that is, a commercial bank, a development bank or a venture 
capital/private equity fund. The researcher interviewed personnel at three of the five 
commercial banks (not including FIDES bank) (personnel at Nedbank and Standard Bank 
were too busy to schedule time for an interview), both development banks (Agribank and 
DBN) and four selected venture capital funds. In order to select venture capital funds, the 
only brief study in the country on active local providers of venture capital, private equity and 
angel funding in Namibia (2013) was used (Business Financial Solutions, 2013). Only 
venture capital funds, private equity funds and angel funds that targeted businesses in ‘any 
sector’ were interviewed to find out whether agricultural SMEs were part of the ‘any sector’ 
classification or not and the reasons for this. These institutions were VPB Namibia Growth 
Fund, Desert Stone Fund, Namibia Procurement Fund and Stimulus Investments. Given the 
above, the sample on the supply side resulted in nine formal financial institutions.  
 
All the interviews were conducted after ethics approval by the University of Stellenbosch 
Business School ethics committee and permission by the financial institutions had been 
granted. 
6.4.2 Justification of the sample size 
The objective of the study was not to maximise numbers but to become ‘saturated’ with 
information on the topic (see Padgett, 1998). The aim was to capture depth and richness 
rather than representativeness (see Padgett, 1998). The interviews were complemented with 
secondary information, and this ensured the adequacy of the data. Because of the small 
population of farmers operating with valid contracts in the various Green Scheme projects on 
the demand side, a small sample size also resulted on the demand side. Koranteng (2010) 
conducted a similar study in South Africa but interviewed only nine farmers.  
6.5 RESULTS 
Of the nine institutions on the supply side, there were only three that financed agricultural 
SMEs, which was about 33% of the total. These were Agribank, Bank Windhoek and FNB. 
Agribank is the main institution involved in financing agriculture in the form of loans 
subsidised by the government, Bank Windhoek finances articles such as tractors for farming 
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and FNB performs intermediary on-lending. The rest of the institutions (six out of nine) that 
formed part of the analysis indicated that they provided finance but not to agricultural SMEs. 
Table 6.2 below provides available data on the number of loans approved and disbursed 
between 2012 and 2014 by Agribank. Although the number of loan amounts approved is 
high, loan amounts disbursed are low. This is attributed to unfulfilled collateral requirements 
and the customer’s inability to substantiate his or her repayment ability. Similarly, the loan 
amounts disbursed kept decreasing because of the drought devastating the country between 
2012 and 2014. Illustrative quotes regarding specific financing options for agriculture, 
financing options known to farmers apart from Agribank and reasons for not financing 
agriculture from institutions that are not financing farmers are presented in the following 
section. 
Table 6.2: Data on the financing of agricultural SMEs by Agribank
19
 
Loan amounts (N$) 
approved 
 
Loan amounts (N$) disbursed 
 
Collateral required 
2012 = 271 396 519.62 
2013 = 255 720 901.62 
2014 = 303 544 095.67 
2012 = 195 731 015 
2013 = 245 189 468 
2014 = 244 935 918 
Bonds over farmland, 
developed/underdeveloped 
municipal plots 
Cession of fixed deposits 
Cession of surrendering 
value of policies 
Listed investments and 
unit trust investments 
Suretyships 
Source: Agribank (2012; 2013; 2014) 
                                                 
19
   The data available are inclusive of small-, medium- and large-scale farmers. 
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“The general purpose of financing by Agribank is to provide reasonably priced loan financing 
to our clients, particular the rural farming community which would stimulate the growth in 
the agricultural sector” (Agribank, 2011:3). 
6.5.1 Specific type of funding provided  
Agribank provides various forms of collateralised and subsidised loans (by government) for 
production to farmers in Green Scheme projects. Farmers who are not in Green Scheme 
projects also receive assistance in the form of loans, although these are not subsidised by 
government. A manager for lending noted: 
 
Those who have been backed by the government they are being treated differently 
because we will liaise with the government to provide them the collateral, the ones 
farming specifically in the green-scheme farm but the others they provide their own 
collateral. (P18, 26:46)(sic) 
 
These loans are disbursed by way of individual lending as opposed to group lending. 
Although Agribank had tried group lending in previous years, it failed because of poor 
execution. 
 
We give to individuals; we use to do group loans before. Group loans were not 
successful because the whole idea then its five, more than ten years ago was that at 
least the, we wanted to do this group lending so that at least the people in the group 
give each other pressure in order to service the loans but that was not successful 
because what happened is that people just met in front of the bank door, form a group 
in front of the bank door, got the money, they don’t even know each other then they 
shared the money and then everybody disappeared when you go back and to say okay 
group leader where is that money he will say but I don’t even know that guy I just met 
him in front of the bank door so our experience in terms of that was not quite good, 
we lost a lot of money and it was one of the initiative that we were trying to do in the 
communal but it never I think the implementation was a bit wrong in terms of the 
execution. (P17, 57:60) 
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As Lehner (2009) points out, group lending may be ineffective when the costs of monitoring 
for group members are high because of loose social ties, which might have a negative effect 
on repayment, as the incentive of future credit would no longer count if one member failed to 
pay.  
 
Apart from Agribank, FNB performs as intermediary for lending to farmers but only to 
commercial farmers because communal farmers do not own any land to serve as collateral. 
This supports the opinion of Trzeciak-Duval (2003) that the private sector’s service tends to 
target the wealthier sectors. 
 
There is only one scheme that we have, there is a scheme in Okakarara what we call 
is the Okamakapati. That’s Ongombe farmers association what we do is we lend 
money to the farmer’s association and they lend money to the different farmers in 
their community and they manage the farmer’s association or they actually manage 
that funds on behalf of the bank. We do financing on the basis of security as you know 
in the communal area there is no, the land doesn’t own to someone specific, the 
security is a problem. (P21, 28:52) 
 
Bank Windhoek does not provide monetary finance, but it finances the specialised equipment 
that farmers may need for production but are unable to pay for out of their own savings. This 
requires a higher deposit, and it has to be salary backed. 
 
What we finance for agricultural activities, we finance them with the tractor for 
example things like equipment. (P19, 32:32)  
 
The specialised equipment we ask a higher deposit that can go up to 30 percent. By 
specialised we mean an equipment that can just be used in that specific industry but 
not other industries, not like a computer where everybody can use it but just an 
irrigation system is basically just meant for agriculture so we ask for a higher deposit 
on that. Reason being if that client did not fulfil the agreement, obviously when we 
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going to repossess and sell not everybody would want to repossess this article. It’s 
likely not to be sold. (P19, 81:81)  
6.5.2 Financing options known to the farmers 
In order to draw a comparison between the existing formal agricultural financing mechanisms 
and what is actually known to farmers, the latter were asked what financing options they were 
aware of, apart from Agribank, in order to establish the credit possibilities known to the 
demand side. Many farmers from all three regions interviewed (see Figure 6.1 below) 
indicated that they were aware only of Agribank.  
 
I looked for assistance from Agribank because there is nowhere else one can get 
money doing such type of work and in such a place. (P16, 105:105)  
 
Another participant noted:  
 
When it comes banks I only know of Agribank. (P13, 95:95) 
 
Medium-scale farmers (all from the Hardap Green Scheme Irrigation Project) pointed to 
commercial banks (although they complained about the interest rates) and village councils 
while others, especially independent farmers, felt that there was a lack of information in the 
country on the different financing options available.  
 
 I am not aware of any but those are the type of things we would like to get 
information on. There is lack of access to information because you hear of people 
who have been given kind of assistance apart from loans but I don’t know how that 
happens. (P16, 98:98)  
 
The lack of information is consistent with the results found by Abor and Biekpe (2006). They 
report that although there are many funded schemes available to SMEs, they are mostly 
underutilised because firms are sometimes not aware of these nonbank financing options and 
therefore rely heavily on the inadequate and collateral-driven bank finance. Similarly, De 
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Klerk et al. (2013) maintain that familiarity with formal financial products is limited, as is 
farmers’ awareness of the formal sources of help.  
 
Figure 6.1: Financing options known to farmers in various regions
20
 
Source: Author’s data, fieldwork, 2014 
6.5.3 Reasons for not financing agriculture 
Formal lenders in Namibia cite the lack of expertise and high risk in financing agriculture as 
the main reasons for not financing agriculture (see Figure 6.2 below).  
 
                                                 
20
 FOKF in Figure 6.1 stands for Financing Options Known by Farmers. 
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Figure 6.2: Reasons for not financing agriculture from financial institutions 
Source: Author’s data, fieldwork, 2014  
 
Coates and Hofmeister (2012) point out that the understanding by potential investors is 
limited when it comes to businesses in the agricultural sector. This was confirmed by this 
study because all the venture capital funds acknowledged the lack of expertise as one of the 
main reason for not taking the route of financing agriculture.  
 
The reason for not financing the agricultural industry one is just the nature of the 
industry itself being agriculture you need to have specialist people that have 
specialised in that industry and who will be able to analyse the applications in that 
industry you know in the right way. (P19, 28:28).  
 
Another venture capitalist respondent noted:  
 
We would have loved to go into farming for instance or agriculture but we just said 
no, look here, we know nothing about agriculture. (P29, 27:27).  
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It is important to note that, although Bank Windhoek may assist in purchasing agricultural 
production machinery such as tractors and machines, these are treated as normal transactions 
only for people who can provide proof of income in order for the bank to determine 
repayment possibility.  
 
Furthermore, the risk involved in financing agriculture also scored highest among the reasons 
found for not financing agricultural SMEs. This is consistent with results found by the World 
Bank (2008b) that because of reasons ranging from the weather to the low-returns in 
agriculture, SMEs, particularly farmers in primary production, are perceived to be high-risk 
businesses as opposed to farmers adding value to an already-produced product.  
 
Being able to tell us what the risk involved is, you know the potential of that business 
and etcetera et cetera. For example, if the person would want to do cropping, you 
know it is one of the things that is viewed to be higher risk because the reason is you 
don’t really know would this person be able to harvest or their project to harvest, 
What in case probably some natural disasters you know, diseases that you know can 
arise in the middle of you know, the process and all those things. (P19, 32:32) 
 
Risks prevalent in the agricultural sector due to dependencies on nature, potentially 
capital intensive nature of agriculture with limited return capacity, unless the 
intensity is increased on the back of possible technological advances that come at 
great cost as well. (P24, 47:47) 
 
The DBN argues that Agribank is already there, so it does not perceive the need to finance 
agriculture.  
 
Agribank by law and by its pure definition is supposed to look at the agri-side of 
things were we look at the more commercial side of things so that distinction is there 
and that’s why most of that products if not all will be routed through Agribank. 
(P20:47:47) 
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Nigeria has found that the high administrative or transaction costs of lending and investment 
of small amounts discourage financial institutions from investing in agriculture (Abereijo & 
Fayomi, 2005, as cited in Akingunola, 2011). This is also the case in Namibia, which is a 
major concern coming specifically from development banks and venture capital funds.  
6.6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The aim of the study was to investigate the financing options for agricultural SMEs from both 
the demand and the supply-perspectives and the reasons for not financing agriculture. The 
findings show that on the supply side, although financial institutions exist, very few (three out 
of nine) are interested in financing or providing support for agriculture to small- and medium-
scale farmers, which by implication means that there is a lack of financial resources for 
agricultural production in the country. This implies that financial penetration in the country is 
low when it comes to agricultural financing. This is disturbing. Trzeciak-Duval (2003) 
cautions that government should ensure competition in financial markets in order to drive 
innovation and efficiency and minimise the risk of monopolistic practices. 
 
Although the agricultural sector is rated as the third highest sector to which commercial 
banks in Namibia lend, as shown in Table 6.1, it could be that this lending is mostly to large 
and well-established farmers with collateral. This assumption is based on the fact that of the 
commercial banks interviewed in this study, FNB finances only SMEs with title to land and 
in commercial areas.  
 
We do financing on the basis of security as you know in the communal area there is 
no, the land doesn’t own to someone specific, the security is a problem (P21,28:52).  
 
Bank Windhoek finances farmers’ equipment, but this has to be salary backed. The reality, 
however, is that the majority of agricultural SMEs, particularly those in Green Scheme 
projects, are not farming in commercial areas and do not have title to land, indicating a 
challenge to access to finance for farmers without collateral.  
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All the venture capitals interviewed during this study acknowledged that they had no 
expertise for financing SMEs in agriculture: 
  
The reason for not financing the agricultural industry one is just the nature of the 
industry itself being agriculture you need to have specialist people (P19, 28:28). 
 
This finding resonates with the argument by Seibel et al. (2005), who maintain that the belief 
held by bank chief executive officers and donors with insurmountable problems of 
agricultural finance has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy, either by categorically 
excluding this type of finance or, when giving it a try, failing because loan officers are not 
experienced and not convinced. Narteh (2013) suggests that there is a need for banks to 
monitor and understand the business needs of SMEs and provide adequate finance to ensure 
effective business development. It would also be prudent for banks to segment SMEs 
according to specific sectors so that the bank staff could specialise and provide the necessary 
services as required.  
 
Further, the negative bias of financial institutions in perceiving agricultural SMEs to be high 
risk presents as fear on the part of financial institutions to become innovative and manage 
their risks while the failure of group lending by Agribank appears to be because of poor 
planning. The perception of risk might be linked to fears of crop failure because agriculture is 
largely rain dependent and drought results in uncertainty for the financial institutions as to 
whether these businesses will able to harvest. However, risks can always be mitigated. For 
example, in Malaysia, the establishment of the SME Bank, with added corporate advisory 
functions and consultation given by coach clients, was an attempt by Malaysia to correct the 
risk profile of the SME borrowers (Ramlee & Berma, 2013). There are also promising signs 
in Kenya and Ghana of greater agricultural finance by increasing capacity building for staff in 
banking institutions. Given the right circumstances, the model used in these countries could 
work in other African countries, including Namibia (Coates & Hofmeister, 2012). According 
to Hartig et al. (2014:172), there has been no empirical evidence in the literature to prove that 
lending to agriculture is indeed more risky than lending to other sectors. They note that  
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It is often misleading to state that banks assess risk of farming businesses and lending 
to agriculture as high risk. Unfortunately many banks and other financial institutions 
have no clear understanding about farm economics and market for agricultural 
produce and they are lacking appropriate approaches to analyzing the related risks so 
there is no base for a professional credit risk assessment by the banks. Thus, the 
reference to high risks in agriculture by banks is often only uniformed perception 
based on prejudices (Hartig et al 2014: 172)  
 
According to Cabannes (2012), agricultural planners often fail because farmers are not kept 
well informed, which also explains the reluctance on the part of SMEs to ask for loans. In this 
paper, insufficient information about the few credit possibilities available for farmers, 
especially those employed outside the Green Scheme projects, demonstrates poor marketing 
from financial institutions. This goes to show that information is relevant not only to lenders 
to make informed decisions as to whom they should lend but also to borrowers to seek 
financial assistance. “Firms stay with the same bank not simply because the bank treats them 
well but because that bank has information available” (Sharpe, 1990:1070).  
 
It is safe to say that information asymmetry, lack of expertise, small transaction from SMEs 
and the risks involved play a major role in fulfilling the loan demand.  
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study confirm and expand on the findings of previous studies and can be 
summarised as follows: The financing of agriculture is a major bottleneck in expanding 
agricultural production. Financial resources are lacking (Seibel et al., 2005) for agricultural 
SME farmers, particularly those in communal areas. One possible reason why farmers are 
unaware of financing options could be that there are so few financial institutions in the 
country and information on them is not available. Based on the work of other authors cited in 
this paper, the researcher asserts that new financing mechanisms could be achieved by the 
various types of financial institutions by following the example of more successful countries. 
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Chapter 7  
IDENTIFYING THE GAP BETWEEN THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF 
FINANCE AMONG SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SCALE FARMERS IN NAMIBIA 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
Agricultural finance refers to finance that is used for crop and livestock production (Vitoria et 
al., 2012). Formal financial institutions such as commercial banks and even venture capital 
funds and private equities refrain from providing finance to small businesses, more especially 
to those in the agricultural sector, due to the risk involved (Coates & Hofmeister, 2012), 
information asymmetry and lack of expertise (Amadhila & Ikhide, 2016). Because Agribank 
is the only formal institution set up with a mandate to provide finance to farmers, the 
motivation for this paper was to determine the magnitude of the agricultural SME finance gap 
and the causes of such a gap.  
Although previous literature already provides useful information with regard to the SME 
finance gap in countries such as Ghana (Abor & Biekpe, 2006) and South Africa (Underhill 
Corporate Solutions, 2011), this information is very generalised (see also Lopez de Silanes, 
McCahery, Schoenmaker & Stanišić, 2015) in that it does not focus on specific sectors or 
focuses only on views from the supply side (Ramlee & Berma, 2013). Of the few studies that 
focus on the agricultural sector, many have been done in countries outside of Africa such as 
Australia (Watson et al., 2009) or report on different countries in one report, and many times 
these reports do not include Namibia (Doran et al., 2009). This paper goes beyond the 
methodology convention in previous research in the literature to describe and explain in more 
nuanced detail by making use of primary data and descriptive statistics to illustrate the data. 
This is combined with a naturalistic approach that involves narratives from interviews (from 
both the demand and the supply side) that highlight and illustrate key issues to gain a deeper 
understanding of the matter as opposed to the pure use of secondary information by similar 
studies in the literature (see Beck, 2013; Cressy, 2002) or the use of survey questionnaires 
(see Watson et al., 2009). It is hoped that this methodology will provide new insights for 
planners, policy makers, researchers and others involved in the agricultural sector in order to 
provide evidence-based solutions to the challenges faced in the agricultural sector.  
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 Following this introduction, this paper works at achieving the following objectives:  
1. To determine the magnitude of the agricultural SME finance gap.  
2. To determine the reasons behind such a gap in the Namibian context.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 7.2 provides a conceptualisation of the 
agricultural SME finance gap as well as the definition of Namibian SMEs, Section 7.3 
provides the theoretical framework of the study, Section 7.4 looks at why a finance gap exists 
in agriculture, Section 7.5 gives the methodology of the study, Section 7.6 presents the results 
and Section 7.7 presents the discussion and summary.  
7.2 CONCEPTUALISATION OF AGRICULTURAL SME FINANCE GAP 
SMEs seem to fall between different financing arrangements. According to De la Torre, 
Martínez Pería and Schmukler (2010) and the IFC (2010), microfinance institutions have 
emerged to serve the smallest enterprises, commonly referred to as microenterprises, and 
banking institutions emerged to serve large corporations. SMEs fall between these two 
markets where there is a finance gap. Government efforts to subsidise inputs for SMEs have 
led to unreliable supplies and rationing, generally favouring large farmers (Minot, 1986), and 
when microfinance institutions decide to finance SMEs, this comes at usurious interest rates 
(Milder, 2008; Tschach, 2002).  
 
The agricultural SME finance gap for farmers is referred to as the lowest three segments of 
farmers. The three lowest segments are semi-commercial smallholders, commercial 
smallholders and medium-sized farmers (see Figure 7.1 below). All three segments have 
difficulty accessing formal finance, especially when producing staple crops and seeking for 
medium- and long-term financing. This paper refers to agricultural SMEs as semi-
commercial smallholders, commercial smallholders and medium-sized farmers engaged in 
primary crop and horticultural production in communal areas in Namibia. 
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             Finance gap 
           
Subsistence farmers  
Figure 7.1: Segmentation of farmers 
Source: Adapted from the IFC (2012:20) 
Doran et al. (2009) refer to the agricultural finance gap as a ‘missing middle syndrome’, 
which means that loans are rarely provided in the range between where small amounts of 
finance requested end (US$5 000) and where large amounts of finance commence 
(US$500 000). In summary, agricultural SMEs usually borrow funds that fall between 
US$5 000 and US$500 000 and thus are referred to as the missing middle. Subsistence 
farmers have limited resources with most of their incomes from off-farm activities. The size 
of their cultivated land is less than two hectares, accounting for 80% of all farms in Africa.  
Data that show specific figures of the finance gap in Africa are very scanty; there is an 
argument that the financial development gap is stark (Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian, Senbet & 
Valenzuela, 2012). Access to formal credit in many African countries is confined to larger 
urban centres where collateral requirements are high.  
 
Medium-sized farmer 
(emerging) 
Commercial 
smallholder 
Semi-commercial 
smallholder 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
126 
 
 
 
 
7.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2013, cited in IFC, 2014), there are 
no precise numbers on the demand for agricultural finance except those based on estimations. 
Similarly, the percentage of smallholders with access to finance is difficult to quantify. This 
difficulty is brought about by a lack of data. For example, in many African countries, the 
issue of a financing gap between demand and supply is discussed but is hardly an exact figure 
put on paper to determine the magnitude of this gap. For instance, in Zimbabwe, the scale of 
demand is uncertain as there is no comprehensive data available for agricultural credit. 
However, there is evidence of a strong but unmet demand for credit amongst small-scale and 
medium-scale farmers. The unmet demand for credit is caused by the limited supply of credit 
and its prohibitive cost. Farmers expressed no interest in applying for agricultural loans due 
to fear of not being able to pay back the loans (Vitoria et al., 2012). 
 
In Asian countries, a study done in Uttar Pradesh in India by Desai (1988, cited in De, 2010) 
showed that in 1984 to 1985, the aggregate credit supply for agricultural production from all 
institutional sources amounted to Rs32 190 million while the credit requirement by farmers 
amounted to Rs278 240 million, amounting to a credit requirement gap of Rs246 050 million. 
Similarly, the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009/10 indicated that total agricultural credit 
disbursements had increased from nearly Rs45 billion in the fiscal year 2000/01 to more than 
Rs166 billion in 2009/10. Despite such increase, growth in the supply of agricultural credit 
has also fallen behind growth in its demand. The demand-supply gap stood at about Rs280 
billion in 2009/10, and the supply of institutional agricultural credit during the fiscal year 
2009/10 fell short by more than half of the demand according to the State Bank estimates. 
This continued shortage of institutional credit has led to increased farmer reliance on the 
informal credit market (Arshad, 2011). 
 
Most other studies that have estimated the finance gap (because of a lack of data) in 
microfinance literature tend to overestimate. The problem with overestimation, however, is 
that one runs the risk of making the unrealistic assumption that every person in the identified 
population would have an outstanding microloan all of the time. This is because the current 
methods used to calculate the potential demand for microfinance take into account the 
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population and income levels (Anand & Rosenberg, 2008). Some population-based estimates 
divide population by average household size on the assumption that there will be one 
microloan per household, more or less (Bruck, 2006; World Bank, 2006). Others reduce the 
overall poor population by suggesting a percentage who are ‘economically active’ or 
‘economically able’ or ‘the working poor’ and thus are assumed to be potential borrowers 
(Ehrbeck 2006, cited, in Anand & Rosenberg, 2008). 
 Because of the difficulty in estimating the finance gap, country-specific estimates begin not 
with the poor population but with the number of micro-entrepreneurs, retrieved from survey 
or census data (Navajas & Tejerina, 2006; Tejerina & Westley, 2007, cited in Anand & 
Rosenberg, 2008). The danger in this approach is that the estimate of potential borrowers is 
too broad and needs further reductions. For example, to assume that every poor person in the 
identified population would require a microloan would be overambitious. Many poor people 
do not want microloans, even if they qualify for them. They may be unwilling to commit to 
the terms and conditions of the loan, including the repayment plan, and may prefer to be 
financed through savings, loans from family or informal money lenders or they simply may 
have no good use for borrowed funds (Anand & Rosenburg, 2008).  
Reinke (2004) also points out that the methods used to estimate microfinance demand have 
significant shortcomings because many people who want to start microenterprises do not 
want to be in debt. They would rather wait until they have accumulated enough of their own 
assets before they start a business. Current estimates also ignore the fact that many of the 
poor prefer the safety of employment and do not want to be entrepreneurs. Starting a small 
business is a survival strategy and not their primary choice of generating an income. If they 
do choose to start a small business, owners might not want to take the risk to leverage their 
businesses upwards as they cannot absorb large amounts of capital due to the small size of 
their businesses. The perceived gap in the market is therefore limited and much smaller than 
the estimates (Anand & Rosenberg, 2008; Hes & Polednáková, 2013). 
People who want and qualify for loans are not necessarily borrowing all the time. For 
example, between 2003 and 2004, microfinance institutions and the government of 
Bangladesh reported 23.8 million members, but only two-thirds were active borrowers as of 
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the respective reporting dates. This raises suspicion that demand estimates are overstated 
(Anand & Rosenberg, 2008).  
The World Bank estimates for the mid-1980s posit that the need-versus-availability gap is 
aggravated by the fact that only around a third of the institutional disbursements goes to small 
and marginal farmers (De, 2010). The theory guiding this paper is that of demand and supply 
of finance for agricultural purposes from the formal sector. There is evidence that a lack of 
access to finance is a major bottleneck for agricultural development (Hartig et al., 2014) and 
that financial penetration is low when it comes to agricultural finance, particularly in Namibia 
(Amadhila & Ikhide, 2016). Traditional commercial banks and other financial institutions are 
very reluctant to finance farmers, in particular small farmers.  
Given the controversy surrounding the demand estimates for microcredit, establishing the 
demand potential of SME finance in developing countries is not as straightforward. However, 
there is a perception that a significant gap between demand for and supply of finance exists. 
The real question is how wide this gap is and what the cause thereof is. Just like previous 
studies, this essay also estimates (because of a lack of sufficient data) the gap between 
demand and supply. To avoid overestimation of demand, small- and medium-scale farmer 
(instead of the entire farming population) loan applications and amounts requested data are 
used. The next section reviews the empirical literature on causes and ways to reduce the SME 
finance gap.  
7.4 WHY A FINANCE GAP IN AGRICULTURE?  
There is a perceived gap between the demand for and the supply of funds for agricultural 
purposes (Morvant-Roux, 2007). This gap has been attributed to issues on both the demand 
and the supply side. This section reviews the empirical literature on access to finance in terms 
of causes of the agricultural finance gap and how it can be reduced.  
The ‘unique nature’ of agricultural businesses is often viewed as an excuse by financial 
institutions for not financing agriculture and as a result of a finance gap. The IFC and 
McKinsey conducted a study in 2010 using existing research and a literature review as well 
as numerous primary interviews with SME banking experts and practitioners worldwide. It 
was found that agricultural SMEs faced special challenges and opportunities because finance 
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for agricultural purposes in general involves higher transaction costs due to the greater 
distances, lower population densities and lower quality of infrastructure encountered in 
serving rural areas, which discourage smaller transactions (IFC, 2013).  
Similarly, addressing the historical background of agricultural finance in West Africa, 
Doligez et al. (2010) posit that the reach of financial services for agricultural farms remains 
quite limited because of the territorial dispersion of borrowers, distance from places of 
residence to places of business, isolation of some regions and low population densities in 
many rural situations, which increase financial services transaction costs. Further problems 
such as the small size of the unit amounts to be managed for the various transactions 
(deposits and loans), which are often not profitable given the unit costs of the individual 
records that must be borne by the financial intermediaries, were also identified. More unique 
features such as the weakness of human capital available locally, which increases the 
management constraints on institutions, and the financial discipline often referred to as the 
‘culture of credit’ whereby a loan is sometimes treated as if it were a grant or an entitlement 
all explain the limited reach of financial services. The World Bank (2008a) report adds 
weather risks in Bangladesh as an additional challenge in serving farmers because of the 
uncertainty involved.  
Tschach (2002) explored the problem of credit market segmentation based on graphical 
analysis, and he noted that although there was no literature that explained why no institutions 
that offered medium-sized loans to medium-sized enterprises at ‘medium’ interest rates 
existed, there was an argument that SMEs were too small – and thus unattractive – for formal 
sector banks. Medium-sized enterprises thus have no access to either formal- or informal-
sector financing. 
The IFC (2012) report using case study models based on a background stocktaking report by 
Rabobank International Advisory Services for the IFC as well as a databank with information 
provided by the IFC from other sources further elaborates that an assessment of agricultural 
SMEs’ creditworthiness is costly for financial institutions and in most cases exceeds the 
profits that they can make. As the farmer grows from a smallholder to a specialised farmer, 
the bank must analyse all the details of the business. To cover such costs, loans must be 
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significantly larger, reaching a size that greatly exceeds the absorption capacity for capital of 
the SME, hence the financing gap. 
The OECD (2006) carried out a qualitative study and circulated a questionnaire to officials in 
all member countries as well as to a large number of non-members (over 100 economies in 
all) to gain some insights into factors influencing the provision of financing to the SME 
sector. The aim was to analyse the SME finance gap. The report argues that many non-OECD 
countries report a widespread shortage in SME finance and that one of the main reasons is 
that if commercial banks have possibilities of earning higher returns by lending to borrowers 
other than SMEs, they will not be willing to develop the skills needed to lend to SMEs and 
thus will not be very inclined to lend to SMEs. Similarly, in India, a study drawing on past 
studies and previous research found that commercial banks had failed to reach a target of 
18% lending to farmers by 3.7% because other sectors such as information technology and 
real estate had entered the ambit of priority sector lending and as a result increased the 
competition for institutional credit (De, 2010). 
Examining how the finance gap for SMEs might be addressed through a questionnaire survey 
based on a sample of 200 firms drawn from the database of the National Board for Small 
Scale Industries and that of the Association of Ghana Industries, Abor and Biekpe (2006) 
argue that the presence of the ‘finance gap’ is mainly the result of the existence of 
information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, which should be improved. 
Information asymmetries refer to the disparity between the information available to 
businesses seeking capital and to suppliers of capital who are typically assumed to be at an 
informational disadvantage with respect to insiders of the business. When lenders do not have 
enough information about the borrower and are uncertain about the borrowers’ ability to pay 
back the loan, the lender may deny credit to such a borrower even if he or she is creditworthy.  
Within the context of information asymmetry, two issues are identified by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). These are adverse selection and moral hazard. Concerning adverse selection, 
theoretical models often assume that borrowers have private knowledge about the success 
probability of their businesses or expected profits that they do not share with the lender. 
Consequently, lenders cannot differentiate between a high-quality business and a low-quality 
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business and adverse selection can result. Moral hazard refers to the inability of the lender to 
control fully how the entrepreneur uses the funds provided. Owners can conceivably benefit 
economically by, for example, redirecting borrowed funds to invest in higher risk businesses 
than those approved by the lenders. Both SMEs and financial institutions create the finance 
gap through SMEs’ unwillingness to share information but also because financial institutions 
prioritise where the high returns will come from.  
Milder (2008) examines innovative value chain finance applications that emphasise models 
tailored to SMEs that fall within the rural finance gap from the United States of America-
based social investment fund Root Capital, which lends directly to rural grassroots in 
Uganda. Milder (ibid) is of the view that in order to close the finance gap, commercial 
financial institutions have the potential to respond to the demand of various financial services 
through agricultural value chain financing. These financing mechanisms could be 1) shifting 
local lending practices whereby agricultural banks provide loan guarantees (loan guarantees 
mean that an agricultural bank forms a relationship with a good number of local banks and 
the local banks enter into a risk-sharing agreement whereby the agricultural bank guarantees 
a portion of any losses from loans to farmers that pertain to the agreement) and 2) risk 
sharing with local banks with the objective of attracting local banks to farmers and 
convincing banks to accept other forms of collateral besides fixed-asset collateral (see 
Milder, 2008).  
Drawing on examples from many countries worldwide, Doran et al. (2009) argue that in 
order to reduce the financing gap, the common theme is to work with the private sector to 
remove frictions of various kinds, thus improving the balance between risk, cost and return. 
A number of initiatives are suggested: 
1. Nongovernmental organisations with a financial focus and a business development 
culture should create linkages and network in at least the early stages of the business 
among financial suppliers, women and men producers, buyers and other service 
providers. 
2. Multilateral donors can be key sponsors of financial sector reform programmes, 
working with national governments and central banks. Reforms can focus on specific 
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institutions such as agricultural development banks or on stimulating competition in 
rural finance. 
3. Innovative financing mechanisms such as warehouse receipts and leasing by donors 
and international financial institutions. 
4. Forming of alliances between commercial banks and nonfinancial distribution 
networks, for example of irrigation equipment or mobile phone services. 
5. Socially responsible investors of various kinds, either working directly or in 
conjunction with banks.  
6. Foundations and socially oriented banks offering partial and temporary guarantees on 
a commercial basis.  
7. Poverty-focused nongovernmental organisations exploring the possibility of building 
capacity in women’s and men’s smallholder groups in remote and difficult locations.  
Implementation of these and other efforts is needed with careful examination of what is 
working and what is not in order for solving of the finance gap to be achieved and 
successfully implemented.  
Estimating the link between credit to SMEs and growth on income per capita while at the 
same time assessing the potential impact that closing the credit gap for women-owned SMEs 
can have on economic development, Stupnytska, Koch, MacBeath, Lawson and Matsui 
(2014) reason that improved access to financing needs to be complemented with business 
training and mentoring to ensure productive use of capital. The researcher’s view is that 
proper training to farmers as well will allow not only productive use of capital but also the 
sustainability of their farms in the long run. Finally, using secondary sources to understand 
the nature, extent and causes of the challenges faced in improving the level of financial 
inclusion in Zimbabwe’s rural communities, Vitoria et al. (2012) opine that access to finance 
for the agricultural sector could be improved by enhancing both the demand and supply. 
Demand for finance could be enhanced through greater awareness and understanding of 
services while supply could be improved through enhancing key national issues affecting the 
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financial sector, the economy and law enforcement, thereby creating an enabling environment 
for investment (Vitoria et al., 2012).  
7.5 METHODOLOGY 
For the first part of the objective of this paper, a quantitative approach was employed to 
estimate the finance gap. The loan approval rate of 70%
21
 at Agribank was used to estimate 
the number of loan applications received. After this had been determined, the average size of 
loans multiplied by price (amounts granted) determined demand. Given the total amounts 
granted by Agribank (supply), the difference between demand and supply gave the finance 
gap.  
For the second objective, the causes of the finance gap were sought. A qualitative case study 
methodology approach was adopted using in-depth semi-structured interviews (this is 
explained in detail in Chapter 4).  
Following approval granted by the University of Stellenbosch Business School ethics 
committee and by Agribank, a total of 28 interviews were conducted on the demand side. 
Depending on the availability of farmers and a convenient time for the researcher and 
participants in the various regions, six interviews were conducted with farmers from the 
Ndonga Linena Irrigation Scheme, six with farmers from the Hardap Irrigation Scheme and 
six with farmers from the Etunda Irrigation Scheme. In addition, 10 independent farmers in 
the same regions in addition to the Oshana Region who were operating outside
22
 the Green 
Scheme projects were also interviewed. These farmers were from Second Chance Garden, 
Eugene Farming, Path Garden and S&T Veg in the Omusati Region, Pozere and Gamade 
gardens in the Kavango Region and four farmers from the Oshana Region. It is important to 
note that of the six Hardap Green Scheme farmers interviewed, three (medium-scale farmers) 
were operating within the project but were not receiving financial assistance from Agribank 
because either they did not want finance from Agribank or they had not been successful in 
                                                 
21
 An approval rate of 70% is information received from Agribank. 
22
 Identified by way of snowball sampling. 
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securing finance, adding to the number of independent farmers. The interviews in Oshana 
region were conducted between December and January 2015.  
On the supply side, two key informant interviews
23
 were conducted at Agribank offices. 
These interviews were held with key informants at the Head Office in the Khomas Region 
and Oshakati Branch in the Oshana Region. The third interview was conducted at the MAWF 
Head Office in Windhoek (capital city of Namibia). Because Agribank is subsidised by the 
government, it was deemed necessary to also include the MAWF. Personnel from 
AGRIBUSDEV, an entity responsible for overseeing the operations of the Green Scheme 
projects in the country that are financed by Agribank, were also interviewed.  
7.6 RESULTS 
7.6.1 Brief background and characteristics of Agribank 
Agribank started way back in 1907. It is a government-owned institution and provides loans 
for agriculture- and fisheries-related economic activities to small-, medium- and large-scale 
farmers.  
When Agribank processes a credit application from a customer, the following minimum 
information is needed (Agribank, 2014): 
o Comprehensive details regarding the identity of the borrower. 
o Evidence of the borrower’s legal ability to borrow. 
o Ability to repay the loan, including the timing and source of repayment and 
evidence of verification thereof. 
o Description of the terms of credit obligation. 
o Assessment of major risks and key litigants. 
o Credit checks. 
                                                 
23
 The justification of two key informant interviews at Agribank has been explained in Chapter 5. 
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o Overview of the facility and collateral. 
o Documentary evidence of review and approval process. 
Given that the government provides collateral and subsidised loans (through Agribank) to 
small-scale farmers employed in the Green Scheme projects, these farmers (many of whom 
come from practising subsistence farming) first go through agricultural training (including 
but not limited to seed production and crop production) for a period of one year to allow 
success of their projects once they are employed and for the government to access enough 
information about them and assess their ability to repay their loans. Once farmers are 
employed in the Green Scheme project, the financial management of their farms is carried out 
by a service provider appointed by the government, meaning that farmers do not deal directly 
with the loans despite the fact that these Agribank loans are their obligations. This is 
consistent with results found by Koranteng (2010) on financing smallholder farmers in South 
Africa in the case of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)’s Kat River citrus 
development scheme. Farmers employed at this scheme receive finance from the IDC, but it 
is controlled by Riverside Company who acts as a service provider.  
 
Although farmers are subsidised by government, there are still small- and medium-scale 
farmers who are excluded from the Green Scheme. Of the small-scale farmers who are 
funded, 80% is guaranteed by government and 20% by Agribank. The small-scale farmers 
have to sign the tripartite agreements between the farmers (the MAWF signiing as an 
underwriter for the loan), the service provider and the financier, Agribank. A fair number of 
small-scale farmers refuse to sign the tripartite agreements as they feel that some of the terms 
of agreement are not favourable to them (Kandjeke, 2013). Medium-scale farmers, in 
contrast, are expected to provide their own collateral if they intend to borrow money from the 
bank. This gives a reason to estimate the gap between demand and supply.  
7.6.2 Characteristics of borrowers interviewed 
Farmers in the Green Scheme have signed renewable lease agreements for a period of five 
years with the MAWF. and many are between the ages of 24 and 55. All farmers interviewed 
have employed only up to a maximum of five people but only on a temporary basis because 
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of the seasonal nature of the work and because the sizes of the plots do not allow many 
assistants.  
7.6.3 Magnitude of the finance gap between demand and supply 
Table 7.1: Gap between demand and supply among communal farmers in Namibia 
Year 2012 2013 2014 Overall
Number of loan applications received 623 316 529           1 468 
Number of loans approved 436 221 370           1 027 
Amounts granted (N$)      62 333 436  28 764 407.84  56 828 666.66  147 926 511 
Percentage of total amount granted 23% 11% 19% 18%
Amount applied for (estimate)  89 068 189.54  41 129 198.54  81 249 634.22  211 447 022 
Finance gap (estimate)      26 734 754  12 364 790.70  24 420 967.56   63 520 512  
Source: Agribank (2012; 2013; 2014) and estimations by the author 
 
From Table 7.1 above, one can see that for the three-year period 2012–2014, there is a clear 
mismatch between demand and supply. The estimated agricultural finance gap stands at N$63 
520 512. However, the finance gap has fluctuated, falling significantly between 2012 and 
2013 and rising again between 2013 and 2014 from N$12 364 790 to N$24 420 967.56.  
7.6.4 Causes of the finance gap 
This section provides the causes of the finance gap in Namibia from both the demand and the 
supply side.  
7.6.4.1 Supply side  
The major issue arising from the supply side, namely Agribank, is loan default by farmers.  
 
The manager of xxx at the Agribank Head Office noted:  
 
The recovery problem is, is generally a problem especially with the Development 
Finance Institutions (DFIs) and when the people have got the perception that it is 
government money so it’s always a bit of problem. (P17, 73:73)  
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This supports previous literature by Singh and Sagar (2004, as cited in De, 2010) who posit 
that a notion has settled among many rural borrowers that loans taken up by them are 
government supported and hence need not be repaid.  
 
Figure 7.2 below indicates that amounts in arrears have been on the increase between 2012 
and 2014 from N$224 million reaching N$387 million. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Agribank (2012; 2013; 2014) 
 
On the issue of loan default, farmers feel that their default on loans (as argued by lenders) is 
caused by insufficient capital provided by the bank, higher cost of inputs and low selling 
price. The following quote summarises this belief:  
 
The requirements are fine its just that the loan amount itself is not enough because for 
anyone to put up collateral at the bank they usually put up a collateral equal to the 
value of the amount of money they are requesting so when the government decided to 
put a collateral, we don’t get enough money because the value of the collateral is 
small. It makes it difficult because the costs of inputs nowadays are very high 
ars  
Figure 7.2: Loan amounts in arrears 
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especially considering the fact that most of the inputs such as fertilizers and chemicals 
are coming from South Africa now you have to buy this product on higher costs and 
when it comes to selling price the selling price is too low because which leads us not 
to pay back the money from Agribank. (P11, 104:104)  
 
Riedl (2007) argues that low selling price is caused by overproduction and market influence 
on price, which lead farmers to reduce their prices in order to sell most of their produce.  
 
In addition to loan default, dishonesty among medium-scale farmers towards Agribank is 
argued by lenders to be another issue that widens the gap between demand and supply. 
Impressive business plans are drawn up with promises of qualification in agriculture, but 
when farmers are given funds, the job on the ground does not match the promises on paper, 
which leads to low agricultural production and therefore losses. The importance of the quality 
and the content of the training offered to farmers may need to be reconsidered to make sure 
that funds are used productively.  
7.6.4.2 Demand side  
On the demand side, three different categories of farmers are found: those who borrow, those 
who do not borrow and those who borrow but are given lower amounts than they applied for. 
All three categories share the sentiment that demand mismatches supply because of a lack of 
compliance with bank requirements and also because of a lack of financial institutions in the 
country. Two farmers narrated the following: 
 
Money is available but if one does not have the requirements e.g. collateral that the 
banks are looking for, it becomes a problem to get access to funds. (P35, 57:57) 
 
I think demand is more than supply because is there any other institution that gives 
funds to farmers apart from Agribank? (P38, 72:72) 
 
Farmers who choose not to borrow, many of whom are operating outside the Green Scheme 
projects, argue that they do not have information on the financing schemes available at 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
139 
 
 
 
 
Agribank and that is why they do not borrow. This reason was advanced more frequently than 
any other. Farmers from the Omusati and Hardap regions noted the following, respectively: 
 
 I think there is a lack of information on the side of the farmers on where to get 
funding that is why they struggle to get funding. (P15, 107:107) 
 
Rumours from the community for example from SME funds are spread but because 
no formal institution is giving awareness so trust is minimal. Information is not very 
clear about agricultural funds. (P2, 88:88) 
 
Other independent farmers feel that they do not need the funds to carry out their agricultural 
activities, and that is why they do not borrow.  
 
I don’t need the funds. It is not hundred of thousands so I do not really need funds 
from financiers. (P1, 67;67)  
 
This is consistent with results found in Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and the 
Dominican Republic cited in Anand and Rosenberg (2008). They found that 42% of people 
(among their respondents) who did not apply for loans did not do so because they did not 
need the loans.  
  
Finally, there are some farmers who borrow but are given lower amounts than they applied 
for.  
 
The amount which I applied for was three hundred and fifty thousand and the one I 
got was one sixty one. (P9, 159:159) 
Another participant noted:  
We give our business plans and then Agribank goes with it and then our cropping 
programmes go to the extension officer’s office, Agribank looks at it and come up with 
a decision on how much money to give. (P13, 91:91) 
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Agribank decides what amounts farmers (employed in Green Scheme projects) should 
receive, and thus it is not always up to the applicants to decide on the amounts that they 
should receive for their farming activities. 
7.7 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
The aim of this paper was to identify the gap between the demand for and supply of financial 
resources and the reasons behind this gap. The results confirm that there is a mismatch 
between the demand for and supply of funds. The finance gap increased between 2013 and 
2014. From the interviews conducted, it is clear that the mismatch between demand and 
supply is caused by loan default and insufficient information provided by farmers (on the 
supply side) and lack of satisfying financing requirements and low supply of funds (on the 
demand side). While there are farmers outside the Green Scheme who do not borrow because 
they are not sufficiently informed about financial services, the researcher argues that there is 
no gap in this regard but rather a lack of information on the availability of financial services 
in the country. This points to imperfections in financial markets. Access to information is 
important, and Agribank could implement aggressive marketing to allow farmers in rural 
communities, especially those working outside the Green Scheme projects, to be aware of the 
financing schemes available at Agribank. This may allow them to apply for financial 
assistance and thus promote agricultural activities.  
 
Farmers who borrow attribute the loan default problem to factors such as insufficient capital, 
higher cost of input and low selling price. Perhaps in addition to subsidised credit extension, 
agricultural support should develop innovative ways of lending because the question still 
remains how much subsidized credit is really ‘sufficient’ to allow purchase of inputs and still 
be able to repay the loan. For countries such as Indonesia that have performed better in their 
agricultural sectors, subsidy programmes have also always provided limited quantities of 
subsidised credit so that not all farmers had access to this credit. Most farmers who had 
access still could not obtain all the financing that they wished to obtain with the subsidy. 
Instead, there was improved provision of formal sector credit through Bank Rakyat 
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Indonesia
24
 (BRI) (Cervantes-Godoy & Dewbre, 2010). The sole focus on subsidised credit 
for farmers could therefore be doing much harm, not only to farmers but also to lenders 
because of loan default. 
 
This study has implications for crafting and developing financial services structures that have 
macroeconomic effects, especially regarding the profitability of agriculture for smallholder 
farmers, such as access to information and finance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 A detailed discussion on BRI is provided in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8  
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL SMEs: LESSONS 
FROM BRAZIL AND INDONESIA  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The government is considered as an entity that consists of a multitude of actors such as 
politicians who must seek political support from various groups, bureaucrats, technocrats and 
so forth. It is a nonmarket organisation, and it generally must do things on a large scale 
(including enforcement of contracts, provision of information, such as agricultural research, 
and extension and provision of basic public services, such as roads and communication) 
(Krueger, 1990). 
Governments in most African countries have tried to intervene and set up financing 
mechanisms in the agricultural sector. Despite the operations of Agribank, which has been in 
existence for 26 years after independence in 1990, agricultural productivity has not been 
encouraging. From 2008 to 2011, the agricultural production index in Namibia has been on 
the decline: 85.60 in 2008, 85.14 in 2009, 83.97 in 2010 and 81.01 in 2011 (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 2015).  
This paper intends to review countries (Brazil and Indonesia) that have achieved high 
agricultural output through reliance on government-sponsored financial institutions to finance 
agriculture.  The issue is what we can learn from their financing model (Duff & Padila, 
2015).  
The specific questions that the paper tries to answer are, What are the specific government 
financial efforts or interventions to support farmers in Namibia, and how do such 
interventions compare with those in Latin America and South-East Asia? Are these 
interventions directed at the real sector, in other words production and marketing, and/or at 
the financial sector, in other words agricultural finance? The answers to these questions are 
crucial because for governments in both developed and developing countries, the agricultural 
sector remains a strategic sector and ensuring food security is high on the political agenda 
(Maurer, 2014). 
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Towards this end, the history of government intervention in agriculture is reviewed in Section 
8.2, Section 8.3 reviews the literature on the new forms of intervention in the agricultural 
sector, Section 8.4 focuses on the methodology, Section 8.5 looks at the Namibian case, 
Section 8.6 explains the major issues with the interventions in Namibia, Section 8.7 compares 
Namibia’s government intervention to those of Brazil and Indonesia and Section 8.8 provides 
the discussion and conclusion.  
8.2 HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE  
Before independence in 1990, agricultural services in Namibia were provided mainly by the 
second-tier ethnic administration operation in the context of the pre-independence regime’s 
policy of apartheid. The commercial sector was well served as compared to the communal 
sector in terms of research, extension and training services run by the colonial administration. 
In addition, a number of statutory bodies and parastatals provided additional research, 
financing and marketing services to the commercial sector. This type of practice excluded 
black native farmers mainly operating in communal areas (Vigne & Whiteside, 1997). 
In order to include the mass of native farmers, mainly small- and medium-scale farmers, one 
way of intervention in Africa took the form of contract farming. In the period 1930–1950, 
contracting was used in many food and fibre sectors. Given the poor performance of 
agriculture in many developing countries, especially in Africa, many donors and governments 
hoped that contract farming and its variants (outgrower schemes, nucleus estates and satellite 
farming) would bring about improved incentives, increased income for farmers and positive 
multiplier effects for impoverished rural economies; indeed, there was considerable growth in 
the number of contract farming schemes during the 1970s and 1980s (Kirsten & Sartorius, 
2002). 
In the 1980s to the 1990s, the predominant approach in agricultural finance by the 
government was the provision of farmer credit with subsidised interest rates, particularly via 
specific state programmes or state-owned agricultural/development banks (Köhn & Jainzik, 
2014).  
Government intervention started through the establishment of state-owned DFIs. These were 
established to serve as a response to the widespread perception that the private financial 
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entities were uninterested in serving the target clientele, especially those in agriculture. These 
institutions obtained much of their funding from related governments or from foreign 
assistance. They were planned to provide SMEs with the long-term financing that the 
commercial banking sector would not supply. The underlying primary objective was to 
reduce poverty (Yaron, 2004).  
The government implemented a Green Scheme policy with Agribank (a state-owned bank) to 
encourage the development of irrigation-based agronomic production in Namibia (including 
small- and medium-scale farmers who received subsidised loans by government). The 
ultimate aim was to increase food production, thereby contributing to the national agenda for 
food self-sufficiency and food security as well as job creation (MAWF, 2008) As a result of 
the Green Scheme implementation, a funding scheme with Agribank was created in 2010 in 
accordance with Cabinet Decision No. 1st(b)/13.04.10/008) (Kandjeke, 2013). The decision 
authorised the utilisation of the Cooperative Loan Guarantee Fund for the purpose of 
guaranteeing loans to be advanced to small-scale farmers. The loan for the small-scale 
farmers was guaranteed by government at a level of 80% and 20% by Agribank. The small-
scale farmers had to sign the tripartite agreements between the farmers (the MAWF signing 
as an underwriter for the loan), the service provider and the financier, Agribank. The 
consequence of the Green Scheme intervention by government was that a fair number of 
small-scale farmers refused to sign the tripartite agreements and defaulted on their loan 
repayments. The refusal to sign arose from small-scale farmers who felt that some of the 
terms of agreement were not favourable to them and thus sold their produce to an 
independent marketer. This violated Article 2 of the lease agreement that stated that the 
small-scale farmers should “honour their obligations towards the Financier, Service Provider 
and the Ministry failure of which he/she shall be required to vacate the plot and dwelling” 
(Kandjeke, 2013:13). Ten small-scale farmers owed an amount of N$1 452 856 to Agribank 
and N$1 583 459 to the service provider as at 31 March 2012. As a result, they were put up 
for eviction (Kandjeke, 2013). 
Besley (1994) criticised government’s intervention on the ground that many of the policies 
were not consistent with objectives of helping the poor. Two central facets of many 
government backed-loan programmes were pointed out: Firstly, default rates were typically 
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very high and, secondly, much of the benefit appeared to go to wealthier farmers (Besley, 
1994). This mirrored observations made in Namibia when it was found that Agribank ran the 
risk of loan default among borrowers because government provided collateral on behalf of 
smallholder farmers and these farmers felt that if they defaulted on their loans, they had 
nothing to lose. This led to high default rates (see results in Chapter 7). Trivelli and Venero 
(2007) argue that lending programmes by government merely served government’s political 
ends and/or underestimated the difficulties and risks implicit in their implementation as 
subsidised credit encouraged farmers to choose unprofitable crops and therefore led to non-
repayment of loans.  
It was in this context that considerable re-thinking about interventions in rural credit markets, 
especially in developing countries, and in particular the view that interventions should be 
restricted to cases where a market failure has been identified was suggested (Besley, 1994).  
8.3 NEW FORMS OF INTERVENTION 
It is thought that some of the many roles of government are to 1) contribute to the 
development of institutions for improving the markets for labour, finance, technology and so 
forth and to 2) offset or eliminate price distortions that arise in cases of demonstrable market 
failure (Stiglitz, 1993; Wade, 1990). For this reason, market failure in the credit sector has 
been used as a motivation for government to intervene. This intervention takes the form of 
state-owned DFIs. The intervention of the government through state-owned DFIs is justified 
as the only option to provide financial services to underserved segments of the population 
when the primary objective is to reduce poverty (Yaron, 2004). Market failures may occur if 
large firms have control over credit markets and use their bargaining power to obtain loans on 
privileged terms. Large firms have an implicit guarantee in that they are more likely to be 
rescued by government when there is a crisis, hence the need for government intervention to 
increase small firms’ access to credit. However, there is also the view that government should 
limit its own activities to improving the functioning of markets and to providing only those 
goods and services in which the government has a clear comparative advantage relative to 
private agents (Wade, 1990). 
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There have been two main schools of thought regarding government intervention in the credit 
sector. The first school argues in favour of government intervention in order to reduce market 
failures, and the second school argues that a market approach should suffice to deal with 
market failure problems. There have been justifications and major criticisms for each.  
8.3.1 School in favour of government intervention 
The need for government intervention to reduce market failure in rural financial markets has 
been motivated by four issues, namely monopoly, externalities, imperfect information and 
enforcement problems.  
8.3.1.1 Monopoly 
Monopoly (also referred to as market power) arises when loan arrangements cannot be 
tailored to each individual. This leads to monopoly inefficiencies whereby lenders restrict 
funds to increase profits. In this case, intervention by government through regulation of 
interest rates and provision of alternative source of credit is an option (Besley, 1994). A firm 
may be found to have monopolised a market unlawfully by maintaining a monopoly power 
for a period of time substantial enough to indicate that market forces by themselves will be 
unable to undo the firm’s dominant position. The existence of dominant firms has undesirable 
consequences. Some of these consequences are resource misallocation and the inability to 
deal with established monopoly results (Williamson, 1972).  
8.3.1.2 Enforcement problems  
An enforcement problem arises when a borrower is able but unwilling to repay his or her 
loan. Enforcement problems can take two forms: Firstly, the lender must attempt to enforce 
repayment after default has occurred. Secondly, enforcement problems are exacerbated by the 
poor development of property rights such as land. In the first case of enforcing payment after 
default, defaults by rich farmers are usually not penalised because the political costs are too 
high. The government then steps in and introduces debt-forgiveness programmes. This has 
been common in India and documented in Bangladesh as well. In the second case where there 
is poor development of property rights such as land to serve as collateral, government can 
help to solve collateral by improving the codification of property rights. However, 
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government intervention in enforcement by introducing debt-forgiveness programmes gives 
the wrong signal to borrowers if these programmes engender expectations that loan default 
will ultimately be rewarded by debt being forgiven. Ultimately, government’s ability to 
commit itself to a policy of imposing sanctions on delinquent borrowers is a significant 
aspect of the political economy of credit programmes (Besley, 1994).  
8.3.1.3 Imperfect information 
Imperfect or asymmetric information may prevent an efficient allocation of lending, leading 
to credit rationing (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993). Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986, cited in Hoff & 
Stiglitz, 1990) posit that markets with imperfect information give rise to externality-like 
effects, for which government intervention may be more successful. In the context of credit 
markets, government expenditure on rural infrastructure (for example land titling and 
commercialisation in the goods market) that reduces farmers’ risks will likely reduce the 
importance of information asymmetries.  
8.3.1.4 Externalities 
Externalities may take the form of benefits created by a firm, in the form of goods, services 
and technology, for which these benefits are not fully compensated in market transactions 
(Wade, 1990). Furthermore, externalities may also occur in institutions that facilitate the 
overcoming of informational problems in rural credit markets. Such institutions are, for 
example, those who provide group lending. There is an externality in this type of lending 
because the individual who bears the initial cost of organising the group lending institution is 
providing a form of social capital that in the end will benefit all members of the group. When 
this externality occurs, there will be an undersupply of the socially beneficial service and 
there will therefore be a need for government to intervene to help to organise and act as a 
catalyst in the formation of such institutions (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990).  
Despite the four issues that call for government intervention, the school in favour of 
government intervention has not been left without criticism. There is an argument that 
attempts by government to intervene in the market have failed and resulted in wasted 
economic resources and stagnant growth rather than actually correcting the market failures 
that they were designed to correct. Furthermore, there is an argument that government 
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intervention in one market runs a substantial risk of lowering the welfare of the poor because 
of its connection with other markets that provide some degree of welfare insurance (Timmer, 
1989).  
Pettinger (2012) opines that governments should not intervene for three reasons: Firstly, they 
are likely to make wrong decisions in their market intervention by being influenced by 
political pressure groups as they spend on inefficient projects that lead to inefficient 
outcomes. Secondly, government intervention takes away individuals’ decision on how to 
spend and act. Thirdly, the market is best at deciding how and when to produce. 
There is thus a warning by Yaron, Benjamin and Charitonenko (1998) that there should be 
careful analyses before appropriate interventions to expand rural incomes. Even if a market 
failure is identified, direct interventions (subsidies, credit programmes or institutions) are 
necessary only if the market failure can be addressed cost-effectively; thus, the benefits must 
exceed the costs.  
8.3.2 School in favour of market approach 
The second school argues that a market approach should suffice to deal with market failure 
problems. This school justifies this argument by claiming that market failures are matched by 
a corresponding list of government failures (Stiglitz, 1987).  
Yaron et al. (1998) are of the opinion that information constraints do not immediately justify 
direct government intervention in the market because markets may be constrained-efficient; 
that is, they maximise incomes subject to the information and other barriers that participants 
face. For example, features of rural areas such as isolated markets, low population densities 
and widespread crop failures in a given region often result in high transaction costs. These 
features differentiate rural financial markets from urban ones and often scare off traditional 
for-profit financial intermediaries. They do not, however, result in market failure because 
these features result in high real costs to society that government interventions would also 
face. “A government failure is not a solution to a market failure” (Yaron et al., 1998:154). 
Nonetheless, this school has been criticised on the basis that “free market prices do not 
provide a satisfactory degree of price stability” (Timmer, 1989:25). The market’s own 
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allocation of resources has been found to be inefficient or unacceptable because of five 
reasons:  
1. Imperfect markets in insurance futures or credit: This means that farmers cannot 
obtain complete insurance against the big risks that they face without having to pay 
usurious interest rates.  
2. Public goods and increasing returns: The provision of public goods in agriculture 
such as water is a pure public good, and the marginal cost of using irrigated water is 
relatively low when government is involved as compared to when left to the market, 
which excludes the majority of people from benefiting.  
3. Imperfect information: The dissemination of information by government, for 
example what crops grow best in a particular area, is a local public good. However, 
disseminating information is costly and the benefits accrue mainly to those who 
receive it.  
4. Externalities: The existence of externalities, for example new technology, justifies 
subsidies for farmers to adopt new technologies.  
5. Income distribution: Given the initial holding of assets, the distribution of income 
generated by free markets does not satisfy society’s ethical judgements. It may result 
in a significant number of people having low incomes or supplies of food (Stiglitz, 
1987).  
De Cleene (2014) posit that a critical ingredient in bringing about actual sustainable 
investments on the ground is the need for government and businesses to work together to 
overcome some of the challenges to successful agricultural growth. A key focus should be the 
forging of partnerships between the public and private sectors to ensure that African 
agriculture will be more profitable for smallholder, medium-scale and large-scale farmers 
alike. Partnerships have the potential to bring about multisector commitment to action. 
Farmers need access not only to land, seeds and fertilisers but also to transport, power and 
water. Roads must be built to reach farmers. This calls for access to rural financing through 
innovative financing instruments that support agricultural development at different stages. 
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There is a warning that careful analyses should be carried out before appropriate 
interventions to expand rural incomes are implemented. Even if a market failure is identified, 
direct interventions (subsidies, credit programmes or institutions) are necessary only if the 
market failure can be addressed cost-effectively; thus, the benefits must exceed the costs 
(Yaron et al., 1998).  
For this reason, this paper supports the need for government intervention so as not to leave 
everything to the private sector. This is especially important in minimising monopolistic 
practices. However, as aptly expressed by Krueger (1990:18), “What is needed is the 
specification of a set of criteria, or rules, by which interventions will be administered, and an 
indication as to the process by which this will occur.” Craig et al. (2007) caution that one 
should not jump to the conclusion that the presence of market imperfections in a credit 
market means that government intervention to correct these is desirable unless one can find a 
positive correlation between measures of loan guarantees by government and the local 
economic performance (see also Williamson, 1972). Furthermore, although the market is 
constrained, government should seek for efficiency, taking into account the imperfections 
that the market in question has to deal with (Besley, 1994). 
8.4 METHODOLOGY 
As explained in Chapter 4, a case study research design was adopted. Three data sources 
were used for this paper: desk research (also referred to as desk reviews), secondary data and 
semi-structured interviews (with key informants) at Agribank. Because this was a comparison 
study between three different countries, in the case of Namibia, all three data sources were 
used. Secondary data included physical research reports, government policies, newspaper 
articles, and published and unpublished articles that dealt with government projects mainly 
from the MAWF, Agribank and the Agricultural Marketing and Trade Agency (AMTA). In 
the case of Brazil and Indonesia, the researcher relied purely on desk research.  
 
The desk research entailed a review of the existing literature on the provision of financial 
services to smallholder farmers worldwide, including a review of specific innovations and 
products in Latin America and South-East Asia (see Appendix C for a list of these). This was 
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done in order to establish what was known about serving this market and to identify where 
knowledge gaps remained to be filled. The knowledge gaps are summarised as follows:  
8.4.1 Country specific research 
Most of the literature on government efforts to finance agriculture comes from countries 
other than those in Africa, and much less literature comes from African countries. This could 
be attributed to the fact that Asian institutions are frequently suggested as models for 
successful government interventions in credit markets. The Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand, Village Banks of BRI and Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh reach millions of clients, many of whom are poor, and they serve agriculture 
directly or indirectly (IFC 2014; Meyer, 2014). The IFC (2014) disseminated the best 
practices of microfinance institutions that have successfully implemented agricultural lending 
operations targeting agricultural smallholders in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
8.4.2 Types of products and services offered 
The type of assistance offered in the current literature (IFC, 2011; 2014) does not specify 
whether these products and services are targeted at the production and marketing sector (real 
sector) of the business or at the financial sector. According to Maurer (2014), price controls 
and subsidies constitute the real sector interventions while agricultural finance institutions 
constitute the financial sector of government intervention. However, there are a few studies 
that distinguish between these two types of interventions by government. The difference 
between the two types of interventions is briefly discussed next.  
8.4.2.1 Real sector interventions: Price controls and subsidies 
With a dependency on agricultural products in many African countries, the impact of crop 
prices on real incomes by sector and income class is enormous. Because of the economic 
significance of agricultural products, maintaining reasonable stability in agricultural prices 
contributes directly to political stability. “Nothing is more unsettling politically than rapid 
shifts in real income and wealth among large sectors of the population” (Timmer, 1989:24). 
Government price interventions can eliminate at least one important cause of price instability 
by stabilising prices for agricultural products. Continuous market interventions and price 
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controls have an impact on the development of a private marketing sector. Farmers need this 
dynamic type of intervention as it provides them with information about what to produce and 
how profitable it will be (Timmer, 1989). Furthermore, economic growth is affected by the 
level and stability of price incentives to farmers, which stimulate growth in output and rural 
incomes. Low and stable consumer prices keep real wages low, thus stimulating investment, 
industrial output and exports (Timmer, 1989).  
8.4.2.2 Agricultural finance interventions: Financial sector 
Agricultural finance interventions involve government intervention in the form of subsidised 
targeted credit for agricultural development (Yaron, 1996). Intervention by government 
through the financial sector differs by product/services and by institutional arrangements. 
Specific sets of laws in financial sector intervention govern commercial banks, state-owned 
development banks and other financial service providers (De Klerk et al., 2013). As 
previously discussed in Section 8.3, government intervention for agricultural finance purpose 
usually takes place through state-owned development banks. However, there is a general rule 
that state-owned rural financial institutions should not receive special privileges that create 
unfair competition (Klein et al., 1999) as this may lead to unnecessary government failures.  
8.5 THE NAMIBIAN CASE 
Agricultural production in Namibia has always been heavily dependent on rainfall (rather 
than irrigation) and is therefore an inherently risky activity (see Figure 8.1 below). 
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Figure 8.1: Crop production status: Area planted (ha) 
Source: Lucas (2012) 
Namibia’s potential for agriculture is severely limited due to climatic and soil factors 
(Schmokel, 1985). The main food crops grown in Namibia are millet (also known as 
mahangu) and maize. Other food crops include groundnuts, wheat and sunflowers. In terms 
of livestock, the main agricultural output in Namibia is beef cattle, sheep and goats, which are 
produced on commercial and communal farms. During the past 10 years, agricultural output 
has been seriously constrained by recurring drought, floods, locusts, insects and worm 
invasions. The MAWF has implemented initiatives geared towards improving food 
production, including the diversification of crop production to bring about improved 
nutritional status in the country (World Health Organization Africa, 2014). These initiatives 
are discussed below.  
One of the strategies (in order to attain national objectives) by government is to encourage 
Agribank to provide both financial and technical assistance to support its agricultural 
development efforts (MAWF, 1995).  
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8.5.1 Agricultural Bank of Namibia 
The mission of Agribank is to promote agriculture and its related activities through affordable 
and sustainable financial solutions towards socioeconomic development in Namibia. It serves 
various clients such as commercial farmers, communal farmers, emerging commercial and 
resettled farmers, cooperative societies, companies and partnerships, individuals, trustees of 
trusts and control boards and provides different types of loans (Agribank, 2013).  
In conjunction with the MAWF, Agribank offers certain loans under special schemes to 
farmers to improve their livelihoods. These schemes are government subsidised and are 
offered with favourable conditions. Favourable conditions include low interest rates. For 
example, interest rates are determined by the cost of funding rather than by the market prime 
interest rates. Furthermore, the area (whether it is a communal area or a commercial area) 
also determines the interest rate charged for farmers because there is an emphasis on trying to 
stimulate production in the communal areas
25
.  
In cases where farmers are expected to provide collateral as security, this security is 
pledged by way of farmers providing their birth certificates, their identity documents, 
proof of income for those who have an income, balance sheets and collateral for those 
who can afford to provide collateral. Those who have been backed by the government 
(in different schemes) are being treated differently because Agribank liaises with the 
government to provide collateral, for example for farmers farming specifically on the 
Green Scheme farms, but the others provide their own collateral. The ‘own collateral’ 
preferred by Agribank includes mortgage collateral, be it a house or any form of fixed 
property that has a title deed in the borrower’s name and can be used to register the 
bond. In addition, fixed investments, for example 32-days-notice accounts or any 
other fixed investment with commercial banks, can be used by the bank in case of 
default (P17, 85:85).  
The following programmes/loan schemes are offered by Agribank, with some of them 
introduced as far back as 1992 in terms of Cabinet Resolution CAB 92 (Agribank 2011). 
                                                 
25
 This information is from interviews conducted at Agribank 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
161 
 
 
 
 
8.5.1.1 Post-settlement support funds 
In terms of a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2009, Agribank established post-
settlement support funds for resettled farmers to enable them to enhance their agricultural 
productivity. Resettled farmers are regarded as previously disadvantaged farmers arising 
from colonial injustices in land distribution. The Namibian government buys farms from 
commercial farmers on a willing seller, willing buyer basis and allocates them to previously 
disadvantaged farmers (Ministry of Land and Resettlement, 2013). The post-settlement 
support funds allow for a co-financing agreement with Agribank regarding post-settlement 
support to resettled farmers that led to the forming of a post-settlement support fund of N$30 
million. By 2015, the Ministry had acquired a total of nine farms within the Khomas Region, 
and a total of 34 families had been resettled. Officially introduced in 2014, the resettlement 
financing support programmes cover the Kharas, Otjozondjupa, Erongo and Khomas regions 
with the intention to replicate the initiative to all the regions in the country. The maximum 
loan amount is limited to N$200 000 per farmer, and by 2015, more than 350 loans had been 
disbursed to resettlement farmers country-wide (Resettled farmers receive loans, 2015).  
8.5.1.2 Green Scheme 
The government of the Republic of Namibia, in terms of Cabinet Decision No. 
18th/06.08.02/004 (MAWF, 2008), approved an amount of N$1 billion to be made available 
for investment in the agricultural sector of Namibia over a period of 10 years. A model was 
adopted whereby a commercial irrigation farming enterprise was tied to a settlement of small-
scale irrigation farming units in a joint enterprise. This arrangement was aimed at inviting the 
private sector to invest in the remote and underdeveloped areas, thus building local capacity 
in terms of production and marketing management (MAWF, 2008). In this context, 
commercial farming enterprises are tied to a settlement of small-scale farming (Green 
Scheme) units in a joint enterprise. The idea is for the latter to learn by watching the 
commercial farmers, thereby building local capacity in terms of production and marketing 
management. In addition to training, the commercial farmers serve as service providers to the 
small-scale farmers by providing them with the necessary farm equipment, transport and 
marketing services at a cost (African Development Bank, 2004).  
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AGRIBUSDEV was established in 2011 as a state-owned company. The objective of the 
agency is to monitor and create an ideal environment for the achievement of the Green 
Scheme objectives as circumscribed by the Green Scheme policy of 2003. Eleven Green 
Scheme projects were established by the MAWF, namely 1) Etunda Green Scheme Irrigation 
Project; 2) Musese Green Scheme Irrigation Project; 3) Sikondo Green Scheme Irrigation 
Project; 4) Uvhungu-Vhungu Green Scheme Irrigation Project; 5) Mashare Green Scheme 
Irrigation Project; 6) Ndonga Linena Green Scheme Irrigation Project; 7) Shitemo Green 
Scheme Irrigation Project; 8) Shadikongoro Green Scheme Irrigation Project; 9) Kalimbeza 
Rice Green Scheme Irrigation Project; 10) Hardap Green Scheme Irrigation Project; and 11) 
Orange River Green Scheme Irrigation Project (AGRIBUSDEV, 2015). 
In 2014, Agribank disbursed N$4.5 million in total for some of the Green Scheme projects as 
follows: Etunda Irrigation Project received N$600 000, Ndonga Linena Irrigation Project 
received N$1.9 million and Orange River Irrigation Project received N$2 million. Total 
Green Scheme project disbursements in 2014 showed an increase of 23% in comparison with 
the 2012/13 financial year. This was despite the fall in allocation to Etunda Green Scheme 
Project by 83% due to poor crop yields by small-scale farmers in the project (Agribank, 
2014). 
Farmers in Green Scheme projects fall under the National Agricultural Credit Programme 
whereby production loans, livestock loans and infrastructure loans are provided. The 
provision of these loans aims to maximise agricultural productivity, ensure surplus 
production and contribute towards food security.  
The types of loans and classifications provided to all types of farmers are as follows:  
(i) Short-term loans: repayable between 1 and 5 years. 
 Production loans – repayable within one year but can be granted as a five-year 
revolving facility.  
 Horticulture production loans – repayable within one year.  
 Green Scheme loans – repayable within one year.  
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(ii) Medium-term loans: repayable between 5 and 10 years. 
 Infrastructure loans – repayable within a maximum of 10 years. For vehicle 
and tractor loans, the repayment period in the case of the purchase of a new 
tractor is 10 years and for a second-hand vehicle, it is 5 years.  
 Improvement loans – these are granted to acquire equipment for improving or 
repairing dilapidated infrastructure and implements such as irrigation 
equipment, boreholes, windmills, dams, water pumps and pipes, hammer 
mills, mahangu threshers, silos, and so forth.  
(iii) Long-term loans: repayable between 10 and 25 years. 
 Alternative energy solar farm systems – used for purchasing and installation of 
alternative energy to contribute towards sustained productivity.  
 Loans for the construction of labourers’ houses – available to commercial 
farmers for the construction of labourers’ houses of an acceptable standard at 
4% interest rate.  
 Loans for the purchase of farmland – for example, the purchase of a pig farm. 
Loans are made available for the purchase of farmland and/or additional land 
for agriculture-related activities. 
 Loan consolidation facility – several existing loans are combined into a new 
bigger loan from a single lender that is used to pay off the balances of the 
existing loans. Clients should have a loan facility with Agribank to qualify and 
should offer some form of collateral such as a house, a farm and/or other 
acceptable collateral.  
All the loans are granted against security of fixed property, investment or any other 
acceptable form of security. Access to agricultural credit (for different types of loans to both 
communal and commercial farmers) from Agribank is shown in Table 8.1 below: 
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Table 8.1: Total loans disbursed by Agribank 
Year(s) Amount (N$) Number of farmers who obtained 
credit 
2012 195 731 015 1 040 
2013 245 189 468 970 
2014 244 935 918 842 
Source: Agribank (2012; 2013; 2014) 
As much as efforts are made and despite the fact that most of the loans provided are 
subsidised by the government, evidence from Table 8.1 above indicates that the total number 
of farmers being financed by Agribank has declined every year from 2012 to 2014. This is 
attributed to economic and financial security problems experienced in the country such as 
drought in 2012 and 2013 and a lack of collateral (Agribank, 2014). The drought has also 
resulted in more people being employed by Green Scheme farmers on a temporary basis than 
on a permanent basis (see figures 8.3 and 8.4 on p. 135). 
8.5.1.3 Drought Relief Scheme 
Because Namibia is faced with severe recurring droughts with potentially devastating effects 
on food security and livelihood of farmers in certain areas, the Drought Relief Scheme was 
introduced by government in 2015 and is operated by Agribank. Agribank has developed four 
drought relief facilities under this scheme in order to mitigate the effects of the drought:  
1.  Interest holiday for one year: This was established to give a repayment break to 
Agribank clients whose loans became due from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.  
2.  Ring fencing of arrears and suspension of penalty interest: This offers amnesty to 
clients to repay their arrears, essentially restructuring the debts. This is done in order 
to ensure that clients meet their debt obligations.  
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3.  Production loan facilities: The purpose of this facility is to enable farmers to cover 
the day-to-day costs of production inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, herbicides, 
pesticides, vaccines, fuel, oil costs, wages and licks.  
4.  Water and infrastructure improvement: This facility enables farmers to upgrade 
water and other infrastructure to sustain the farming operation throughout the drought 
crisis. For the third and fourth facilities, normal Agribank collateral conditions 
(mentioned above) apply in order to gain access to these loans (Johannes, 2015).  
8.5.2 Agricultural Marketing and Trade Agency 
Because of a lack of access to markets for small- and medium-scale farmers in Namibia, the 
government through the MAWF established AMTA as a specialised agency of the MAWF to 
coordinate and manage the marketing and trading of agricultural produce in Namibia. AMTA 
aims to create a market for the produce of the small- and medium-scale farmers involved in 
horticultural farming. AMTA is a trading platform whereby infrastructure such as floor space 
is provided to store the produce of farmers (both in Green Scheme projects and individual), 
and cooling facilities are provided to extend the shelf life of produce such as cabbages. 
Agents are recruited to sell on behalf of the farmers once an agreement (between farmers and 
agents) is reached on the price to sell the produce at (AMTA, s.a.).  
The AMTA has enlisted six marketing agents who source and market the produce on behalf 
of the farmers; however, three of the agents’ contracts were terminated during the period 
under review because they did not meet the market requirements. AMTA has been able to 
obtain supply contracts with two major retailer fresh produce distributors. These are 
Freshmark, which supplies Shoprite and Checkers and also has a supply contract with Nature 
Food Valley, which supplies Pick n Pay (AMTA, s.a.).  
8.5.3 Dry Land Crop Production Programme 
In addition to the loans provided by Agribank, in 2007, the government made available an 
amount of N$5 million for the Dry Land Crop Production Programme. The MAWF through 
the Department of Extension and Engineering Services is responsible for the implementation 
of the Dry Land Crop Production Programme. The aim is to support the majority of 
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households who depend on rain-fed crop farming for subsistence and incomes from surplus. 
The MAWF prepares a budget proposal annually and submits it to the Ministry of Finance for 
funding. The Ministry of Finance makes funds available yearly for the execution of the Dry 
Land Crop Production Programme. Under this programme, the MAWF provides four types of 
services (MAWF, 2010): 
 Provision of ploughing services: Government provides ploughing services to the 
target group through government-owned tractors and through employing the services 
of private tractor owners. Every participant has three hectares ploughed at a 
subsidised rate between government and the beneficiary. The level of subsidy is 
determined depending on the prices and resources available to government for this 
programme.  
 Provision of improved seeds: Government provides improved seeds to the target 
group at subsidised rates determined from time to time depending on the prevailing 
prices and resources available to government for this programme. Training to improve 
production is provided to farmers.  
 Provision of fertilisers: It has been observed that soils in North-East and Central 
Namibia are predominantly sandy, very low in nutrients, organic material and water-
holding capacity, neutral to slightly acidic, susceptible to wind erosion and prone to 
compaction. Government therefore provides fertilisers that address the needs of the 
different types of soil to the target group at subsidised rates to be determined from 
time to time depending on the prevailing prices and resources available to 
government.  
 Provision of weeding services: Government provides weeding services to target 
beneficiaries on a subsidised basis at rates to be determined from time to time, 
depending on the prevailing prices and resources available to government. These 
services are provided at a subsidised rate. 
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8.5.4 Conservation Agriculture Programme 
It has been observed that the smallholder sector in Namibia is vulnerable to climate 
change/variability and that rainfall variability is likely to increase, resulting in a higher 
frequency and intensity of extreme events such as droughts and floods. A new way of 
farming known as conservation agriculture was established to counter and reverse land 
degradation and to adapt to climate change variability while ensuring national food security. 
The programme targets all crop producers in Namibia, encouraging them to adapt 
conservation agriculture practices. Assistance is provided by government in the form of a 
subsidy. Under this programme, government has assigned roles and responsibilities to the 
different agents, some of which are from the Ministry of Finance, to ensure that the needed 
subsidies and bank loans are available and that there is better access to farm inputs, 
machinery and implements for small-scale farmers. Agribank has to ensure easy access to 
loans for organised and individual farmers (MAWF, 2015).  
8.6 MAJOR ISSUES WITH THE INTERVENTIONS 
The abovementioned interventions have brought about both negative and positive issues. The 
various interventions by government have achieved some measurable success. Firstly, 
Agribank’s loan book has increased by 9% from N$1.8 billion in 2012/13 to N$2.0 billion in 
2013/14. This rise is attributed to the growing number of farms purchased by previously 
disadvantaged Namibians as well as an increase in improvement loans. Supporting the 
upward trend were the loan amounts disbursed per beneficiary in respect of the post-
settlement support funds, which rose from N$65 000 per loan in 2012/13 to N$2 000 000 per 
loan in 2013/14. These loans have helped resettled farmers to improve their productivity and 
thus contribute to food production in the country (Agribank, 2014). (See the increment in 
productivity, although at a very slow pace, especially in wheat production, from 2006 to 2011 
in Figure 8.2.)  
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Figure 8.2: Crop production status: Total production (ton) 
Source: Lucas (2012) 
Both the post-settlement support funds and the Green Scheme projects have absorbed many 
unemployed people (and improved their quality of life) in rural areas who otherwise would 
not have been absorbed by an increasingly sophisticated labour market that demands readily 
honed skills and experience (see figures 8.3 and 8.4 below for an increase in employment 
between 2014/15 and 2015/16). 
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Figure 8.3: Employment created by the various Green Scheme projects in 2014/15 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Employment created by the various Green Scheme projects in 2015/16 
Source: Titus (2016) 
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Apart from access to finance, increased productivity and employment creation, sales volumes 
increased from 269 metric ton in 2013/14 to 863 metric ton in 2015 as a result of AMTA’s 
establishment, which means that revenue collection for farmers has shown significant growth. 
This significant growth has been attributed to the fact that most farmers are now using 
AMTA to market their produce as opposed to 2013/14 when the hubs opened their doors. 
This has positively impacted on the incomes of farmers who are selling their produce through 
the hubs (AMTA, s.a.). 
However, the problems of agricultural finance through these interventions still persist. Small-
scale farmers find it hard to take advantage of the interventions because they lack adequate 
collateral to participate in the schemes (Amadhila & Ikhide, 2016). 
The drought conditions have negatively impacted clients’ ability to service their debt from 
different types of loans provided by Agribank, and as a result, the number of permanent jobs 
created in the various schemes supported by Agribank has kept on declining: 3 210 in 2012, 
2 910 in 2014 and 2 526 in 2014 (Agribank, 2012; 2013; 2014). Hay (1988) provides 
evidence that during 1981/82, the rains failed in Botswana and this had a negative impact on 
agricultural output and employment. Because of the low agricultural output as a result of the 
low rainfall, incomes derived from agricultural output also declined and wage employment 
opportunities were lost or fell. Rural wage employment fell because these opportunities were 
mostly in agriculture or dependent on it. In the Namibian case, the loss of employment and 
incomes due to drought resulted in loan default.  
Despite the increase in sales volumes because of AMTA’s establishment, there is a concern 
that AMTA has not addressed the issue of pricing. Farmers buy their inputs at high prices and 
these prices are non-negotiable. However, the prices that they receive for their produce could 
be lower due to excess produce in the market.  
With agriculture, the input costs do not change, but the price we get for our produce 
changes. For example, if our input costs are N$70 per hectare then sometimes our 
prices fetch N$70 to N$75 per hectare. However, two weeks later the exact same crop 
can fetch as little as N$45 per hectare (Reliable prices crucial for horticulturists, 
2015:1).  
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Assuncal, Hemsley and Gandour (2015) refer to low output price as price risk. They argue 
that price risk is a major concern for both farmers and policymakers: Unmanaged risks can 
not only lead to low income for farmers but can also affect the agricultural banking sector, 
contributing to a rural poverty trap. In the works of Jaleta and Gardebroek (2007) in which 
they explain the relative bargaining power of tomato buyers and sellers by regressing the 
relative deviation between initial price quotes and the final trading price on a set of economic 
variables using farm-gate transaction data from central Ethiopia, they argue that one possible 
reason for the uncertainty of farmers’ prices is the fluctuating wholesale price at the central 
vegetable market. Lack of accurate central market information and the perishable nature of 
vegetables affect farmers’ valuation for their products and their bargaining power. When 
farmers cannot wait for better prices by storing their harvest, they are forced to accept a lower 
price to avoid the risk of not selling. The resulting low vegetable prices have a direct impact 
on the next household resource allocation decisions on food and cash crop production. Jaleta 
and Gardebroek (2007) therefore argue that transmitting the daily vegetable wholesale price 
information to the potential vegetable-producing areas via radio or internet could help both 
vegetable producers and buyers to have up-to-date knowledge of the central market prices. 
Establishing and supporting farmers’ vegetable marketing cooperative unions could also help 
to bridge the price information gap, facilitate the price information transmission process and, 
when there is a shortage of buyers at the farm-gate, assist farmers in assembling and 
transporting their vegetable products to the central market (see also Svensson & Yanagizawa, 
2009). 
Finally, under the Conservation Agriculture Programme, good opportunities for improved 
availability of ripping services exist due to numerous tractors being in private hands (though 
not having ripping implements yet) and opportunities for financing new tractors and 
equipment. However, there has been a serious lack of tractors for the provision of ripping 
services. In addition, high running costs, problems with drivers and competition from 
government tractors pose threats to ripping service provision by the private sector (Von Hase, 
2013).  
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8.7 COMPARISON OF BRAZIL AND INDONESIA TO NAMIBIA – LESSONS 
FROM SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
8.7.1 Why compare Latin American and South-East Asian countries to Namibia? 
The recent research work in Latin America and South-East Asia and their respectable rates of 
agricultural productivity growth in the recent past (Duff & Padila, 2015) gave reason for this 
paper to draw a comparison between selected features of both regions’ government 
intervention in the funding of agriculture by financial institutions and that of Namibia and 
government intervention in lending to agriculture. Table 8.2 below provides some indicators 
that gave reason for a comparison between the three countries under discussion. Just like 
Namibia, both Brazil and Indonesia are classified as developing countries. The GDP annual 
rates for all three countries fell between 2010 and 2013. Furthermore, the gross national 
income (GNI) for Namibia and Brazil kept increasing while for Indonesia it fluctuated. Most 
notable is that while the percentage of people employed in the agricultural sector has 
fluctuated between 2005 and 2013, the Crop Production Index (CPI) has done relatively well 
although declining a little between 2010 and 2013 (this is attributed to the drought conditions 
in the country). In comparison, although the percentage of people employed in the 
agricultural sector in Indonesia has been on the decline, the CPI has been on the increase 
between 2005 and 2013.  
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Table 8.2: Selected indicators between Namibia, Brazil and Indonesia 
Indicators Namibia Brazil Indonesia 
Year(s) 2005 2010 2013 2005 2010 2013 2005 2010 2013 
GDP annual 
rates (%) 
2.5 6 4.4 5.8 7.5 2.5 5.7 6.2 5.8 
GNI per 
capita (US$) 
3 526.8 4 876.7  5 408.0 4 602.6 10 780.0 11 002.9 1 211.5 2 863.9 1 273.5 
Employment 
in the 
agricultural 
sector (%) 
29.9 16.3 27.4 17.0 15.3 21.4 44.0 38.3 35.9 
CPI 94.7 108.8 107.4 98 126.6 140.3 98.5 123.5 136.6 
Source: The World Bank Group
26
 (2016); United Nations Statistics Division (2016) 
8.7.2 Brazil 
In the 1950s, the increasing failings of agriculture prompted governments into action and a 
series of measures was put in place to encourage the modernisation of estates and commercial 
farms in Latin America. Among such measures were subsidised credit for the purchase of 
agricultural machinery and equipment, for the acquisition of fertilisers and improved seed 
varieties and for the delivery of technical assistance programmes (Kay, 2002). During the 
1960s, resources for credit made up a large part of externally funded agricultural programmes 
in Latin America. This assistance came from the Agency for International Development, the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group (Adams, 1971).  
One particular country from Latin America that has succeeded in transforming its agriculture, 
particularly for smallholder farmers, is Brazil. Market failures and chronic rural poverty in 
                                                 
26
 Only the CPI data were sourced from the World Bank Group website. 
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Brazil have prompted government intervention in domestic food markets to connect large 
predictable markets to smallholder production. One way of intervention took the form of 
structured demand. Structured demand connects large predictable markets such as provision 
of food to schools and hospitals to create a market for smallholder farmers. The idea stems 
from the fact that in many rural areas of the developing world, there is a narrow demand with 
limited marketing options and a lack of competition to purchase from smallholder farmers. 
These circumstances lead to uncertainty for the farmers as to what price they should receive 
in the market for their produce, unfairly low purchase prices from private traders and few 
outlets for new varieties of crops. The government thus intervened through the creation of the 
Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) and the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE). 
The most innovative mode by the PAA was the one that allowed for the purchase of 
immediate delivery of produce to food-insecure populations identified in nurseries, schools 
public hospitals and so forth. Payment is made after produce has been delivered. The PNAE, 
in contrast, provides meals prepared with the produce from smallholder farmers to schools in 
Brazil. In the end, the main objectives of these interventions was to make sure that there was 
no surplus production that lay around without a market (Veras Soares, Nehring, Schwengber, 
Rodrigues, Lambais, Balaban, Jones & Galante, 2013). The consequences were an increase in 
the market. Particularly the number of municipalities where schools received food from the 
PAA increased from 597 in 2009 to 815 in 2012. This is an in important initiative that the 
Namibian government could learn from, given the issue of excess produce and thus low 
output prices currently experienced in the market. 
There were, however, challenges with these initiatives such as timely and efficient payment 
of farmers after delivery of their produce. For this reason, the PAA introduced a debit card 
system to ensure that bank transfers were made as soon as produce had been delivered. In 
contrast to the PAA system in Brazil, the Namibian AMTA has two marketing systems, 
namely the wholesale system and the commission system. With the wholesale system, the 
producers are paid after delivering the produce and this payment is done via electronic 
transfer within seven days. With the commission system, the producers are supposed to be 
paid after the produce is sold and the agent’s and market’s commissions are deducted. 
However, in order to boost producers’ trust in the market, AMTA has made a decision to pay 
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all producers within seven days regardless of the marketing system used. The main reason for 
AMTA to pay within seven days (usually done within 3–5 working day) is to minimise 
transaction costs. If AMTA is to pay every producer as he or she delivers, the cost will be 
high and will have to be transferred to the price of the final selling product. Since AMTA is 
effectively using a wholesale system, price determination of farmers’ produce is done taking 
into account the local supply of produce in the local market as well as the imported produce. 
The price is negotiated with the producers (and not imposed). The challenge, however, is a 
defined margin of mark-up with wholesaling. As a result, AMTA end up having to set a fixed 
price for the week that may not be responsive to price changes or demand/supply in the 
market since AMTA is only allowed to mark up 12% on cost price. The upside is that the 
producers are guaranteed payment for everything that they deliver (Enkono, 2016).  
Other ways in which Banco de Brasil, a bank in Brazil, promoted agricultural production in 
Brazil and increased access to finance were through the provision of unsubsidised loans at 
market interest rates against a note issued by the farmers. This note works in such a way that 
it commits farmers to delivering a specified amount of product or an equivalent payment on a 
future date to a buyer. With this method of financing, farmers are more likely to invest, 
improve their technology or seek out new buyers to deliver their products to. This in turn 
allows farmers to make a leap forward in productivity by adopting upgrades. If farmers have 
a standing source of technical assistance, they become more attractive to buyers, in turn 
improving their income and ultimately increasing their access to financing (Chalmers, 
Wenner, Tiffen & Galvez, 2006). This has not only allowed many smallholder farmers to 
gain access to credit without collateral (promoting borrowing among farmers) but has also 
increased agricultural production (Alcantara, Enrique, Enrique, Corrales & Leonela, 2006). 
 This differs greatly from the Namibian context where limited smallholder farmers who have 
access to credit are mostly employed in government Green Scheme projects and provided 
with subsidised loans through Agribank. Smallholder farmers outside Green Scheme projects 
quite simply do not have access to credit because they do not have collateral to offer. The 
problem is that it is a challenge to Agribank to offer loans without collateral. When asked 
about what Agribank could still do to support smallholder farmers in Namibia, in other words 
areas for improvement, managers at Agribank offered the following:  
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For us is to design a system or to come up with a strategy on how to finance small-
scale farmers who do not have collateral and to base our lending on the cash flow. 
(P18, 99:99) 
Working capital loans in Brazil and other Latin American countries are the predominant type 
of credit disbursed in Latin America with flexible payment terms matched to agricultural 
production cycles (a personal guarantor) (IFC, 2014) as compared to Agribank where 
repayment of loans is based on the number of years predetermined by the bank, depending on 
the type of loan that the farmer takes out (Agribank, s.a.). If, for example, a farmer takes out a 
production/horticultural loan at Agribank, this loan needs to be repaid within one year; 
however, if the farmer does not have good harvests, repaying these loans becomes a problem. 
The number of years that one is given to pay back a loan most of the time does not match 
production cycles. For example, a production loan needs to be paid back within a year. 
However, if there is not a good harvest that particular year, repayment of the loan can be 
affected.  
It is important to provide specialised training to credit officers managing agricultural loans, 
regardless of the individual’s professional background (IFC, 2014), in order to allow success 
of interventions set up by government. Lending expertise in Namibia is quite a challenge (see 
Amadhila & Ikhide, 2016). As much as staff at Agribank pointed out that they received 
training through the Southern African Development Community at the DFI forums, perhaps 
the content of what is included in the training should be re-examined in terms of including 
specific topics such as lending to agriculture. The staff interviewed acknowledged that this 
training did not necessarily focus on agricultural finance but rather focused on financing 
development industries in general.  
8.7.3 Indonesia 
South-East Asian countries have much in common with Africa in terms of rich natural 
resources of productive farmland, forests and minerals and weaker human capital. Moreover, 
these countries have had to cope with periods of political instability and therefore South-East 
Asia provides a much more relevant model for comparison to Namibia than East Asia. The 
large East Asian countries such as Korea and Japan are less relevant because their large 
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economies and well-educated workforce hardly describe the characteristics of Africa 
(Boestel, Francks & Kim, 2013).  
A specific country in South-East Asia that could be compared to Africa is Indonesia. Just like 
many countries in Africa, more than half the population of Indonesia is still defined as rural 
and a large proportion of rural people depend on farming for a living.  
Along with overcoming land and water resources problems, the government of Indonesia 
invested heavily in irrigation and actions were taken such as increasing the quality of 
intensification, increasing cropping intensity, expanding planting area to cater for an increase 
in population, improving agriculture infrastructure and facilities (including improvement of 
irrigation networks) and improving food diversification. Eventually, in 2000 and 2001 there 
was sufficient rice with a surplus of more than two million ton. Depending on the source of 
water and the provision of irrigation facilities, land in Indonesia is classified as technical 
irrigation areas (3.4 million ha or 31%), semitechnical irrigation areas (1.12 million ha or 
10%), simple irrigation areas (0.77 million ha or 7%), village irrigation areas (2.29 million ha 
or 21%), inland and tidal swamp areas (1.677 million ha or 15%) and rainfed areas (1.77 
million ha or 16%) (Suprapto, 2002).  
During the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997, the agricultural sector in Indonesia was heavily 
hit and as a result, the head count poverty rate rose from 17.6% to 23.4%. However, the 
Indonesian government has used a wide variety of policy instruments to achieve food 
sufficiency and price stability. Policy efforts in Indonesia have included fertiliser subsidies 
and agricultural credit subsidies. Although fertiliser subsidies fell in the early 1990s and had 
been entirely eliminated by 2000, they were reinstituted in 2009 and had risen to Rp16 trillion 
from Rp357 billion, representing 30% of the entire agriculture budget in that year. 
Furthermore, government-financed purchases (price support) of rice afforded rice producers 
prices above what would have prevailed in the marketplace. A guaranteed price for rice 
producers in Indonesia stimulates farmers’ output as it leads to a protected agricultural sector 
and securing of farmers’ incomes. Furthermore, it provides a stronger domestic market for 
food security. Price incentives are a key stimulus for farmers to take risks and invest in high 
crop production outputs (Timmer, 1993). Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck (2001) reason 
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that price support reduces price uncertainty as compared with sometimes volatile markets. 
Furthermore, an important benefit of better price security is that farmers can better estimate 
their revenues for a given period (Verhaegen & Van Huylenbroeck, 2001).  
In order to increase limited quantities of subsidised credit to farmers, policy efforts in the 
farm credit introduced the improved provision of formal sector credit through BRI and this 
has proven successful as it now accounts for a larger share of credit to the agricultural sector 
(Cervantes-Godoy & Dewbre, 2010). This move away from credit subsidy to market-
determined credit allocation continued to focus on income expansion and poverty reduction, 
just like the credit subsidy approach. However, the difference between the two is that the 
formal market allocation approach makes the case for cost-effective alternatives, such as 
increased investment in rural infrastructure or in human development, unlike the credit 
subsidy allocation, which has failed in many countries as it pursued short-term objectives 
framed in terms of agricultural production gains rather than long-term objectives aimed at the 
sustained expansion of rural incomes (Yaron et al., 1998). For example, in order to promote 
timely repayment of loans disbursed, BRI offered a monthly interest rebate on the original 
loan value. Staff incentives for better performance on extending and collecting loans were 
also offered (Yaron, 1994). The staff incentives for loan officers work in such a way that 
incentives are linked to the performance of the loan portfolio, so clients are monitored more 
closely than is usual. This move has not only allowed investment in human capital and 
rewards (monetary incentives and promotions) that are related to sound financial performance 
and sustainability of the institution but has also created innovative and flexible loan terms and 
conditions adapted to social, economic and cultural circumstances, such as monthly 
repayment schedules tailored to the clients’ cash flow (see Yaron et al., 1998).  
There is evidence that loan recovery is a problem in Namibia as it leads to Agribank’s 
reluctance to lend (see results section in Chapter 7 of this dissertation). However, Indonesia’s 
BRI has provided a good example to show that rural finance can be profitable when it does 
not rely on subsidies as long as the government intervention is directed towards improving 
the legal and regulatory framework, adopting appropriate governance arrangements and 
having management principles and operating procedure for interventions that reflect a new 
and more promising approach to rural finance (Yaron et al., 1998).  
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8.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to review the specific government financial efforts to support 
farmers in Namibia while at the same time drawing lessons from Brazil and Indonesia. The 
efforts to finance agriculture in Namibia both in terms of real sector interventions and 
agricultural finance are laudable. However, there is still room for improvement, especially 
when it comes to the issues of pricing and the training of agricultural lenders.  There is also a 
need to adopt innovative lending techniques that are suitable to agricultural finance, which 
will benefit financial institutions and farmers. These are some of the lessons to learn from 
other developing countries such as Brazil and Indonesia who have advanced agricultural 
sector productivity.  
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Chapter 9  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
9.1 SUMMARY  
This research comprised a collection of essays that examined the issue of access to finance 
for agricultural SMEs in Namibia. In the first essay, the researcher sought to identify and 
explain the constraints to financing agriculture for agricultural SMEs among crop production 
farmers and Agribank. In the second essay, the researcher went on to identify the financing 
options for agricultural SMEs and to give reasons for the unfulfilled loan demand among 
agricultural SMEs. In the third essay, the magnitude of the agricultural SME finance gap and 
the causes of the gap were determined. The final essay compared government efforts to 
financing agriculture in Namibia to Brazil and Indonesia in order to draw some lessons.  
The research used primary data, adopting a qualitative methodology using semi-structured 
interviews. In addition, secondary information from selected financial institutions and 
relevant organisations’ websites, reports, booklets and newspaper articles was consulted to 
support the analysis. This method provided an in-depth understanding of small- and medium-
scale enterprises’ access to agricultural finance. For example, the study used illustrative 
quotes that highlighted key issues, which makes this study more exploratory than previous 
studies. 
Apart from providing valuable empirical knowledge needed not only for the growth and 
development of the sector but most importantly for improving agricultural finance and 
initiating a new dimension to the debate and controversies regarding access to information on 
agricultural financial services for independent farmers as compared to Green Scheme 
farmers, the study also contributes to the body of knowledge relating to SMEs in the 
agricultural sector by focusing on the financial aspect both from the supply and the demand 
side. Furthermore, previous studies that have focused on small-scale farmers have subjected 
farmers’ access to finance to rural credit markets, in other words informal moneylenders, 
using secondary information with a quantitative approach to collect and analyse the data 
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(Aleem, 1990; Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Obeng, 2008). This study focused on formal financial 
institutions such as development financial institutions and banks using primary data with a 
qualitative approach in order to get to the grassroots and gain an in-depth understanding.  
The results of the study can be summarised as follows: 
Constraints to financing agriculture arise as a result of market imperfections. These are lack 
of timely response to farmers, lack of access to markets and lack of access to land that can be 
used as collateral, among others. This study shows that these market imperfections are more 
systemic than acknowledged in mainstream economics. The findings suggest that instead of 
just promoting smallholder agriculture, fixing market imperfections first may be the best 
solution.  
 
With regard to financing options for agricultural SMEs, the financing of agriculture is a 
major bottleneck in expanding agricultural production. There is a limited provision of 
financial institutions in support of agriculture. The findings prove that on the supply side, 
although financial institutions exist, very few are interested in financing agriculture, which by 
implication means that there is a lack of financial resources for agricultural production on the 
demand side. On the demand side, many farmers are not aware of the financing options 
available for agriculture.  
 
There is confirmation that demand outstrips supply (for three consecutive years). Farmers 
default on their loans and provide insufficient information to lenders, which limit Agribank’s 
supply of loans. Furthermore, the lack of financial institution in the country also causes a 
financial gap. Farmers outside the Green Scheme projects do not engage in borrowing 
because they are not aware of financial services in the country, pointing to poor marketing 
structures by Agribank and imperfections in the financial market.  
 
The study made a comparison of the government of Namibia’s efforts towards agricultural 
finance for agricultural SMEs to efforts in Latin America and South-East Asia. The 
government of Namibia has intervened in the credit market both through agricultural finance 
and real sector interventions. However, there is still room for improvement, especially when 
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it comes to the issue of payment of appropriate prices to farmers and acquisition of skills by 
agricultural lenders. 
9.2. CONCLUSIONS 
The financing constraints identified in Chapter 5 have confirmed that many of the constraints 
presented in the results section occur as a result of other constraints.  The researcher argues 
that finance is a binding constraint. The top five issues identified on the demand-side are a 
lack of collateral, bank rules and regulations, insufficient capital, poor understanding among 
loan officers and Bank paperwork and bureaucracy paperwork and bureaucracy.  On the 
supply-side, the issue of lack of collateral makes up the major constraint among the 
interviews conducted at Agribank. Finance is a binding constraint. The paper supports 
previous literature that fixing market imperfections may be the best solution.  
 
In Chapter 6, the study investigated the financing options for agricultural SMEs from both the 
demand and the supply-perspectives and the reasons for not financing agriculture. The 
findings of this paper confirm and expand on previous studies that financial resources are 
lacking for agricultural small and medium-scale farmers, particularly those in communal 
areas. One possible reason why farmers are unaware of any financing options is attributed to 
the fact that there are few financial institutions in the country and information on them is not 
available. 
 
Chapter 7 confirms that demand outstrips supply.  The mismatch between demand and supply 
is caused by loan default and insufficient information provided by farmers on the supply-side. 
On the demand-side, the inability of farmers to meet financing requirements and low supply 
of funds causes a gap. While there are farmers outside the green-schemes who do not borrow 
as they are not well informed about financial services, the researcher argues that there is no 
gap in this regard but rather a lack of information on the availability of financial services in 
the country. 
 
Finally in Chapter 8, the study reviewed countries (Brazil and Indonesia) that have achieved 
high agricultural output through reliance on government sponsored financial institutions to 
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finance agriculture like in Namibia. There is a lesson for adopting innovative lending 
techniques that are suitable to agricultural finance which will benefit financial institutions and 
farmers. Namibia lacks agricultural financing expertise, and there is poor access to markets 
for farmers to improve their farming practices. There is a need to learn from the examples 
from the Brazilian and Indonesian governments who have adopted innovative lending 
techniques suitable to agricultural activities in order to promote agricultural activities in these 
countries. 
 
In the findings of the all four empirical essays, there is clear evidence that there is indeed a 
market failure in the loan market and that there is a need for government intervention and 
collaboration by both the public and the private sector. Fixing market imperfections such as 
adopting innovative lending techniques to suit all types of farmers may be the best solution in 
promoting access to finance and increasing food production. 
9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation recommends some interventions necessary for the improvement of 
agricultural finance. Interventions should be directed at reducing the bottlenecks that prevent 
a number of SMEs, particularly in the agricultural sector, from accessing finance. Addressing 
the bottlenecks may incentivise financial institutions to enter this largely untapped segment 
(agricultural SMEs) of the agricultural industry. Of specific concern are the following points:  
1. Interventions should holistically address both the demand- and supply-side 
constraints.  
2. Priority areas should include market inefficiencies such as bureaucracy and enforcing 
contracts. 
3. Financial institutions should invest more in training of staff to understand the unique 
nature of agricultural lending practices.  
4. Examples from other countries such as Bangladesh, Australia, Indonesia, Kenya 
Uganda and Brazil should be studied on how they have mitigated their risks in 
financing agriculture and promoting access to markets.  
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5. Products that would address constraints brought about by a lack of collateral should 
be developed in order to ensure affordability. 
6. Departments for lending to small-scale farmers that would target constraints, 
particularly for farmers in communal areas, should be created.  
7. Agricultural research and development should be heavily invested in to make sure that 
the country’s institutions and infrastructure are conducive to the success of farmers.  
8. Guaranteed minimum prices should be fixed by government at the farm-gate markets 
to ensure that farmers’ losses resulting from unforeseen events such as the incessant 
drought in Namibia do not interfere with the welfare of farmers. This will boost the 
ability of farmers to repay loans and enhance lending by financial institutions. The 
example of pricing in Indonesia is a good lesson regarding this issue.  
The key issue is to ensure access to finance to as many individuals as possible and to allow 
Namibia to move up the ranks again in terms of individuals with access to credit, given the 
latest information that the Doing Business 2015 report section on ‘Getting Credit’ ranked 
Namibia 61
st
 out of 189 economies, down from 55
th
 in 2014 (Phiri & Ojiri, 2015).  
Sometimes credit interventions in agriculture do not take into account other factors, for 
example the availability of water, and this is a mistake because agriculture is one activity that 
depends heavily on the availability of water and having access to funds without having access 
to water is as good as having nothing. The scarcity of water will lead to crop failures, poor 
profits and perhaps to loan default. For an arid country such as Namibia, there is a need to 
learn from examples from countries such as Indonesia. As discussed earlier, along with 
overcoming land and water resources problems, the government in Indonesia invested heavily 
in irrigation and actions were taken such as increasing the quality of intensification, 
increasing cropping intensity, expanding planting area to cater for an increase in population, 
improving agriculture infrastructure and facilities (including improvement of irrigation 
networks) and improving food diversification. The result was a great success in agricultural 
production.  
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Finally, the provision of information to farmers on the financial services available to them 
will assist in reducing the finance gap. Information could be provided by using reliable social 
networks in the rural areas, through formal meetings in rural areas or through the media.  
9.4  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The phenomenon of agricultural credit requires innovative thinking in practice. This would 
require further research in the mode of delivery of agricultural credit aimed at resolving 
market imperfections. For this reason, further research could be conducted to focus on how to 
link the support provided to farmers towards social perfection. The role of government 
supported Development Finance Institutions utilising market based approaches but 
emphasising the social capital in the communities to reach SMEs in the agricultural sector 
needs to be further explored using appropriate research methodologies.  
Furthermore, such research could identify the current training programs offered to credit 
officers in development finance institutions operating in the agricultural sector. The 
overarching goal is on how to build sustainable financial institutions in this all important 
sector of the Namibian economy. 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview guide for Agribank and other relevant stakeholders
27
 
Introduction 
The results of this interview will provide the basis for a PhD dissertation in which the 
financing of agricultural small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is investigated.  
Extant research in developing countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, India and Malawi has tended 
to focus on SMEs in general. Namibia has had few studies done on this topic that focus not 
only on SMEs in general but also on the demand side or supply side separately. This study 
will thus contribute to the body of knowledge relating to SMEs in the agricultural sector by 
focusing on the financial aspect both from the supply and the demand side. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, a study of this nature will be the first one carried out in Namibia. 
Rest assured that the responses will be treated in strict confidence in that measures will be put 
in place to protect identities by assigning pseudonym codes and never reporting any identifier 
details. Furthermore, data will be kept in a safe locker in the postgraduate laboratory that only 
the researcher has access to.  
To verify the authenticity of this research project, please contact Prof Sylvanus Ikhide, 
Development Finance, University of Stellenbosch Business School, at +27 (0)21 918 4485. 
Personal experience level 
1. Name of financial institution. 
2. What position do you hold in the department? 
 
                                                 
27
 Modified from Samuel, Ernest and Awuah (2012) and Amiss (2012), and further questions were added as 
arising from the related literature. 
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Financing constraints, options and existing support mechanisms (Agribank and other 
relevant stakeholders) 
1. What kind of borrowers to do you deal with? (Small-, medium- or large-scale 
enterprises.) 
2. Which of the categories of borrowers above do you prefer and why? 
3. Do you fund primary agricultural SMEs? If not, why? (Please elaborate.) 
4. What do you think about the quality of applications that you receive and why?  
5.  What other support/services do you offer to primary agricultural SMEs apart from 
 providing funds?  
The following questions are only applicable if your institution is involved in financing or 
providing any support to agricultural SMEs 
6.  What are the lending criteria used in terms of providing financial access or any 
 support to primary agricultural SMEs? 
7.  What are the problems that you can identify when agricultural SMEs apply for 
 financing or any other assistance? 
8.  What support do you provide to assist SMEs in overcoming the problems experienced 
 when applying for finance?  
Finance gap (Agribank only) 
9. Have you received any training in dealing with agricultural SMEs when you started 
working in the department? 
10. How has the loan recovery performance been in the past few years since you started 
 giving out loans, and how has this affected the bank? 
11. What (in your opinion) are the causes of poor loan recovery performance?  
12. What factors do you use in determining your interest rate? 
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13.  Do you sometimes fail to grant loans and why? 
14. Do you ask for security to grant loans? 
15. What type of security is usually preferred? 
16. Do you think that your institution is effectively catering for the needs of SMEs in 
 Namibia in terms of finance that SMEs need and finance that is available? (Please 
provide any evidence of requested funding and provided funding.) 
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APPENDIX B
28
 
Interview questions for SME clients 
The results of this interview will provide the basis for a PhD dissertation in which the 
financing of agricultural small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is investigated.  
Extant research in developing countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, India and Malawi has tended 
to focus on SMEs in general. Namibia has had few studies done on this topic that focus not 
only on SMEs in general but also on the demand side or supply side separately. This study 
will thus contribute to the body of knowledge relating to SMEs in the agricultural sector by 
focusing on the financial aspect both from the supply and the demand side. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, a study of this nature will be the first one carried out in Namibia. 
Rest assured that the responses will be treated in strict confidence in that measures will be put 
in place to protect identities by assigning pseudonym codes and never reporting any identifier 
details. Furthermore, data will be kept in a safe locker in the postgraduate laboratory that only 
the researcher has access to.  
To verify the authenticity of this research project, please contact Prof Sylvanus Ikhide, 
Development Finance, University of Stellenbosch Business School, at +27 (0)21 918 4485. 
Section A – Personal details 
1. Name of business. 
2. What position do you hold in the business? 
3. Do you own a small- or medium-scale farm? 
4. How long have you been in business? 
5. How many people have you employed or do you plan to employ and why? 
                                                 
28
 Interview guide adapted from Samuel, Ernest and Awuah (2012), and further questions were added as arising 
from the related literature. 
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Section B – Finance 
6. What was the start-up cost of the business? 
7. What was the main source of funds for starting the business? 
8. Have you ever applied for a loan from an institution? (If yes, where?) 
9. If you have never applied for a loan from an institution, please explain why.  
(If you answered ‘no’ to Question 8 and gave a reason in Question 9, please proceed to 
questions 15 to 17 and that is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you very much for your 
time. If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 8, please proceed to Question 10.) 
10.  What were the requirements from your financial provider to gain access to  
 finance, and what are your thoughts on these requirements? 
11. What do you think are the biggest challenges to accessing finance for agricultural 
 SMEs in Namibia? 
12. Was the loan that you applied for approved the first time?  
13. What was the amount of the loan that you applied for?  
14. If you applied and did NOT receive the loan, what was the reason behind your failure 
 to obtain the loan?  
Section C – Financial institutions 
15. Are you aware of Agribank? 
16. What are the services that you expect from financial institutions such as Agribank?  
17. Whom have you approached for advice about access to finance in the past?  
18. What other finance options are you aware off apart from loans? 
19. What are the problems that you experienced when you applied for the loan? 
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20. Kindly indicate the reason for your decision to apply for financial assistance at the 
 institution where you applied.  
21. Do you think that the staff at the financial institution where you applied are 
 knowledgeable enough and understand your business? If not, please elaborate. 
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APPENDIX C 
Desk review list of examples 
Access to finance for smallholder farmers – Learning from the experiences of microfinance 
institutions in Latin America 
Practical lessons for Africa from East Asia in industrial and trade policies 
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APPENDIX D 
Code book families 
Code families Definition Example of a 
code 
Example of a quotation 
Demand-side 
constraints 
Refers to difficulties 
experienced by 
borrowers, i.e. SME 
farmers, in accessing 
finance from 
financial institutions.  
Demand-side 
constraint_lack of 
collateral 
I have a desire to get 
money from a bank but the 
biggest challenge is 
security to secure for the 
loan. (P8, 84:84) 
Supply-side constraints Refers to difficulties 
experienced by 
lenders, i.e. 
Agribank, in 
providing finance to 
borrowers (SME 
farmers). 
Supply-side 
constraint_no 
collateral to offer 
As people don’t have 
collateral which is part of 
the requirements that we 
need that becomes a bit 
difficult for us to grant 
loans. (P17, 82:82) 
Financing options Refers to formal 
financial institutions 
providing both 
monetary options, 
e.g. loans, and non-
monetary options, 
e.g. land, to SME 
farmers for the 
purpose of financial 
support. 
Financing 
options_loan 
guarantee by the 
government 
Now what happens is the 
government has entered 
into an agreement with 
Agribank and at the same 
time this agreement is 
between government and 
the small-scale farmers 
now what is happening is 
the small-scale farmer 
borrows money from 
Agribank but the 
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government is providing 
guarantee to that in case 
that should this small-scale 
farmer pass away or should 
they not be able to pay 
back then government will 
step in but only if the cause 
is justifiable example 
natural causes such as 
drought, fire. (P22, 28:28) 
Reasons for not 
financing agriculture 
Refers to all the 
motives of financial 
institutions not to 
provide financial 
support to SME 
farmers. 
Reason for not 
financing_lack of 
expertise 
We don’t really have 
people that is specialised in 
that industry so we want 
some people who are 
specialised in financing 
agriculture. (P19, 91:91) 
 
Government support 
mechanisms 
Refers to all the 
financial support 
made available to 
SME farmers by 
government. 
Agribank support 
mechanism_loans 
If you are a farmer and you 
need a loan you have to 
come to Agribank and 
Agribank will approve your 
facility then will issue you 
with a voucher, this 
voucher you will use it to 
go and procure services 
from different service 
suppliers and we will pay 
directly to the suppliers. 
Once you have procured 
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the service from the 
supplier he will issue with 
a receipt and he will send 
his claim directly to the 
bank provided that the 
client who is a small-scale 
farmers has confirmed and 
signed on that invoice that 
indeed he or she has 
received that services and 
he gives that authorisation 
for us to pay that supplier. 
(P18, 43:43) 
SME finance gap 
issues 
Refers to causes of 
the agricultural SME 
finance gap. 
Cause of SME 
finance gap_loan 
default 
I think demand is more 
than supply. The money is 
available but if one does 
not have the requirements 
that the banks are looking 
for it becomes a problem to 
get access to funds. (P35, 
57:57) 
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